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I 
 
Executive Summary 
 
The purpose of this thesis is to analyse the effect of state ownership on abnormal return and 
systematic risk in Norwegian state-owned firms on the Oslo Stock Exchange in the period 1999-
2015. This master thesis provides important insights for both retail and institutional investors 
by analysing the effect of state ownership from an investor perspective. Inspired by the current 
political debate and earlier studies on the effect of privatization we seek to answer the following 
research question: “How does Norwegian state ownership affect abnormal return and 
systematic risk in Norwegian publicly listed firms” 
Using an OLS specification we find that state ownership is not significantly correlated with 
abnormal return. Furthermore, the OLS specification documents that state-owned firms are on 
average more exposed to systematic risk than private. The results demonstrate that state 
ownership has a neutral effect on abnormal return, and increases the systematic risk compared 
to private ownership. 
The Event Model reveals that the immediate market reaction after a state divestment is negative. 
The results are robust and the exogeneity of the divestments are validated using the Synthetic 
Control Group Method. The results indicate the market perceives the Norwegian Government 
to contribute with abnormal return in Statoil and Telenor. However, we do not have empirical 
support to conclude on a general basis that state ownership affects all firm positively.  
Further, the Event Model documents an increase in the systematic risk of the firm after a state 
divestment. The results from the General OLS Model and the Event Model suggest that state 
ownership leads to higher systematic risk compared to private firms and that privatization in 
Statoil and Telenor leads to higher systematic risk. One explanation could be that passive 
ownership increases the riskiness of the firm’s investment and at the same time government 
funds protect the firm against downside risk. As a result, the systematic risk of the firm is lower 
than the weighted average of its investments. 
The results contradict earlier studies which find that state ownership reduces efficiency and 
profitability. However, our results could be consistent with previous evidence as long as the 
Norwegian Government contributes with shareholder value which offsets the negative aspects. 
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1 Introduction 
 
Privatization has become an important economic and political mean to increase the efficiency 
of state-owned firms. The use of financial markets to allocate resources from Governments to 
private investors first initiated by the Thatcher government in United Kingdom in the early 
1980s, now appears to be a legitimate argument for increasing profitability in state-owned firms 
(Megginson & Netter, 2001). However, the effect of partial privatization is widely argued since 
privatization programs often begin with the sale of non-controlling equity where control rights 
remain at the governments’ hands. Thus, investigating the impact of partial privatization is of 
practical importance for investors and governments. Partial privatization is also of theoretical 
interest due to the insight it offers to the longstanding debate over why state-owned firms1 
perform poorly (Gupta, 2005). With a new coalition government in Norway favouring 
privatization, the question of privatization is yet again open for debate. 
Numerous privatization schemes in the 80’s and the 90’s have generated a large amount of 
empirical literature regarding the effects of privatization on company performance. However, 
the majority of the empirical literature focuses on full privatization transactions in transitional 
economies where the majority stakes or all assets are transferred to private investors. Earlier 
studies find evidence that privatization leads to performance and efficiency gains. In contrast 
to the vast literature on full privatization, the number of studies on partial privatization 
programs is limited. Boardman and Vining (1989) were among the first researchers to study 
partial privatization programs. They found evidence that partial and fully state-owned firms 
perform worse than private companies, indicating that full privatization is necessary for 
achieving performance improvements. Prior to 2005 there existed little empirical evidence of 
positive efficiency effects from partial privatization (Gupta, 2005). In contrast to Boardman and 
Vining (1989), Gupta (2005) finds evidence of higher efficiency and profitability even with 
partial privatization when studying India’s state-owned firms.  
The objective of this thesis is to quantify the effects of state ownership from an investor’s 
perspective focusing on abnormal return and systematic risk. In addition, we want to test the 
direction of the causality between excess stock return and the divestment decision. Previous 
literature does not test the direction of causality, but addresses the problem using instrument 
variables or other model specifications. This thesis seeks to fill the gap in the existing literature 
                                                 
1 State-owned firms are in our analysis referred to as partially state-owned firms. 
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concerning the effect of partial privatization in a modern market economy from an investor’s 
perspective. This master thesis aims to answer the following research question: 
“How does Norwegian state ownership affect abnormal return and systematic risk in 
Norwegian publicly listed firms” 
By answering the research question, we will be able to provide better knowledge to institutional 
and retail investors and to introduce quantitative arguments to the political debate of why 
privatization matters. In order to answer the research question empirically we have formulated 
three null hypotheses. 
Following previous researchers, we believe that state ownership has a negative impact on the 
firm’s performance and efficiency through non-profit goals. Hence, the following hypothesis is 
tested in this thesis: 
Hypothesis 1: The correlation between abnormal return and state ownership is negative  
Moreover, because the Government most likely prevents important national firms to face 
bankruptcy, we believe that the Norwegian Government reduces the downside risk and hence, 
the market risk of the firm. Thus, we formulate the hypothesis: 
Hypothesis 2: Private firms are more prone to systematic risk than state-owned firms 
We believe that a reduction in state ownership leads to a positive market reaction because of a 
reduction in political influence. Moreover, we believe that the market beta will increase due to 
the reduction in state ownership leading to less protection against downside risk. Hence, the 
following hypothesis will be tested: 
Hypothesis 3: A reduction in state ownership leads to a positive market reaction and 
increases the systematic risk of the firm 
Hypothesis 3 tests the market reaction to a divestment. Moreover, testing and analysing the 
results both empirically and with the use of economic theory enable us to answer the research 
question listed above. 
The thesis is organized as follows. Section 2 briefly describes the main characteristics and 
history of the Norwegian privatization program in the late 90’s until today. Section 3 gives a 
brief summary of relevant previous literature and theoretical arguments. Section 4 presents 
theory relevant for the methodology. The dataset is presented in Section 5 and in Section 6 the 
methodologies and the results of the models are presented in sequential order. The economic 
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analysis of the main results are presented in Section 7. As an additional analysis, the individual 
relationship between the state-owned firms and abnormal return is analysed in Section 8. 
Finally, we conclude on the basis of the economic and empirical analysis in Section 9.  
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2  History and the Privatization Process 
 
 Historical Review of the Norwegian Privatization Scheme 
 
In the early 1990s new principles of public administration were introduced in Norway to 
enhance the performance of state-owned enterprises. The private market was used as the 
benchmark model and the Government assumed that a private market design of the public sector 
would make it more efficient and qualitatively better. The first step towards a more market-
driven economy was the corporatization2 and privatization of public firms during the 1990s and 
early 2000s. Although socialization was never an important political goal in Norway, the 
Norwegian Government had developed a significant public ownership over the years. 
(Sejersted, 2015) 
The Norwegian state ownership model, referred to as the “Hydro Model”, is based on passive 
ownership and the arm length principle, which provides companies commercial freedom and 
reduced government interference. The Government's principles of good ownership does not 
allow discriminations between state and private owners. Thus, the Government cannot use 
political power in decision making. However, in most of the privatization transactions the 
Norwegian Government retained the control rights in the firm. As a controlling shareholder, the 
Government can ensure majority consensus in important business decisions such as long term 
investments and headquarter locations. Historically, this topic has been a critical argument in 
favour of state ownership. 
In the early 2000s many state monopolies were deregulated, especially in the public service 
sectors. The state-owned firms, which were not privatized went through a corporatization 
process to enhance their competitiveness in the newly deregulated markets. As a part of the 
corporatization scheme, the Civil Aviation Administration (Luftfartsverket) and parts of the 
Norwegian Coastal Administration (Kystverket), National Rail Administration 
(Jernbaneverket) and the Norwegian Public Roads Administration (Statens Vegvesen) 
converted into separate joint stock companies. (Sejersted, 2015) 
 
                                                 
2 In this thesis, corporatization is defined as the process of implementing and transforming a state-owned firm to look like and 
behave as a private without selling to private investors. The difference between privatization and corporatization is that shares 
of the privatized firm are sold by listing the firm on a stock exchange, whereas corporatized firms are still 100% state-owned. 
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Telecom was the first sector to be privatized. In December 2000, Telenor was listed on Oslo 
Stock Exchange and a large part of the shares were sold to private investors. Six months later, 
the privatization wave continued with the PIPO3 of Statoil in June 2001. Until 2005, further 
divestments in the listed state-owned firms; DNB, Statoil and Telenor continued. The 
divestments in Statoil and Telenor were completed through secret block sales to institutional 
investors, followed by a sale to retail investors approximately a week later. In addition, in 
October 2005, the giant salmon farming company, Cermaq, went public. This was the end of 
the privatization scheme, and after the Stoltenberg II coalition government ended in 2005, the 
privatization wave died out with some exceptions. 
In 2013, a new privatization wave started with a new government in Norway. In October 2014 
Entra, one of Norway’s leading real estate companies, went public on Oslo Stock Exchange. 
The new Government also planned a PIPO of Mesta, one of Norway's biggest contractors in 
construction, operation and maintenance of roads. In addition, the Government now wants to 
divest in multiple state-owned companies such as Telenor, Kongsberg, Flytoget, Statsskog and 
Hydro. However, due to political disagreement and civic engagement the plans have been put 
on hold. 
 
 The Financial and Political Process of Divestments 
 
The divestment transactions are often completed through a block sale, and later a small fraction 
sale to retail investors. However, there exists other relevant processes before the actual 
divestment takes place. The formal political and financial process associated with the reduction 
of state ownership consists of three parts. First, the proposal has to be submitted to the 
Government by the responsible ministry. Which ministry, depends on the firms operational 
industry. Second, after the Government has considered and agreed on the proposal, a bill will 
be promoted to the Parliament. Third, once the Parliament has considered the proposal and 
agreed, the transaction can be carried out. If the responsible ministry already has authorization 
to carry out the transaction, it is usually sufficient to inform the Parliament after the transaction 
is completed. The Government normally engages investment banks to carry out the transaction. 
Legal and financial consultants are also engaged in this process. The financial process secures 
                                                 
3 PIPO: Privatization Initial Private Offering 
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that the shares trade at fair value. At the execution date the financial market gets information 
about the size, buyer and further plans for the sale to retail investors. 
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3 Why Privatization Matters 
 
 Theoretical Arguments 
 
The analysis focus on theoretical arguments concerning stock return. Previous literature on 
privatization have often focused on the social welfare aspect of state ownership, considering 
everything from working condition to market failure. We do not regard these effects from 
privatization as unimportant, but they are outside the scope of our analysis. An additional 
difference compared to previous work is that this thesis concentrate on analysing partially state-
owned firms. The firms in our sample have characteristics from both fully state-owned and 
private firms, as a consequence, not all previous arguments4 regarding full privatization are 
relevant for the analysis. While there is little theoretical framework on mixed ownership, the 
analysis utilize previous arguments from Agency Theory and the impact of soft budget 
constraints, to explain the effect of state ownership.  
 
 The Political View 
In perspective of Agency Theory, a decrease in state ownership can result in shareholder value 
maximization. The “Political View” postulates that governments promote political and social 
goals that might be in conflict with shareholder value maximization (Shleifer, 1994). From an 
Agency Theory perspective managers are agents under the control of the principals. The 
Government has the power to incorporate conflicting goals in the contract with the managers if 
they have the majority of the shares. Thus, a reduction in state ownership has the potential to 
eliminate conflicting goals and ensure a profit maximizing contract between the principals and 
agents which results in higher stock return. Shareholders might be governments, private 
institutional block holders or retail investors and will likely have different performance 
measures and expectations (Li, Xia, Long, & Tan, 2012). Hence, diverging goals make control 
rights over the firm a critical factor when principal-agent contracts are to be determined. 
In addition, political goals can change from one administration to the next. The failure to 
credibly commit to a set of goals or policies can reduce the efficiency of a firm’s operations 
                                                 
4 Numerous papers have used Property Rights theory to explain why fully state-owned firms might be less efficient than private. 
The theory is not relevant in this study because we are analysing publicly listed firms with dominant residual claim over its 
profits. 
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and governance (Megginson & Netter, 2001). Likewise, managers in traditional state-owned 
companies are less motivated to strive for efficiency and profit maximization since the company 
is part of an administrative-bureaucratic system of the government. The systems are more 
concerned with compliance rather than value creation (Li et al., 2012). This type of problem is 
most likely significantly reduced for state-owned firms listed on a stock exchange, however, Li 
et al. (2012) argue that further privatization increases the efficiency of the company. They claim 
that managers act under guidance from the government and will be influenced by the 
administrative-bureaucratic system as long as the government retains control rights. 
 
 The Managerial View 
On the other hand, the “Managerial View” explained in Laffont (1993) provides a new 
perspective on privatization. The "Managerial View" postulates that dilution of ownership in 
terms of further privatization may have an adverse impact on stock price (Gupta, 2005). 
Efficient diversification of owners seems to result in a clear separation between ownership and 
control (Fama, 1980). Managers might seek to maximize firm size, and not profits, and 
individual shareholders generally have no interest or resources to personally monitor managers 
(Fama, 1980). As a consequence, a well-diversified, low concentrated ownership can result in 
agency problems through corporate governance problems and information asymmetry. While 
small investors might not have the resources or time to influence the managers, a strong owner 
has incentives and power to induce control and discipline over managers. In contrast to the 
“Managerial View”, Nickell (1996) argues that ownership does not affect performance. He 
states that competition in general eliminates agency costs through an efficient allocation of 
resources which reduces managerial slack and stimulates higher effort from managers and 
employees. 
 
 Soft Budget Constraints 
Soft budget constraints in state-owned firms could lead to less competitive and effective 
companies. Frydman, Gray, Hessel and Rapaczynski (2000) and Majumdar (1998) are two of 
several studies arguing that soft budget constraints are a major source of inefficiency. They 
argue that the threat of takeover disciplines the managers who are not maximizing firm value. 
State-owned firms are not exposed to the same market discipline as private because 
governments are less likely to let big and important companies to face bankruptcy or to allow 
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takeovers. Private firms strives to be as efficient as possible to avoid financial distress and 
takeovers. On the other hand, state-owned companies could lack the motivation to be as 
efficient leading to less competitive and profitable companies (Kornai, Maskin, & Roland, 
2003). 
 
 Theoretical Conclusion 
To our knowledge, economic theory does not provide any clear guidance on the trade-off 
between the “Political View” and the “Managerial View”. Most of the earlier arguments 
presented in this Section are possible explanations of the change in efficiency and profitability 
due to private ownership, rather than the effect on abnormal return. Beyond profitability and 
efficiency gains, other advantages and disadvantages of state ownership regarding abnormal 
return makes a theoretical conclusion based on previous theoretical arguments inconclusive.  
 
 Previous Empirical Evidence on Privatization 
 
This Section presents the methodology and the results from some of the main studies on state 
ownership and privatization. There are two main groups of studies within the privatization 
literature, "State versus Private" and "Pre versus Post"-analysis (Frydman, Gray, Hessel, & 
Rapaczynski, 1999). The same categorization is used in our literature review in order to give a 
systematic review of previous literature. Moreover, specific attention are given to studies most 
relevant to the research question. The Section is organized as follows: The first part compares 
the performance of fully state-owned companies with either private or mixed-owned firms to 
address the effect of state ownership. The second part concentrates on the change in 
performance following a privatization, and utilize the change in ownership to do an event study 
on the effect of state ownership. 
 
  State versus Private Analysis 
The claim that privatization improves firm performance is often the reason behind the 
privatization programs seen to date. A substantial contribution to this claim stems from the 
"State versus Private" literature (Frydman et al., 1999). The first part start off with a 
conceptualization of relevant existing papers using this method. 
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Boardman and Vining (1989) point out numerous theoretical arguments for why private 
companies should be more efficient than state-owned. Most importantly, they argue that state 
ownership inhibits managers to bear the consequences of their decisions leading them to pursue 
personal goals, resulting in reduced profitability. However, empirical literature prior to 
Boardman and Vining (1989) provides little evidence of privatization effects on company 
efficiency and profitability. The authors provide several reasons for why earlier empirical 
results are biased. Among many, they point out that numerous authors only assess companies 
operating in a limited context e.g. natural monopolies or regulated duopolies. To avoid the 
methodology weaknesses of previous work, Boardman and Vining (1989) estimate a panel data 
model using 500 non-US companies operating in competitive markets. Using return on equity, 
return on assets, return on sales and net income as profitability measures, the author estimates 
the impact of ownership on performance. To control for the different ownership structures the 
authors include dummy variables for both state and mixed ownership making private companies 
the benchmark. In order to account for different accounting principles between countries the 
authors employ different country dummies. Their empirical results are consistent with their 
hypothesis, suggesting that mixed and state ownership perform worse than private companies. 
Hence, full privatization is necessary for achieving performance improvements (A. E. 
Boardman & Vining, 1989). 
Boardman and Vining’s paper (1989) is of relevance to this thesis because of their distinction 
between private and mixed ownership. Their effort to estimate the average impact of 
privatization makes their methodology comparable to our first hypothesis. Furthermore, they 
provide useful insight into the theoretical arguments of why private companies should 
outperform state-owned. In particular they focus on the political influence5 in the state-owned 
firms. 
In addition to Boardman and Vining (1989), researchers such as Dewenter and Malatesta 
(2001), and Frydman, Gray, Hessel and Rapaczynski (1999) use the “Political View” and argue 
that state-owned companies underperform relative to private companies due to the pursuit of 
other goals6 than profit maximization. As a consequence, they expect state-owned companies 
to be less efficient than private. In order to test this hypothesis, Dewenter and Malatesta (2001) 
employ a similar panel data model as Boardman and Vining (1989). However, they employ a 
larger cross-sectional sample over longer time periods and control for additional factors that 
                                                 
5 Referred to as the “Political View” in later studies 
6 E.g. social and political objectives. 
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might influence company performance. Dwenter and Melatesta (2001) find further empirical 
evidence that private companies outperform state-owned companies, even when they control 
for size, location, industry, and business-cycle effects. 
As opposed to Boardman and Vining (1989) and Dewenter and Malatesta (2001), Frydman et 
al. (1999) study full privatization. Their empirical strategy is to investigate privatization effects 
on revenue growth, employment, labour productivity and cost per output in a fixed effect 
regression to control for potential pre-privatization fixed differences. Using data from 90 fully 
state-owned and 128 privatized companies from transition economies in Central Europe, 
Frydman et al. (1999) investigate the general effect of full privatization. In contrast to previous 
studies, Frydman et al. (1999) differentiate between insider and outsider-owners7. In their 
analysis, they find that the effect of a change in ownership is significantly different depending 
on the type of owners to whom control rights are given. The authors find that post-privatization 
performance of companies controlled by inside owners is not significantly different from state-
owned companies. Whereas outsider-owned companies show superior post-privatization 
performance compared to fully state-owned and privatized companies controlled by insiders. 
Frydman et al. (1999) results are important because they provide a new insights to the existing 
literature and give explicit suggestions of how to design privatization programs in order to 
maximize the benefits. The study challenges the claim that privatization on average leads to 
higher profitability and emphasizes the need to specify to whom control rights are given 
(Frydman et al., 1999). 
 
 Pre- versus Post-Privatization Analysis  
The second group of studies examines companies privatized through public share offerings. 
While these studies employ different empirical techniques, the majority of the studies measures 
the performance effect of privatization by comparing the 3-year mean or median post-
privatization performance to their own 3-year mean or median pre-privatization performance 
(Boubakri & Cosset, 1998; D'Souza & Megginson, 1999; Megginson, Nash, & 
Vanrandenborgh, 1994). Megginson, Nash and van Randenborgh (1994) were the first 
researchers to employ the method, hence it is referred to as the MNR methodology (Megginson 
& Netter, 2001). The MNR methodology has several economic and econometric drawbacks. Of 
these, selection bias is of great concern. State-owned companies are most likely be biased 
towards the largest and most profitable companies. Furthermore, state-owned companies sold 
                                                 
7 Examples of insider-owners are employees and managers. Outsider-owners are owners external to the firm. 
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through share offerings might be among the healthiest state-owned companies because 
governments have a tendency to privatize the best performing companies first (Megginson et 
al., 1994). As a consequence, the estimated general privatization effect on performance might 
be biased. 
Using the MNR methodology Megginson, Nash and van Randenborgh (1994) argue that the 
lack of efficiency in state-owned firms is a result of political interference, which Gupta (2005) 
refers to as the “Political View”. The company becomes less efficient since the government 
pursue objectives other than profit maximization. Hence, only the transfer of management 
control to private owners is likely to increase efficiency in state-owned firms. Megginson et al. 
(1994) examine the effects of privatization using a large sample of 61 companies from 18 
countries and 32 industries that experience full or partial privatization through public share 
offerings during the period 1961 to 1990. For the full sample they document an increase in 
profitability, capital spending and employment (Megginson et al., 1994). Testing the same 
hypothesis and using the same methodology D’Souza and Megginson (1999) and Boubakri and 
Cosset (1998) find supporting evidence that privatization works. 
Prior to 2005 little research has been done on partial privatization (Gupta, 2005). Gupta (2005) 
argues that full privatization makes it difficult to distinguish between the “Political View” and 
the “Managerial View” because ownership and control rights shift to the private sector at the 
same time. Partial privatization through an IPO enables Gupta (2005) to test the “Managerial 
View” since the partially privatized company still remains under government control and is 
subject to political interference (Gupta, 2005). Gupta (2005) uses the "Managerial View" to 
argue that state-owned companies underperform relative to private owned. Difficulties in 
monitoring managers or the lack of public share price to provide information about manager 
actions and skills could result in agency costs. This argument is also shared by La Porta and 
López-de-Silanes (1999). Gupta (2005) argues that without a public share price, the managerial 
incentive contracts are restricted leading to reduced performance. Observing the pre- and post 
-privatization performance of 42 companies partially privatized by the Indian government over 
the period 1990 to 2000, Gupta (2005) seeks to test whether the performance of state-owned 
firms in India is affected by the sale of non-controlling equity stakes in the stock market. 
Following the privatization literature, Gupta (2005) investigates the effect of partial 
privatization on profitability, labour productivity, investment expenditures and employment.  
Rather than employing the MNR methodology, Gupta (2005) uses a panel data model and 
includes an explanatory variable which measures the accumulated percentage of private equity. 
13 
  
The author finds significant increase in both the level and growth in performance following 
partial privatization. La Porta and Lopez-De-Silanes (1999) support this conclusion with 
evidence of large increases in profitability for privatized Mexican companies. They find that 
the average operating-income-to-sales rises by 24 percentage points in the post privatization 
period (La Porta & Lopez-De-Silanes, 1999).  
 
 Conclusive Remarks  
All of the privatization studies discussed so far use accounting measures of profitability. 
However, there are several drawbacks of using accounting information when estimating 
performance improvements. First, accounting measures are sensitive to different accounting 
principles (Megginson et al., 1994). Second, accounting data is highly manipulative and are not 
always reflect the company’s true performance (Teoh, Welch, & Wong, 1998).  
As mentioned in Frydman et al. (1999) and Megginson et al. (1994), there exists several 
econometrical challenges when assessing the effects of privatization. Among them are selection 
bias and the exogenous assumption of the ownership variable. Frydman et al. (1999) and Gupta 
(2005) provide an interesting and feasible approach to address the potential issues of selection 
bias. Frydman et al. (1999) and Gupta (2005) are to some degree able to control for pre-
privatization fixed differences between the companies using a fixed effect specification on 
company level. Finally, previous literature discuss and try to avoid8 the possibility of reverse 
causality and simultaneously bias, suggesting that causality runs from profitability to 
privatization or both ways at the same time. However, they do not test the actual direction of 
the causality between performance and privatization. 
In our opinion Gupta (2005) provides the most persuasive paper. First, the study addresses the 
problems of selection bias and endogeneity. Second, Gupta (2005) is able to test the 
“Managerial View” when she investigates companies partially privatized through IPOs. 
However, the part of the “Managerial View” which focuses on the lack of stock price to provide 
information is not relevant in the analysis because the companies in our sample already trade 
publicly. The analysis utilize the argument of the “Managerial View” which focuses on the 
effect of dilution of ownership.  
                                                 
8 Gupta (2005) provides a solutions to the problem by instrumenting the privatization variable using higher lags of the 
dependent variable and the privatization variable in a GMM Model developed by Arellano and Bond in 1991. However, 
Frydman et al. (1999) fail to address the potential endogenous nature of the privatization variable.  
14 
  
On the basis of previous research, this thesis seeks to bring new insight into to the discussion 
of why privatization matters by analysing the effect of state ownership on abnormal return and 
systematic risk. In addition, our thesis contributes with new insight using stock return as 
performance measure, thus eliminating shortcomings due to accounting manipulations and 
different reporting principles in earlier studies. Finally, this thesis adds a new element to the 
existing literature by providing an approach to test the direction of the causality between 
privatization and performance. 
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4 Theory of the Methodology 
 
This Section gives an introduction to the theory underpinning the empirical models and 
analysis. First, the Section introduces the Capital Asset Pricing Model, CAPM, and explain its 
implications. CAPM is one of the most recognized portfolio theories, and is central to the 
economic reasoning in the analysis. Further, we focus on deviations from the CAPM using the 
Fama French Four Factor Model in the empirical models. Second, the Efficient Market 
Hypothesis is introduced to explain the economic rationale behind the event study. Moreover, 
the Efficient Market Hypothesis provides insight to the market mechanisms after an exogenous 
event.  
 
 Capital Asset Pricing Model 
 
The Capital Asset Pricing Model, abbreviated CAPM, is based on assumptions from 
Markowitz’s Portfolio Theory (1952) and was developed independently by Sharpe (1964), 
Lintner (1965) and Mossin (1966). 
CAPM is based on numerous assumptions. Among other, CAPM assumes that all investors 
have the same information and that they want to maximize the relationship between risk and 
return, referred to as “mean variance optimization” (Sharpe, 1964). Furthermore, CAPM 
assumes that all investors optimize their portfolio according to Markowitz’s portfolio 
optimization. The assumption implies that if all investors observe the same investable universe 
and have the same investment opportunities, their efficient frontiers will be identical. Facing 
the same risk free rate, all investors will draw an identical tangent CAL, Capital Allocation 
Line, composed of the same risky assets (Sharpe, 1964). As a result, the market portfolio has 
the same weights as the individual risky portfolios. For this reason, the individual Capital 
Allocation Line will also be the Capital Market Line. 
Likewise, in a world where CAPM assumptions hold, the model implies that the optimal risky 
portfolio is the market portfolio and that every investors hold this portfolio. The market 
portfolio is perfectly diversified and is the portfolio which gives the highest return per unit risk. 
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CAPM is built on the insight that the appropriate risk premium on an asset is determined by its 
contribution of portfolio risk. The relevant risk is the systematic risk, because idiosyncratic risk 
can be eliminated through diversification. Mathematically, the model is expressed as: 
𝐸(𝑟𝑖) = 𝑟𝑓 + 𝛽𝑖[𝐸(𝑟𝑚) − 𝑟𝑓] 
𝐸(𝑟𝑖) is the expected return of asset i, 𝑟𝑓 is the risk-free rate and 𝐸(𝑟𝑚) is the expected market 
return. The 𝛽 represents the relationship between the return of the asset and the market portfolio, 
and is referred to as the market beta. The market beta represents the normal excess stock return 
of the firm. The beta of the firm is interpreted as the expected percentage change in excess stock 
return given one percent point change in the return of the market portfolio. The market beta can 
be defined as: 
𝛽𝑖 =
𝐶𝑜𝑣(𝑟𝑖, 𝑟𝑚)
𝜎𝑚2
 
The relationship between the expected return and the market beta can be interpreted as a reward-
risk equation. Risk-averse investors measure the risk of the optimal risky portfolio by its 
variance. Hence, the risk premium on individual assets is expected to depend on the contribution 
of the asset to the risk of the portfolio. The market beta measures the stock’s contribution to the 
variance of the market portfolio, therefore, the required risk premium is a function of beta. 
Moreover, CAPM states that the security risk premium is proportional to both the beta and the 
risk premium of the market portfolio. That is, the risk premium equals: 
𝛽𝑖[𝐸(𝑟𝑚) − 𝑟𝑓]. 
The expected return-beta relationship can be portrayed graphically as the security market line, 
SML, where the slope is the excess return of the market portfolio. 
In CAPM the market portfolio is efficient and consists of all investment opportunities. For 
instance, the portfolio consists of human capital, which is not observable. As a consequence, a 
proxy for the hypothetical market portfolio need to be used. For this reason, empirical work has 
shown that there could be other factors which significantly affect the excess stock return 
(Bessembinder & Zhang, 2013; Fama & French, 1993, 1996). The relationship between a 
company's expected return and factors not explained by CAPM is called pricing anomalies. The 
most recognized pricing anomalies are the value, size and momentum effect, which are 
incorporated in the Fama French Four Factor Model.  
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 Fama French Four Factor Model 
 
Empirical research has shown that common risk in stock returns is fairly well explained by the 
four factors, excess market return, SMB9, HML10 and MOM11 (Carhart, 1997; Fama & French, 
1993; Lyon, Barber, & Tsai, 1999)  
The Fama French Four Factor Model is one of the most recognized multifactor models. Fama 
and French discovered that only 70% of the stock return could be explained by the market beta 
(Fama & French, 1992). They tested different multifactor models, and found that size and value 
had a significant effect on the stock price which resulted in the Fama French Three Factor 
Model (Fama & French, 1993). Later the three factor model was augmented by Carhart (1997), 
including a fourth factor, the momentum. The augmented Fama French Model consists of four 
factor portfolios, the market excess return, SMB, HML and Momentum.  
𝑟𝑖𝑡 − 𝑟𝑓𝑡 = 𝛼𝑖 + 𝐵𝑖(𝑟𝑀𝑡 − 𝑟𝑓𝑡) + 𝛾𝑖𝑆𝑀𝐵𝑡 + 𝜃𝑖𝐻𝑀𝐿𝑡 + 𝛿𝑖𝑀𝑂𝑀𝑡 + 𝜀𝑖𝑡 
Fama and French (2004) claim that the biggest shortage of the Four Factor Model is its 
economic support. The model is a result of data mining for significant factors. This implies that 
the empirical relationship is known, but not the economic relationship between the stock return 
and common risk factors; SMB, HML, Momentum. 
 
  The Efficient Market Hypothesis 
 
The Efficient Market Hypothesis is based on the assumption that stock prices reflect all relevant 
information about the asset's fundamental value (Fama, 1965; Samuelson, 1965). The 
hypothesis is based on the assumption that investors have access to the same information as the 
market and that the stock price is fully reflected by available information. New and relevant 
information results in a change in the stock price, which eliminates arbitrage opportunities. If 
these assumptions hold, investors can only expect to achieve annual, risk-adjusted returns. It 
will be impossible to "beat the market" if the hypothesis of an efficient market is valid (Fama, 
1965). 
                                                 
9 Small Minus Big 
10 High Minus Low 
11 Momentum 
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There exists three forms of market efficiency: weak, semi-strong and strong. Weak form 
efficiency implies that the stock price reflects historical data. In a semi-strong form, all investors 
have access to public information, in addition to historical data. Given the assumption that stock 
prices adjust quickly to all new available information and investors purchase stocks after this 
information is released, an investor can only “beat the market” with private information. Hence, 
to beat a semi-strong efficient market, the investor has to trade on relevant private information. 
In a strong form efficient market stock prices reflect private, public and historic information, 
hence investors will not be able to profit above the average investor. 
Assuming that stock prices react solely to new and unpredictable information and that price 
movements are correct and immediate, the stock price follows a random walk implying that the 
stock return at time t is independent of the stock return at time t-1 (Fama, 1965). For this reason, 
stock price movements are random and cannot be predicted based on historical data. Today's 
share price is therefore the best estimate of tomorrow's price. 
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5 Data  
 
 Creating the Dataset 
 
Our dataset consists of industry, country of origin and daily observations of stock prices12, 
market capitalization and trading volumes of 76 international publicly traded companies for the 
period, 04.01.1999 - 31.08.2015. Daily log stock return is calculated in Excel and is the log of 
the percentage change in stock prices between trading days. In addition, we have collected the 
ownership shares of the Norwegian Government and subsequent changes in state ownership. 
The companies operate in eight different industries and have headquarters in 21 different 
countries. Furthermore, the sample constitutes of eight companies partially owned by the 
Norwegian Government and 68 private companies. See Table 10 and 11 in the Appendix for 
the full list of private and state-owned firms sorted by industry. Firms going public after 
04.01.1999, are included in the sample as of their first trading day. Firm level data is collected 
from the Bloomberg terminal and the daily Fama French four factors13 are collected from Fama 
and French’s website. The four Fama French factors14 are the market excess return, SMB, HML 
and Momentum. The risk free asset is the 1 month American T-bill. Daily risk free return is the 
arithmetic mean of the 1 month T-bill return.  
We use the American market factor defined by French (2015) to control for market risk rather 
than Oslo Stock Exchange. The state-owned firms have in common that they are large and 
operate internationally. This implies that they are likely to be exposed to international 
movements. In addition, Oslo Stock exchange is of limited size, as a result, a value weighted 
market portfolio of the Norwegian market will mainly reflect the return of a few large 
companies (Ødegaard, 2009). This will lead to simultaneous bias when estimating the 
                                                 
12 Closing price 
13 The four Fama French factors are in log returns. 
14 “The Fama/French factors are constructed using the 6 value-weight zero-cost portfolios formed on size and book-to-market. 
SMB (Small Minus Big) is the average return on the three small portfolios minus the average return on the three big portfolios. 
HML (High Minus Low) is the average return on the two value portfolios minus the average return on the two growth portfolios. 
Rm-Rf, the excess return on the market, value-weight return of all CRSP firms incorporated in the US and listed on the NYSE, 
AMEX, or NASDAQ that have a CRSP share code of 10 or 11 at the beginning of month t, good shares and price data at the 
beginning of t, and good return data for t minus the one-month Treasury bill rate” (French, 2015) 
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systematic risk (A. Boardman et al., 1986). As a consequence, the American market is used as 
a proxy for the market portfolio.  
In order to create the panel dataset, we had to match the trading dates for our Fama French 
variables with the daily observations of each firm and then delete non-trading days. This 
resulted in deletion of 154 daily observation from each company, 12.012 observations in total. 
Hence the data consists of 286.460 daily observations. Market capitalization is the daily market 
capitalization using the closing price. Trading volume is the daily trading volume at the end of 
each trading day. Our dataset results in a strongly balanced panel dataset (76x4191). A summary 
of raw daily log stock return, daily market capitalization and daily trading volume organized by 
ownership type is presented in Table 1. 
As shown in Table 1, state-owned firms have in average higher daily raw stock return than 
private firms. Although, comparable firms are included based on size, see next Section for 
further details, the table reveals that the average state-owned firm has a higher market 
capitalization than the average private firm. In addition to differences in size, trading volume is 
on average higher for private firms. However, this is expected because the Government does 
not actively trade, thus reducing the free-float of the company.  
 
Table 1: Daily raw return, daily trading volume and daily market capitalization sorted by ownership type. All variables are 
sampled from the period 04.01.1999-31.08.201. Raw return is the average daily log stock return. Trading volume is the 
average daily trading volume. Market Capitalization is the average daily market cap. The dataset consists of eight state-
owned and 68 private firms. The state-owned firms are; Statoil, SAS, Telenor, Cermaq, Hydro, Yara, Kongsberg Gruppen 
and DNB. The firms are headquartered in 21 different countries, see Table 10 and 11 in the Appendix for further details. 
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 Selection of Private Companies  
 
The selection of private firms15 is based on the criteria; size, industry and credit rating. To 
ensure that the firms are private and not owned by a foreign government, previous ownership 
details back to 1999 are studied. In order to minimize selection bias, we choose private firms 
that have the same visible characteristics as the state-owned firms (Frydman et al., 1999). 
Optimally, the firms should be identical, except for the type of ownership. However, state-
owned firms are quite different from each other in terms of industry, capital structure and 
competitive climate. For this reason, we include the peers16 to each state-owned company. 
Bloomberg’s peer-group suggestions to each state-owned firm are used to define the respective 
peer-groups. The peer-group of each state-owned company operates in the same industry and 
are of similar size17 and credit rating. Each peer-group consists of three to ten companies 
depending on the size of the industry and the quality of the financial market where the company 
is listed. We exclude18 companies from emerging markets; China, India, Thailand, Egypt and 
Romania. Our final selection of companies with their corresponding industry is presented in 
Table 10 and 11 in the Appendix. Moreover, we include only industries in which Norwegian 
state-owned companies are present, thus reducing the possibility of fundamentals differences 
between industries with and without state-owned companies. In summary, the dataset consists 
of 68 private and eight state-owned companies from eight industries and 21 different countries. 
 
 Removing Outliers 
 
The importance of removing outliers in financial data is often disputed in the empirical literature 
(Hadi & Simonoff, 1993). Irregular outliers19 may have a significant impact on the regression 
output and lead to biased results. On the contrary, outliers may also be valid observations, hence 
adjustments are largely subjective. The daily return series are illustrated in Figure 10 in the 
Appendix and the graph reveals some particularly extreme observations. 
                                                 
15 Throughout this thesis, we define private firms as firms with no state ownership after 1999. For Firms privatized before 
1999, we assume that the effect of previous state ownership is negliable. 
16 Peers are firms that are comparable in terms of size, industry, credit rating and or are competitors of the firm in question.  
17 Market capitalization is used as a proxy for size. 
18 The companies from emerging markets are excluded in order to reduce the problem of artificially low market betas arising 
from low liquidity and low degree of integration in the financial market where the companies are listed.  
19 Defined as extreme data points 
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Extreme returns may have a significant effect on the results. For this reason, a technique called 
"Winsorization" is applied on the excess return variable. The “Winsorization” procedure 
involves replacing extreme observations with an upper or lower limit of less extreme excess 
returns. The most common "Winsorization" level within financial analysis is the 98% level 
(Leone, Minutti-Meza, & Wasley, 2012). As a result, the 1st and 99th percentile are chosen as 
the lower and upper limit of the excess return variable. Note that excess returns greater than the 
99th percentile and lower than the 1st percentile are not removed, but replaced with their 
respective boundary. Thus, 2% of the daily excess return observations for the period are 
modified to either an upper or lower limit. The rationale behind the process is that the 
observations continue to affect the regression output, but not undermine the analysis. An 
alternative strategy is to delete extreme observations. However, this would lead to loss of 
potential valid observations. The daily excess returns after the “Winsorization” are illustrated 
in Figure 11 in the Appendix. 
 
 Advantages and Disadvantages of the Dataset 
 
Our dataset has different attributes than other privatization studies. First, stock return rather 
than accounting measures are used as the dependent variable. Market data is less prone to 
manipulation and is not affected by accounting principles. Moreover, stock return provides us 
with an unbiased estimator of future profits (A. Boardman et al., 1986). The stock market allows 
us to benefit from the assumption about an efficient market, as a consequence, the market 
reaction of an event is the correct adjustment in the price due to changes in the NPV of future 
profits. Moreover, market data enables us to get frequent observations which is crucial to an 
event study (Brown & Warner, 1980; Campbell, 1997). Finally, market data allows us to use 
pricing models and to isolate the potential change in abnormal return and systematic risk. 
Second, the firms included in the dataset are listed on highly developed stock exchanges which 
increases the likelihood of stock prices being an unbiased estimate of future profits. In addition 
and in contrast to Frydman et al. (1999), who only observe whether firms are privatized, our 
firms have detailed ownership information which let us analyse the effect of a change in state 
ownership. Third, the dataset consists of different industries and follows Boardman & Vining’s 
(1989) suggestion of using a multi-industry approach. 
Fourth, we include only industries where state-owned companies are present, thus reducing the 
possibility of fundamentals differences between industries with and without state ownership. In 
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addition, the dataset includes private companies similar to the state-owned firms, thus reducing 
the fundamentals differences between private and state-owned firms mentioned by Frydman et 
al. (1999). 
The main concern about the dataset is the small number of state-owned firms. Too few state-
owned firms may result in low cross-sectional variation which might affect the significance 
level. In addition, a small sample means that we must be careful not to generalize the results. 
The selection of state-owned firms could have been extended by looking at other countries such 
as Sweden and Denmark, and analysing the effect of state ownership in Scandinavia. An 
extension of the dataset is interesting, but we want to focus on state ownership in Norway, thus 
only Norwegian state-owned firms are included. 
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6 Methodology and Results 
 
This Section presents the methodology and the results. In order to give a systematic and correct 
empirical approach to the research question, we employ three different econometrical models; 
the General OLS Model, the Event Model and the Synthetic Control. 
 
 Empirical Strategy 
 
Our methodology is twofold. First, our methodology seeks to identify the effect of state 
ownership on abnormal return and systematic risk for Norwegian state-owned firms using a 
Pooled OLS specification. The model is inspired by the “State vs. Private” literature described 
in Section 3.2.1. The OLS framework allows us to benefit from both cross-sectional and time-
variation in the sample. Second, we conduct an event study in order to isolate and quantify the 
market reaction from a change in state ownership, ceteris paribus. The market reaction gives an 
indication on how the market perceives the Norwegian Government as an equity owner20. In 
addition, the event study gives an indication of the severity of the potential selection bias 
problem in the OLS specification. In order to address both abnormal return and systematic risk, 
the Event Model21 separates the privatization effect into an immediate market reaction and a 
structural change in the systematic risk of the firm. The final model, the Synthetic Control22, is 
a robustness test of the Event Model. Testing the exogenous event assumption is critical due to 
the possibilities of reverse causality and omitted variable bias in the Event Model. Finally, as a 
supplementary analysis we investigate the individual relationship between the state-owned 
firms and abnormal return in an industry-specific OLS specification. 
  
                                                 
20 For instance, if the estimated market reaction is close to zero or insignificant, the market might be indifferent between having 
the Government as an owner, implying that state ownership is not causing any abnormal return. 
21 The Event Model is inspired by the article of Dube et al. (2011), which analyses the effect of national coups on stock prices. 
22A method for causal inference in comparative case studies (Abadie et al., 2010; Abadie, Diamond, & Hainmueller, 2015; 
Abadie & Gardeazabal, 2003) 
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 The General OLS Model 
 
The General OLS tests the following hypotheses: 
Hypothesis 1: The correlation between abnormal return and state ownership is negative  
Hypothesis 2: Private firms are more prone to systematic risk than state-owned firms 
 
 Selection of State-Owned Companies 
This thesis focuses on the effect of state ownership where the Norwegian Government has a 
strategic and direct ownership, as a consequence, ownership held by the State Pension Fund 
Global and the State Pension Fund Norway are not relevant. In the General OLS Model every 
public listed company with direct state ownership is of relevance23. The final selection of state-
owned firms in the General OLS Model includes; Hydro, Kongsberg Gruppen, Telenor, Statoil, 
Cermaq, DNB, SAS and Yara. An overview of the Norwegian Government’s ownership shares 
is given the Table 2.  
 
 The General OLS Specification 
Comparing the stock return of state-owned companies to private firms is one method through 
which the effect of state ownership can be estimated (Megginson & Netter, 2001). The General 
OLS Model follows the methodology of the “State vs. Private” literature described in Section 
3.2.1. The objective is to identify the average impact of state ownership on abnormal return and 
                                                 
23 Aker Solution and Kvaerner are indirectly owned by the Government through a holding company, Aker Holding and for 
this reason, omitted from the sample. Raufoss is omitted from the sample because the firm faced bankruptcy in 2003.  
Table 2: State ownership, as of 09.11.2015, for the 
selection of state-owned firms in the General OLS Model. 
Cermaq went public 24.10.2005 and was fully privatized 
in 2014. 
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systematic risk by comparing state-owned to private firms using the following OLS 
specification24:  
𝑅𝑖𝑡 = 𝛽0 +  𝛼𝑖 + 𝛽1𝑆𝑂𝐸𝑖 + 𝛽2𝑆𝑡𝑎𝑡𝑒𝐵𝑒𝑡𝑎𝑖  + 𝛽3
𝑖 𝑅𝑡
𝑚 + 𝛽4
𝑖𝑆𝑀𝐵𝑡 + 𝛽5
𝑖 𝐻𝑀𝐿𝑡
+ 𝛽6
𝑖 𝑀𝑂𝑀𝑡 + 𝛽7𝑌𝑒𝑎𝑟𝑡 + 𝛽8𝑀𝑜𝑛𝑡ℎ𝑡 + 𝛽9𝐼𝑛𝑑𝑢𝑠𝑡𝑟𝑦𝑖 + 𝜀𝑖𝑡 
𝑆𝑡𝑎𝑡𝑒𝐵𝑒𝑡𝑎𝑖 =  𝑆𝑂𝐸𝑖 ∗ 𝑅𝑡
𝑚 
𝑅𝑖𝑡 is the daily log excess stock return
25 over the risk-free rate on a buy-and-hold portfolio of i 
stocks on day t. The explanatory variables of interest are the ownership variable, SOE, and the 
systematic risk variable, StateBeta. SOE is a dummy variable which is coded 1 for state-owned 
companies and 0 otherwise. The SOE-variable captures fixed effects on the ownership level, 
state-owned versus private. As a result, SOE will be the average abnormal return due to state 
ownership. Moreover, SOE captures the percentage difference in abnormal return between 
state-owned and private firms. StateBeta is an interaction between SOE and the market excess 
return, and represents the difference in the market beta between private and state-owned firms. 
The scope of this thesis is limited to analyse the systematic risk regarding the correlation with 
the market return. As a result, the correlation between state ownership and the other pricing 
factors in the model is not analysed. The variables, SOE and StateBeta, capture the relationship 
between state ownership and excess return in terms of abnormal return and systematic risk, 
respectively. 
Furthermore, yearly and monthly dummies are included in the specification in order to capture 
contemporary correlation (Gupta, 2005). Industry dummies are included to capture fixed effects 
at the industry level. The unobserved component, 𝛼𝑖, reflects firm specific fixed effects. The 
random unobserved component, 𝜀𝑖𝑡, reflects unobserved shocks affecting the performance of 
firms. 
In order to estimate individual factor loadings, each of the four Fama French factors is interacted 
with a firm-specific dummy variable, 𝐹𝑖𝑟𝑚𝑖. The four Fama-French factors: Excess Market 
Return, High-Minus-Low, Small-Minus-Big and Momentum are denoted as: 𝑅𝑡
𝑚, 𝐻𝑀𝐿𝑡 , 𝑆𝑀𝐵𝑡 
and 𝑀𝑂𝑀𝑡. The normal return is given by the Fama French Four Factor Model.  
𝐴𝑅𝑖𝑡 =  𝛼𝑖 + 𝑆𝑂𝐸𝑖 + 𝐼𝑛𝑑𝑢𝑠𝑡𝑟𝑦𝑖 +  𝜀𝑖𝑡 
                                                 
24 We control for the four Fama French factors, excess market return, SMB, HML and Momentum by interacting the factors 
with a company dummy variable. This creates individual factor loadings.   
25 Stock prices follow an autoregressive process, AR(1) with unit root. In order to create a stationary process, we use the first-
difference of the stock price. Log return is used because log return is normally distributed.  
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𝐸(𝜀𝑖𝑡) =  0 
𝐸(𝐴𝑅𝑖𝑡) =  𝛼𝑖 + 𝑆𝑂𝐸𝑖 +  𝐼𝑛𝑑𝑢𝑠𝑡𝑟𝑦𝑖 
By assumption, everything that is not explained by the Fama-French Four-Factor Model is 
considered abnormal return, 𝐴𝑅𝑖𝑡. As a result, there exists three sources of abnormal return in 
the model, when excluding time dummies; 𝛼𝑖  , 𝑆𝑂𝐸𝑖, and 𝐼𝑛𝑑𝑢𝑠𝑡𝑟𝑦𝑖. Furthermore and 
according to pricing theory, 𝐴𝑅𝑖𝑡 is 0, implying that both 𝛼𝑖, 𝑆𝑂𝐸𝑖 and 𝐼𝑛𝑑𝑢𝑠𝑡𝑟𝑦𝑖  should be 
insignificant (Fama & French, 2012; Gupta, 2005). For this reason, if the coefficient of 𝑆𝑂𝐸 is 
significantly different than 0, state ownership is correlated with abnormal return, 𝐴𝑅𝑖𝑡. It is 
important to emphasize that the General OLS Model only quantifies the correlation between 
ownership type and abnormal return and between ownership type and systematic risk. An 
alternative approach would be to create a factor portfolio based on the ownership variable and 
add it to the existing Fama French factors and test if ownership is a priced factor in the market, 
this is however, out of scope for this thesis. Furthermore, an alternative specification would be 
to use a Fixed Effect specification. The FE-model saves degrees of freedom and removes firm 
fixed effects. The number of degrees of freedom is not considered a problem in the model due 
to the large number of observations. However, the problem with the fixed effect specification 
is that the variable of interest, 𝑆𝑂𝐸, is constant over time and would be removed if the fixed 
effects specification was to be used. Hence, we have to use a pooled OLS specification and 
control for, as far as possible, the firm fixed effects.  
 
 Robustness and Limitations of the General OLS Model 
We cluster standard errors on the cross sectional variable, Company, to deal with 
heteroscedasticity and serial correlation. 
Previous literature proves that stock return is driven by time-varying variables26 (Bessembinder 
& Zhang, 2013) and not time-constant fundamental differences. However, according to 
Frydman et al. (1999), the sample of state-owned firms cannot be treated as a random sample 
from the population of publicly listed firms. Frydman et al. (1999) argue that state-owned firms 
                                                 
26 The empirical finance literature has shown that systematic risk in stock returns is fairly well explained by the Fama French 
Four Factor Model (Carhart, 1997; Fama & French, 1993; Lyon et al., 1999). According to Bessembinder and Zhang (2013), 
additional factors could be relevant control variables for the analysis. Relevant variables to include could be the oil price due 
to the high exposure to oil price movements on the Norwegian stock exchange, and the world interest rate. However, Ødegaard 
(2009) finds no support for the oil price being a systematic risk factor in the Norwegian market. To implement and test for all 
relevant variables will be out of scope for this thesis. 
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are likely to have different characteristics than private firms, implying a potential selection bias 
problem in our sample. If the firms are identical, except from different owners, a model with 
only SOE and StateBeta captures the effect of state ownership. Even though our dataset 
constitutes of peer-groups to the state-owned firms, there could be differences across industries 
and between private and state-owned firms. As a consequence, differences in the sample need 
to be controlled for. The model addresses the constant differences between industries by 
including industry dummies. However, the specification does not address the dynamic selection 
bias27 that may arise if state ownership is correlated with time-varying or time-constant 
characteristics, 𝜀𝑖𝑡 and 𝛼𝑖, respectively, that are unobservable or not included in the model 
(Gupta, 2005). Moreover, we do not control for firm fixed effects which might cause bias in the 
estimation. 
The possible omitted variables have to be correlated with SOE or StateBeta to cause bias in the 
estimators. Hence, our primary concern is to control for relevant variables that could be 
correlated with state ownership. Megginson and Netter (2001) are especially concerned about 
the perceived market failure within the particular industry. However, the model partially 
controls for the constant differences between industries by including industry dummies. 
Megginson and Netter (2001) argue that some industries are more likely to have state ownership 
than others. Historically, this has been airlines, telecom and natural resources. 
Another potential bias, is reverse causality. Historically, state-owned companies have had 
natural monopolies in important and profitable industries (Megginson & Netter, 2001). A 
relationship between a non-competitive, profitable environment and state ownership could 
imply that the causality runs from performance to state ownership. As a consequence, the SOE 
variable might be endogenous which violates the exogeneity assumption in the OLS framework.  
Furthermore, the specification captures only if firms are state-owned or not, and does not take 
into consideration the different levels of government involvement. That is, the General OLS 
Model reveals the correlation between state ownership and excess stock return regardless of the 
size of the state ownership. 
                                                 
27 E.g. if a company has smarter and more efficient workers, one would expect that such qualities would be reflected in higher 
profits resulting in higher stock return. This selection bias would have been unobservable for the researcher and could lead to 
omitted variable bias if not controlled for. 
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 Results of the General OLS 
For the main analysis we run a general regression model including eight state-owned firms 
based on the criteria mentioned in Section 5.2 and Section 6.2.1. The variables of primary 
interest are SOE28 and StateBeta29. The objective of the General OLS Model is to look at the 
average correlation between state ownership and abnormal return, and state ownership and 
systematic risk. The results of the General OLS Model is presented in Table 3. 
The Model implies that state ownership has a positive, but not significant effect on firm’s 
abnormal stock return. The results make us able to reject Hypothesis 1 of a negative abnormal 
return for state-owned firms. In addition, the model reveals that state-owned firms have on 
average a 0.314 higher market beta than private firms, significant at a 1% level. The positive 
StateBeta indicates that state-owned companies are more prone to systematic risk. The results 
of a higher market beta for state-owned firms are inconsistent with Hypothesis 2 of higher 
systematic risk in private firms. 
 
                                                 
28 SOE is a dummy variable that equals 1 for all state-owned companies and 0 otherwise 
29 StateBeta is an interaction of SOE and market excess return 
Table 3: The results presented are from the General OLS regression. State-owned companies not directly owned by the 
Norwegian Government are dropped from the sample. The sample consists of the eight state-owned companies; Telenor, 
Kongsberg Gruppen, Statoil, DNB, SAS; Yara, Cermaq and Hydro. The coefficient of “SOE” is on an indicator for state 
ownership and gives the percentage point change in daily abnormal return relative to private companies. “StateBeta” is an 
interaction between a dummy variable for all state-owned firms and the market excess return, and represents the difference 
in the average market beta between state-owned and private firms. Furthermore, we control for the four Fama French factors, 
excess market return, SMB, HML and Momentum, each interacted with a company dummy variable. Finally, we control for 
macro factors and seasonal factors using yearly and monthly dummies, respectively. The standard errors are clustered on 
company level. 
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 Robustness of the Results 
Furthermore, the General OLS Model reveals no serial correlation using the xtserial command 
in Stata. The normality of the residuals are tested by plotting the residuals and finds that they 
follow a normal distribution. 
It is important to emphasize, that the underlying assumption of the model states that all 
independent variables are to be exogenous of the model. Omitted variables are most likely 
causing bias in the SOE variable due to fundamental fixed differences between state-owned and 
private firms. The next model, the Event Model works as a robustness test and give an indication 
on the endogenous nature of the SOE variable. 
 
 Limitations of the Results 
The General OLS Model has an R-squared of 14.9%, which means that it explains 14.9% of the 
observed variation. Lack of explanatory power may be due to several reasons. First, each 
company return contains unsystematic risk because the dataset consists of company stock return 
rather than diversified portfolios, which is by definition not explained by our pricing model. 
Second, pricing models, such as Fama French, explain the long-run relationship between stock 
return and systematic risk factors. As a consequence, the low R-squared could be the result of 
using daily return rather than monthly or yearly observations. 
It is important to emphasize that there is a natural limitation to the sample which consists of 
only eight state-owned firms. The sample is limited although the whole population of 
Norwegian publicly listed firms with direct state ownership is included. In comparison, Gupta 
(2005) and Frydman et al. (1999) have 42 and 90 state-owned firms, respectively. A way to 
increase the number of firms is to include international companies, but this will be beyond the 
purpose of this thesis. As a consequence, the results are relevant only for Norwegian state-
owned firms and caution should be exercised if generalizing the results to international state-
owned firms. 
In order to conclude that there exists a causal relationship between state ownership and 
abnormal return, and between state ownership and systematic risk, we estimate the market 
reaction and the change in the systematic risk after a change in state ownership. The Event 
Model exploits the gradual change in state ownership. 
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 The Event Model 
 
In the General OLS Model the objective was to estimate the effect of state ownership on 
abnormal return and systematic risk. However, the results could be biased due to reverse 
causality or selection bias. In contrast, the Event Model avoids the selection bias problem by 
comparing pre- and post-levels of the same firm. The methodology draws parallels to the “Pre 
vs. Post” literature in Section 3.2.2. We test the following hypothesis: 
Hypothesis 3: A reduction in state ownership leads to a positive market reaction and 
increases the systematic risk of the firm 
 
 The Objective of the Event Study 
Our event study is twofold. First, the general effect from a change in state ownership is 
estimated using a panel data model, the Event Model. The objective of the Event Model is to 
isolate the immediate market reaction from a divestment. The estimated market reaction gives 
an indication on how the market perceives the Norwegian Government as an equity owner. 
Second, an in-depth analysis of the divestments is conducted, in which the exogeneity of the 
divestments are examined using the Synthetic Control. The objective is to confirm the 
exogeneity of each divestment event. 
 
 Selection of State-Owned Firms 
The selection criteria used in the Event Model are stricter than for the General OLS Model. In 
addition to direct state ownership, the Event Model requires stock return both before and after 
the divestment for the selection of state-owned firms. As a consequence, only companies in 
which the Government has made two or more divestments are relevant to the regression. The 
firms that fulfil the criteria are: Telenor, Statoil and DNB. However, DNB is omitted from the 
sample because of the Norwegian Government’s bailout during the bank crisis in the 90’s and 
the financial crisis in 200830. As a result, the Government’s decision to invest and later divest 
in DNB is clearly endogenous31. Thus, the firm sample consists of Telenor and Statoil. 
                                                 
30 As a part of the bailout program the Norwegian Government increased their ownership in DNB. 
31 In the case of DNB, the direction of causality goes from performance of the company to the divestment/investment decision. 
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 Divestment Events 
A decrease in state ownership will potentially lead to a market reaction for two reasons. First, 
the market might believe that private ownership is better or worse than state ownership. Second, 
the change in state ownership might cause shifts in the supply or demand of the stock. With a 
limited demand it is reasonable to assume that the excess supply due to a divestment leads to a 
negative market reaction. However, the divestments analysed consist of block sales to 
institutional foreign investors. We assume that the market is capable of absorbing large 
divestments without severe "supply and demand-reactions" due to the unlimited size of the 
international capital market.  
Sales to retail investors are excluded from the analysis because direct intervention in the market 
without using the international capital market will result in severe supply and demand reactions. 
The restriction reduces the probability of getting severe “supply and demand- reactions”, but at 
a cost of lower variation in the selection of firms and events. In summary, four divestments 
classify as proper events for our study, two block sales in Telenor and Statoil. 
The four divestment events analysed are all block sales to large American investment banks. 
The first divestment event after the IPO of Telenor in 2001 was a 13.9% block sale to Lehman 
Brothers on the 30th of June 2003. The announcement took place on the morning that same day. 
The block sale combined with a small fraction sale to Norwegian investors increased the free 
float of the company by 67%. The second divestment in Telenor took place on the evening of 
the 29th of Mars 2004. However, Oslo Stock Exchange was closed at the time of announcement 
and did not experience the effect of the divestment until the 30th of March. The 9.45% block 
sale to Goldman Sachs combined with 1.67% to private Norwegian investors increased the free 
float with almost 30%. The two divestments for Statoil took place on the evening on the 6th of 
July 2004 and 16th of February 2005. Hence, the effect from the event is expected to materialise 
the day after the announcement. Both block sales were approximately 4.6%, and were sold to 
Lehman Brothers and Merill Lynch. The block sale combined with the sale to private 
Norwegian investors increased the free float by 29.5% and 22.8%. The four different divestment 
events are illustrated in Table 4. 
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The rationale for the divestments are driven by political and theoretical arguments, and not 
firm-specific reasons. According to St.prp.32 No. 66 and St.meld33. No. 38, the justification of 
the decision to divest was the following: “Ensure similar commercial terms as its competitors, 
and to clarify the role of the state and the competitive position of the company. Market forces 
would serve as an important signal and act as a corrective to the company to make decisions 
that serve value creation” (Energidepartementet, 2004; Samferdselsdepartementet, 2000). The 
statement indicates that the divestment events are exogenous to the model. 
 
 Estimating the Effect on Shareholder-value 
The potential positive or negative effect of state ownership can be measured by comparing the 
NPV of future profits under private ownership with the NPV of future profits achieved under 
state ownership. If the capital market is competitive and efficient, as assumed in the model, 
stock prices provide an unbiased estimate of a firm’s future profits. Consequently, to test how 
the firm is affected by state ownership, the Event Model estimates the immediate change in 
abnormal return and the change in company’s long-run risk-profile at the time of divestment. 
Although the empirical approach provides an estimate of the effect expected by the market 
rather than the actual intrinsic effect of state ownership, the method is well established in the 
finance literature (A. Boardman, Freedman, & Eckel, 1986). Furthermore, foreign institutional 
investors are perceived to have a neutral effect on stock prices. We assume that the market 
reaction is solely based on characteristics of the seller, in this case the Norwegian Government, 
and not attributes of the buyer. 
 
                                                 
32 Parliament bill 
33 Parliamentary report 
Table 4: Overview of divestments and respective dates for Statoil and Telenor. Approval date is the date the proposal is 
approved by the Parliament. Announcement date is the date the transaction is announced by the Government and the execution 
date is the first trading day where we expect a reaction of the announcement. Change in ownership is characterized as critical 
if the ownership share decrease below 67%, 50% and 33%. 
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 Exogenous Event 
The decision to divest in a company is not random and might violate the exogeneity assumption 
of the Event Model. In the yearly “State Ownership Report” and the Parliament Propositions, 
the majority of the arguments to divest is based on political principals and not economic 
reasons. Moreover, we find no evidence which implies that divestment decisions are based upon 
company-specific events or characteristics that are intuitively correlated with stock return. For 
this reason, the divestments in Statoil and Telenor are treated as exogenous events. Regardless 
of our assumptions, the events might not be exogenous and the results have to be interpreted 
carefully. Finally, we assume that multiple changes in state ownership within each company 
are independent of each other.  
 
 Constructing the Event Window 
In contrast to more conventional event studies, in which most of the information is revealed 
during a short event window, information about the Government’s divestments reveals more 
gradually depending on the speed of the political process (Abadie & Gardeazabal, 2003). The 
decision to divest must pass through several hearings and propositions that may last for several 
years or possibly never result in a divestment. Many of the proposed and approved divestment 
decisions from the early 2000s have never been completed. Hence, there exists great uncertainty 
regarding the execution of the divestment and it is reasonable to assume that the market has not 
priced in the divestment before the announcement. 
As mentioned in Section 2.2, divestment transactions are often completed through block sales, 
followed by small fraction sales to retail investors. The block sale process is secret34 until public 
announcement, thus the event window is determinable. A semi-strong market implies that the 
announcement and execution date of the block sale are the most relevant events in our event 
window. Nevertheless, there exists other events35 during the political process which might be 
relevant to control for. However, we choose not to investigate these events any further because 
collecting the exact dates of these events are difficult and time consuming. We focus on a short 
event window. Campbell (1997) provides evidence that there is a severe drop in explanatory 
power when the length of the event window is increased. If the timing of an event is known 
precisely, the probability of statistically identifying the effect will be higher for a short event 
                                                 
34 After consultation with the Ownership Department in the Industry and Fisheries Ministry in the Norwegian Government, we 
find it reasonable to assume that the divestments are secret until announcement. 
35 Including hearings, propositions and final approvals from the Parliament. 
35 
  
window. In addition, Brown and Warner (1980) recommend the researcher to spend time 
collecting accurate event dates, which could improve the analysis substantially. As a 
consequence, we spend time finding the most important and relevant events such as 
announcement date, public news around the divestment and final execution date (Eckel, Eckel, 
& Singal, 1997).  
 
 Model Specification  
The Event Model uses the stock return of Statoil and Telenor. The model seeks to identify the 
average effect of privatization with the following specification36 inspired by Boardman, 
Freedman and Eckel (1986), and Dube et al. (2011):  
𝑅𝑖𝑡 = 𝐹𝑖𝑟𝑚𝑖𝑡 + 𝜃1𝑃𝑟𝑖𝑣𝑖𝑡(𝐾) + 𝜃2𝑃𝑜𝑠𝑡𝑃𝑟𝑖𝑣𝑖𝑡 + 𝐵2
𝑖 𝑅𝑡
𝑚 + 𝐵3
𝑖 𝑆𝑀𝐵𝑡 + 𝐵4
𝑖𝐻𝑀𝐿𝑡 + 𝐵5
𝑖 𝑀𝑂𝑀𝑡
+ 𝐵6𝑌𝑒𝑎𝑟𝑡 + 𝐵7𝑀𝑜𝑛𝑡ℎ𝑡 + 𝜀𝑖𝑡 
𝑃𝑜𝑠𝑡𝑃𝑟𝑖𝑣𝑖𝑡 = 𝑇𝑝𝑜𝑠𝑡 ∗ 𝑅𝑡
𝑚 ∗ 𝐹𝑖𝑟𝑚𝑖 
𝑃𝑟𝑖𝑣𝑖𝑡(𝐾) = 𝐶ℎ𝑎𝑛𝑔𝑒 𝑖𝑛 𝑜𝑤𝑛𝑒𝑟𝑠ℎ𝑖𝑝𝑖 ∗ 𝐸𝑣𝑒𝑛𝑡 𝑑𝑢𝑚𝑚𝑦𝑡(𝐾) 
𝐿𝑒𝑛𝑔𝑡ℎ 𝑜𝑓 𝑡ℎ𝑒 𝑒𝑣𝑒𝑛𝑡 𝑤𝑖𝑛𝑑𝑜𝑤37, 𝐾 =  −1, 1, 2, 3, 5, 7 𝑎𝑛𝑑 10.   
We regress a firm’s excess stock return, 𝑅𝑖𝑡, on the change in state ownership. We are interested 
in the percentage point change in abnormal return, 𝑃𝑟𝑖𝑣𝑖𝑡(𝐾) and the change in market beta, 
PostPriv after a divestment. The model controls for the four Fama French factors38. In addition, 
firm fixed effects are controlled for by implementing firm dummies. This is possible because 
the variables of interest, 𝑃𝑟𝑖𝑣𝑖𝑡(𝐾) and PostPriv varies over time. 
𝑃𝑟𝑖𝑣𝑖𝑡(𝐾)39 is a variable that takes on the percentage size of the change in state ownership 
interacted with an event dummy for a K-day event window. The length of event window varies 
with K-days, from -1, 1, 2, 3, 5, 7 and 10 days, starting at the execution date. The variable 
measures the percentage change in abnormal return. The change in daily average abnormal 
return due to a change in state ownership for each K-period, is 𝜃1. To get the cumulative effect 
                                                 
36 We control for the four Fama French factors, excess market return, SMB, HML and Momentum by interacting the factors 
with a company dummy variable. This creates individual factor loadings.   
37 Starting at the execution date. 
38 Each interacted with a firm dummy See the General OLS for further information about the Fama-French Four-factor Model 
39 The 𝑃𝑅𝐼𝑉𝑖𝑡(𝐾)-variable is inspired from the article of Dube et al. (2011). 
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of a divestment event, the average daily effect, 𝜃1, has to be multiplied by K. The cumulative 
change in abnormal return, CCAR, is then K𝜃140. 
The second variable of interest is the interaction term, PostPriv. In order to control for changes 
in systematic risk, we implement interaction term between the excess market return, 𝑅𝑡
𝑚, and a 
firm individual post privatization dummy, 𝑇𝑝𝑜𝑠𝑡 ∗ 𝐹𝑖𝑟𝑚𝑖, which equals 0 before and 1 after the 
divestment depending on the firm. This allows us to test if state ownership affects the systematic 
risk of the firm. The corresponding coefficient, 𝜃2, will be the estimated general long-term 
change in the market beta after a change in ownership. The potential change in the systematic 
risk and abnormal return will hopefully provide insight on how state ownership affects the firm. 
The privatization coefficient, 𝐾𝜃1, represents the effect of a 100% divestment of a hypothetical 
state-owned firm. To obtain the effect from a specific divestment event, the size of that 
particular state divestment has to be multiplied by the coefficient, 𝐾𝜃1. The total estimated 
event specific CCAR is: 
𝑇𝑜𝑡𝑎𝑙 𝑒𝑣𝑒𝑛𝑡 𝑠𝑝𝑒𝑐𝑖𝑓𝑖𝑐 𝐶𝐶𝐴𝑅 =  𝐾𝜃1 ∗  𝑃𝑟𝑖𝑣𝑡. 
K-day represents the length of the event window and captures potential overreactions. See 
illustration of the event window in Figure 1. To cope with different levels of market efficiency, 
we consider K-day event windows varying from -1, 1, 2, 3, 5, 7 and 10 days, starting at the 
execution date. Testing different lengths of event windows are recommended when the impact 
of the information at the event date is unclear (Fama, Fisher, Jensen, & Roll, 1969). 
We include one-day pre-event, 𝐾 = −1, to capture the possibilities of insider information 
leaking into the market. Inside information violates the assumptions about a semi-strong market 
efficiency. In addition, a positive pre-event excess stock return could also indicate that the 
divestment is not exogenous and that the Government’s decision to divest is a response to a 
positive market movements prior to the event.  
                                                 
40 This is a standard approximation to (1 + 𝜃1)
𝑘 − 1. 
Figure 1: Illustration of the length of the event window represented by the brackets. K are the days after the execution 
date. We consider K-day event windows varying from -1, 1, 2, 3, 5, 7 and 10 days, starting at the execution date. 
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 Robustness and Limitations of the Event Model 
The model might suffer from omitted variables bias. However, relevant omitted variables must 
be correlated with Priv and PostPriv to cause bias in the estimators. With this in mind, we find 
the most relevant omitted variables to be public events and industry specific shocks around the 
events. Another limitation is the lack of casual interference in the model. The direction of the 
causality is unknown. To get a better picture of the omitted variable problem and the casual 
interference between a divestment decision and stock performance, each event is analysed using 
the Synthetic Control. 
In addition to the Synthetic Control, time-shifted placebo tests are conducted to test if the results 
are an artefact of our dataset. Using the same specification as in the Event Model, we re-estimate 
the model with different time-shifted placebos ranging from +/- 25 days with a five day interval. 
The placebo test reveals the likelihood of getting significant results. 
One potential limitation to the Event Model specification is that the distribution of abnormal 
return is often non-normal and the number of events in the study are small (Dube, Kaplan, & 
Naidu, 2011). That is, the dataset consists of two firms, with a total of four events. As a 
consequence, conventional standard errors may produce an incorrect test size. To cope with the 
limitations, Dube et al. (2011) suggest a non-parametric small sample test based on the sign and 
rank test, but with exact distributions. However, the small sample test is beyond the scope of 
this research thesis. We use robust standard errors. 
In addition to the empirical limitation, the model suffers from an economic limitation similar 
to the General OLS Model. The Event Model does not capture the different levels of state 
ownership. Different degrees of state ownership will potentially have varying effect on excess 
stock return, especially in the case of control rights, vetoes and majority stakes. When the 
Government retains control rights, it can still use its ownership rights to interfere with business 
decisions (Li et al., 2012). It is reasonable to believe that a reduction of state ownership, from 
51% to 49%, affects the excess stock price significantly more than a change from 61% to 59%. 
A solution to this limitation, is to separate the divestment events into different sub-groups 
depending on the level of privatization. However, this reduces the variation of the privatization 
variable. With only four relevant events, further classification of the events will potentially 
result in lower significance levels. One solution to this problem is to include international 
privatization events. 
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 Results of the Event Model 
The results from the Event Model serve as a robustness test of the results of the General OLS 
Model, and give further insight into the effect from Norwegian state ownership in Statoil and 
Telenor.  
In row 1 in Table 5, we report the average daily abnormal return, Priv, for K-days for a 
hypothetical 100% divestment event. K ranges from -1 to 10 and represents the length of the 
event window. In row 2 in Table 5, we report the results of, PostPriv. 
 
Row 1 in Table 5 shows market reactions of the divestments in the Event Model. The coefficient 
of Priv41 represents the average daily market reaction after a divestment. The results imply that 
the daily one-day, K=1, abnormal return is reduced with 40.1% for a hypothetical 100% 
divestment. The daily two-day, K=2, abnormal return is reduced with 19.1%. Both results are 
highly significant at a 1% level. The results are significant up to a three-day event window. 
In row 2 in Table 5, we report the results for the long-run structural change in the average 
systematic risk following a divestment. The Event Model reveals that the market beta increases 
                                                 
41 The coefficient of Priv represents the average market reaction for a 100% divestment and is on an indicator for announcement 
events interacted with the change in ownership (Dube et al., 2011). 
Table 5: The results presented are from the Event Model regression. All state-owned companies with fewer than two divestments are 
dropped from the sample. Furthermore, companies in which sale or purchase of stocks are done through open market auctions rather 
than block sales to international investors are removed from the sample. The final sample consists of Telenor and Statoil. The 
coefficient of the “Priv” variable is on an indicator for the length of divestment event, K-day, interacted with the change in 
ownership. ”Priv” gives the average percentage change in daily abnormal return. “PostPriv” is an interaction term between the 
excess market return, 𝑅𝑡
𝑚, and a firm individual post privatization dummy, T𝑝𝑜𝑠𝑡 ∗ 𝐹𝑖𝑟𝑚𝑖, which equals 0 before and 1 after the 
divestment depending on the firm. Furthermore, we control for the four Fama French factors, excess market return, SMB, HML and 
Momentum, each interacted with a company dummy variable. Finally, we control for macro factors and seasonal factors using yearly 
and monthly dummies, respectively. We use robust standard errors. 
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with 0.123 after a divestment which is in line with our hypothesis. PostPriv, is significant at a 
5% level. The coefficient does not represent a hypothetical 100% state-owned firm, but is an 
average of the change in the systematic risk of Telenor and Statoil after privatization. The 
interpretation of the coefficient is not dependent on the size of the divestment, but captures the 
change in the market beta after the divestment. The coefficient reveals that Telenor and Statoil 
have 0.123 higher market betas after the first divestments. The results imply that the systematic 
risk increases with privatization, which might seem conflicting with previous results from the 
General OLS Model. However, PostPriv must be interpreted as the increase in market beta 
relative to previous levels prior to the event, whereas the higher market beta in the General OLS 
is relative to private firms. 
The model finds clear evidence that the market reacts negatively to divestments. The significant 
change in abnormal return immediately after the execution is inconsistent with our hypothesis 
that a state divestment causes a positive stock return. While the General OLS Model reveals a 
neutral effect of state ownership, the Event Model indicates that the Norwegian Government 
has a positive impact on the abnormal return of Statoil and Telenor. The market reaction is 
significant at a 1% level on a 1-day and 2-days event window, and 5% for the 3-days event 
window. However, for event windows longer than three days the stock price reaction is not 
significant. A reduction in explanatory power is reasonable when increasing the length of the 
event window (Campbell, 1997). The results of an immediate significant price reaction imply 
that the market is semi-strong efficient and reacts on public information. 
In the first row of Table 5, we report the coefficient of the one-day pre-event variable, K=-1. 
The variable captures the change in the abnormal return on the day before the divestment. The 
one-day pre-event variable, is meant to incorporate the effect from private information leaking 
into the market before the public announcement. The increase in the average abnormal return 
on the day before the execution of a divestment is 17.9%, significant at a 1% level. The results 
indicate that the market reacts positive prior to a divestment. A significant pre-event variable 
suggests that the divestment might not be exogenous. An increase in the abnormal return prior 
to the divestment, implies that there could be a price trend which causes the Government to 
divest. The timing of the event can no longer be assumed to exogenous as a result of the pre-
existing trends in the stock price. The model might suffer from reversed causality. However, 
the Event Model predicts that the divestment causes a unique market reaction which contradicts 
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the pre-existing trend, thus reducing the severity42 of the bias. The uniqueness of this market 
reaction will be further scrutinized in the Synthetic Control.  
The cumulative change in the K-day abnormal return is the coefficient multiplied by K, resulting 
in a 38.6% reduction in abnormal return, for K=2, within the two days following the 
announcement of the divestment. Illustrated in Figure 2, the cumulative change in abnormal 
return, CCAR, is nearly constant when increasing the event window with K-days. An almost 
constant CCAR implies that the immediate market reaction is correct, with no further 
adjustments. The negative market reaction implies that the market believes that the Government 
contributes with abnormal return in Statoil and Telenor. 
Figure 2 graphs the results from Table 5 and visualizes the cumulative change in abnormal 
return, CCAR, and how it changes over the length of the event window. The graph also 
visualizes by the stippled line, the 95% confidence interval, and illustrates where the coefficient 
is no longer significant. To obtain CCAR we use the regression output from row 1 in Table 5 
multiplied by the length of the event window, K-day. The graph shows that the CCAR is 
approximately constant for all K-days, but not significant for event windows greater than three 
                                                 
42 The bias with have been severe if the pre-existing trend was negative. Then the divestment would be correlated with the pre-
trend and the model would overestimate Priv. 
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Figure 2: Graphed results of the Event Model, K-day CCAR. To obtain CCAR we use the regression output from Table 5 
multiplied by the length of the event window, K-day. The thicker line represents the average daily change in abnormal return 
from a change in state ownership multiplied by the length of the event window. The horizontal axis denotes the length of the 
event window. K=3 implies that the event window is three days, the estimated effect is the average of the three day market 
reaction. The stippled lines represent the 95% confidence intervals using robust standard errors from the regression output. 
The divestments do not overlap even at the maximum length of the event window at 10 days or later in the in-time placebo tests 
where the event is moved +/- 25 days. 
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days. The results imply that there is no overestimation and that the market reaction is correct 
and immediate. 
As mentioned, the estimates in Table 5 are for a hypothetical company, where the Government 
reduced an imaginary ownership share from 100% to 0% during one divestment. This is not a 
very likely scenario, but the results can easily be applied to actual divestment events. To obtain 
the average effect for the four divestments, the coefficient of Priv has to be multiplied by the 
average change in state ownership. The average divestment is 8.135%. Using the estimates from 
the Event Model, the predicted average reduction in daily abnormal return is 3.262% for a 1-
day event window, K=1. For the 2-day event window, K=2, the daily average abnormal return 
is reduced with 1.554%, resulting in a CCAR of -3.101%. The coefficient can also be used on 
specific divestments. For instance, the Government announced and executed a 13.9% reduction 
in their ownership in Telenor on the 30th of June 2003. For this divestment the model predicts 
a reduction in the one-day, K=1, abnormal stock return of 5.574%. 
 
 Robustness of the Results 
Our empirical results document a significant negative change in the abnormal stock return in 
the three days following a divestment announcement. However, the results might be caused by 
other events in the same period as the divestment. If this is the case, the event variables take 
credit for such factors, leading to biased results. Relevant factors can be shocks in the industry 
or other public events happening around the same execution date. As a consequence, the model 
might suffer from omitted variable bias. However, the Synthetic Control tests if there exists any 
industry specific shocks and other public events around the time of divestment.  
In addition, to test if the estimates are an artefact of our dataset, we have conducted an “In-
Time” shifted placebo. We use the same specification as in the Event Model, but re-estimate 
the model using different time-shifted placebo events ranging from +/- 25 days with a 5-day 
interval. The 2-day event window, K=2, is used in the placebo test.  
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We report the daily change in abnormal return for a 2-day event window, K=2. The results are 
presented in Table 6. Out of ten time-shifted placebo regressions, the privatization variable is 
only significant for t=+25. The placebo test proves that it is possible to get a significant estimate 
on a random date with a probability of 1/10 using our dataset43. However, none of the time-
shifted placebos have a magnitude of similar size to the one observed for the true divestment 
event, t=0. Figure 3 illustrates the magnitude of the placebo estimates compared to the original 
estimate. By the size of the market reaction at the execution date, t=0, it is not very likely that 
the estimates are an artefact of our dataset. The low magnitude of the placebo estimates, 
combined with 9/10 placebos being insignificant, reinforce that the original estimate at t=0, is 
not due to local serial correlation in returns (Dube et al., 2011). 
                                                 
43 The probability is likely to be reduced if our dataset consisted of more than two firms. 
Table 6: Results of the “In-Time” Placebo Test. We use the same specification as in the Event Model, and re-estimate the model 
using different time-shifted placebo events, ranging from +/- 25 days with a 5-day interval. We report the daily change in 
abnormal return for a 2-day event window, K=2, in the placebo test. The coefficient of F25.priv2 stands for; F25= Forward 25 
days and priv2= 2-day event window, and captures the average daily change in AR for 25 and 24 days prior to each divestment 
event. The coefficient of L25.priv2 stands for; L25= Lagged 25 days and priv2= 2-day event window, and captures the average 
daily change in AR for 25 and 24 days after to each divestment event. Furthermore, we control for the four Fama French factors, 
excess market return, SMB, HML and Momentum, each interacted with a company dummy variable. Finally, we control for 
macro factors using yearly dummies and seasonal factors using monthly dummies. 
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 Limitations of the Results 
Overall, the Event Model predicts that a reduction in state ownership for Statoil and Telenor 
leads to an immediate negative abnormal return which is significant up to a 3-day event 
window. A limitation to the results are the positive change in the abnormal return one-day pre-
event which leads to doubts about the exogeneity of the divestments and reduces the probability 
of a causal relationship between the divestment and the estimated effect. The observed pattern 
of change in abnormal return prior to the divestment, combined with the possibility of industry-
specific shocks in the event window, emphasizes the needs to implement a third model. The 
Synthetic Control seeks to address the limitation of the Event Model regarding reverse causality 
and omitted variable bias. 
A potential limitation of the results are the small sample of firms included in the event study. 
Telenor and Statoil might have different characteristics than the rest of the state-owned firms. 
It is reasonable to believe that the healthiest and most profitable state-owned firms are 
privatized first, implying that there exists differences between state-owned firms (Frydman et 
al., 1999; Megginson & Netter, 2001). Thus, using only Telenor and Statoil in the sample 
increases the likelihood of selection bias in the Event Model. Moreover, the interpretation of 
the coefficients is for an average divestment, but based on only four divestment. For this reason, 
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Figure 3: The graph illustrates the average daily change in AR of the “In-Time” Placebo test of the Event Model for K=2. To 
obtain the change in AR we use the regression output from Table 6. The thicker line represents the average daily change in 
abnormal return from a change in state ownership with leads and lags ranging from +/- 25 days, with a 5-day interval. The 
horizontal axis denotes the number of leads and lags of the execution date. t=-25 implies that the 2-day event window is 
forwarded 25 days, meaning that the effect from the divestment happens 25 and 24 days prior to the execution date. The stippled 
lines represent the 95% confidence interval using robust standard errors from the regression output. 
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we should be careful to generalize the results to all state-owned firms. The results might be 
significant and valid for Statoil and Telenor, but for other state-owned firms the results might 
be biased due to differences between the firms.  
 
 The Synthetic Control  
 
In order to conclude on our second hypothesis, we need to address the possibility of endogenous 
divestments. The Synthetic Control serves as a robustness test of the exogenous assumption in 
the Event Model. 
 
 The Objective of the Synthetic Control 
The Event Model might suffer from reverse causality and omitted variable bias. The Synthetic 
Control allows us to conduct an individual in-depth casual inference analysis for the four 
divestments and to test the exogenous assumption of the Priv variable in the Event Model 
(Abadie & Gardeazabal, 2003). The objective is to test the exogeneity of the divestments in the 
Event Model by comparing the pre-trend of the synthetic company with the pre-trend of the 
treated company. Differences reveal if the Event Model suffers from reverse causality, omitted 
relevant events or shocks. 
 
 Optimal Model 
The optimal model is a Difference-in-Difference analysis where the treatment effect on state-
owned firms is compared to a control group with similar pre-trend. The treatments are the 
divestments of Statoil and Telenor. To get a valid and significant result from a Difference-in-
Difference, we need multiple individuals in the treatment and control group (Kolesar & Imbens, 
2012). However, in Norway only two firms qualify for the Event Model. In addition, the change 
in state ownership occurs at different time for each company, which means that we have one 
firm in each treatment group. In summary, the lack of firms in the treatment group prevents us 
from doing a Difference-in-Difference analysis.  
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 The Synthetic Control  
To cope with the lack of variations in the treatment group, we use the Synthetic Control Group 
Method. The method is similar to the Difference in Difference Model, see Appendix for further 
details. Moreover, the Synthetic Control allows us to analyse the effect of a change in state 
ownership with only one firm treated at a time. However, testing for significance is not possible 
without variation in the treatment group. 
The Synthetic Control is closely related to statistical matching methods for observational 
studies. In the methods, it is important that the treated firm and the control group have common 
support (Abadie & Gardeazabal, 2003). The majority of statistical matching methods defines 
common support using the propensity score of the individuals in the control group, discarding 
the units with too high propensity score values (King & Zeng, 2006). However, a second 
approach is used with the Synthetic Control which involves examining the “convex hull” of the 
covariates by identifying the multi-dimensional space that allows interpolation rather than 
extrapolation (Abadie & Gardeazabal, 2003; King & Zeng, 2006). The Synthetic Control 
prevents extrapolation outside the support of the excess stock return predictors by restricting 
the weights given to each firm to be zero or positive and sum to one (Abadie & Gardeazabal, 
2003; King & Zeng, 2006). 
The principles behind the Synthetic Control are similar to those of the Propensity Score 
Matching Method. The quality of the fit between the control and treated company is maximized 
by matching the best pair. However, the Synthetic Control has only one treated firm, and the 
credibility of the method depends on the quality of the fit between the pair. To maximize the 
quality of the fit, the Synthetic Control creates a synthetic company, consisting of a weighted 
combination of the non-treated companies. The differences between the Synthetic Control and 
Propensity Score Matching are that the Synthetic Control only match one treated company, and 
that the treated company is matched with a synthetic company consisting of a weighted 
combination of relevant non-treated companies. 
 
 Sampling Interval 
Daily data has potentially more explanatory power than monthly data (Brown & Warner, 1980; 
Campbell, 1997). However, for the Synthetic Control weekly or monthly data could offer 
advantages over daily data. Longer sampling interval could potentially provide us with 
smoother data and makes it easier for the Synthetic Control to construct a synthetic company 
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from the "donor pool". There is a trade-off between maximizing the explanatory power of the 
event and maximizing the likelihood of getting a good synthetic control group. The Event 
Model is more vital in the analysis compared the Synthetic Control. In addition, if the market 
is efficient, the stock prices will reflect all public news immediately after an announcement. 
Following this argument, the daily market return is necessary in order to capture the immediate 
market reaction, though at the cost of potentially lower quality of the Synthetic Control. 
 
 Creating the Control Group 
As mentioned, a problem with observational studies is to get a good enough control group for 
comparison. The Synthetic Control package for Stata allows us to build a synthetic company 
consisting of firms from the “donor pool”. The “donor pool” is a set of non-treated firms which 
are relevant and comparable to the treated firm. The package selects a weighted combination of 
the firms from the “donor pool” based on the given criteria variables set by the researchers, and 
tries to maximize the fit of the pre-treatment outcome, 𝑅𝑖𝑡 of the treated unit (Abadie & 
Gardeazabal, 2003). The Synthetic Control requires the companies in the “donor pool” to have 
similar characteristics, such as size, risk and industry. Without similar characteristics between 
the treated firm and the "donor pool", the Synthetic Control reduces its quality and accuracy. 
Finally, having a big "donor pool" can result in over-fitting, thus only relevant and comparable 
firms are included. In order to fulfil the criteria, we define the peer-group of Statoil and Telenor 
from our primary dataset in the General OLS Model to be the "donor pool". 
There is a limited disadvantage in including variables that are uncorrelated with excess stock 
return since they are of little influence in the optimization procedure. The method simply 
allocates a low weight to an irrelevant variable. However, excluding a potentially important 
variable can be very costly in terms of decreased accuracy which creates extreme 
counterfactuals (Abadie & Gardeazabal, 2003). Stuart (2010) recommends that researchers 
should be liberal in terms of including variables that may be associated with excess stock return. 
The variables that we find most important to explain the excess stock return for Statoil and 
Telenor are; the firm’s correlation with the excess market return, 𝑅𝑡
𝑚, HML, SMB and MOM44. 
The “donor pool” consists of only relevant companies in terms of size, operations and 
competition, as a result, these characteristics are already matched. 
                                                 
44 We use the rolling 100-day factor loadings for Statoil and Telenor, and the firms in the donor pool to optimize the pre-
divestment fit. 
47 
  
The Synthetic Control Package in Stata selects the weights, W*, such that the resulting synthetic 
control group minimizes the root mean square prediction error, RMSPE, over the pre-treatment 
period. The RMPSE is a quality measure of the fit between the synthetic and treated firm. The 
package allocates the weights, W*, that maximize the quality of the fit between the control and 
treated firm. Technically, it minimizes the RMSPE and finds the combination of firms that 
provides the synthetic company with the highest common support (Abadie et al., 2015), see 
Appendix for further details regarding the technical properties of the Synthetic Control. The set 
of weights, W*, and the post-treatment data are used to estimate the counterfactual. Figure 4 
illustrates an example from Abadie et al. (2010), in which they construct a synthetic state for 
California, using a combination of other states in the US. The quality of the synthetic fit is 
considered high. 
 
Figure 4: Example of the Synthetic Control (Abadie, Diamond, & Hainmueller, 2010). The Y-axis denotes the differences 
between the dependent variable for the treated unit and its synthetic control group. The downward sloping line represents 
the differences. The vertical stippled line highlights the date of the treatment. 
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 Placebo Test 
Due to the lack of significance levels for the estimated effects, we need to perform inference 
tests in order to validate the results. In short, the placebo test repeats the optimization procedure 
for each firm in the donor pool and creates a synthetic company for each firm. With “In-Space” 
placebo treatments we are able to estimate the probability of observing the same market 
reaction. The placebo treatment is conducted on the firms in the "donor pool" of both Statoil 
and Telenor. An illustrative example of the “In-Space” placebo test from Abadie et al. (2010) 
is presented in Figure 5.  
We implement a similar placebo test on all four divestments. Using the results from the placebo 
tests, the Post/Pre RMSPE-ratio of each placebo-treatment are compared to the true treatment. 
One important aspect of the ratio-test is that it incorporates the quality of the Synthetic Control. 
As mentioned, the accuracy of the Synthetic Control depends on the quality of the pre-treatment 
fit, and a bad fit can result in extreme counterfactuals. A bad fit is indicated with a high pre-
RMSPE. As a result, to get a high Post/Pre RMSPE-ratio, the quality of the fit has to be good 
(low Pre-RMSPE) and the pre-event difference between the treated unit and the counterfactual 
has to be large (high Post-RMSPE). In Figure 5, the treated unit has by far the most extreme 
ratio in the test. The probability of observing the Post/Pre RMSPE-ratio is used as the 
significance level of the treatment effect. 
 
Figure 5: Example of a Placebo test (Abadie et al., 2010). The Y-axis denotes the differences between the synthetic and 
treated/placebo unit. The bold line represents the differences between the synthetic and the true treated unit. The grey lines 
represents the differences between the placebo synthetic units and the units in the donor pool. The date of treatment is 
illustrated by the vertical stippled line. The rarity of the magnitude of the difference on the treatment date indicates if the 
results are significant.  
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 Results of the Synthetic Control 
The composition of the synthetic firm for both Statoil and Telenor are tabulated in Table 7. The 
quality of the pre-treatment fit varies with each event, but the overall quality of the pre-
treatment fit is not optimal, thus reducing the accuracy of the method. The Root Mean Square 
Prediction Error, RMSPE, for each event is tabulated in Table 8. 
 
Figure 6 displays the differences between the treated firms and their synthetic counterpart for 
30 observations before and 30 observations after each divestment. The graphs shows that the 
synthetic counterparts replicate the excess stock return for Statoil and Telenor fairly well for 
some dates, but the difference is often of significant size. However, the magnitude of the 
differences on the event date is higher than for most of the observed differences in the 
observation period of 61 days.  
Table 8: The Root Mean Square Prediction Error for the four 
divestment events. See the Appendix for further details 
regarding RMSPE. 
Table 7: Tabulation of the different weights, w*, given to Statoil and Telenor’s donor pool. The tables lists the weights of each firm, 
i which constitute the synthetic Telenor and synthetic Statoil for each of the two divestments. In the first divestment of Telenor, we 
have the following weights; TDC 46.9%, Italia Telefonica 14% and United Internet 39.1%. 
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Regardless of the quality of the pre-treatment fit, the graph shows large differences between the 
treated and synthetic firm for three out of four events. In both Telenor’s divestments and in the 
first divestment in Statoil, we observe large negative differences, which stand out from the rest 
of the observations. The market reacts immediately at the date of the divestment and the effect 
lasts only for a short period. The graphs supports the results in the Event Model, in which the 
effect from a reduction in state ownership is significant for a 3-day event window.  
The graphs in Figure 6 indicate that the estimated market reaction in the Event Model does not 
contain any omitted variable bias. Industry specific shocks and public events regarding the 
industry at the time of the event affect both the treated firm and the synthetic firm, hence, the 
differences between the synthetic and treated firm will be small and have little or no effect on 
the graph. However, we observe large differences at the execution date. We conclude that the 
estimated effect from the divestment event has no omitted relevant industry events because the 
differences between the synthetic and treated firm are abnormally high at the time of the event. 
Finally, we conclude that there is no clear pre-treatment trend in the price, suggesting that the 
Government did not sell in response to movements in the stock price. The negative market 
reaction takes place on the exact event date and there is no evidence of a persistent trend prior 
Figure 6: Output from the Synthetic Control Group Method. The y-axis denotes the differences in the excess stock return 
between Statoil and its synthetic firm, and Telenor and its synthetic firm. The graph illustrates the differences for all four 
divestment events. The date of divestment is illustrated by a stippled vertical line. Large differences on the date of divestment 
implies a significant market reaction due to the decrease of government shares.  
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to the divestment in any of the individual analysis. For this reason, the critical assumption of an 
exogenous event is more likely to be correct. All things considered, the Synthetic Control 
provides evidence of an exogenous event and that the causality runs from divestment to excess 
stock return. Ultimately, the results increase our confidence in the Event Model. 
 
 Robustness of the Results 
To evaluate the credibility of the Synthetic Control, we conduct a final “In-Space” placebo test 
where the treatment is reassigned to all the comparison firms in the donor pool. Using the 
Synthetic Control with the same treatment date on all firms, it is possible to test if there is a 
similar market reaction for the firms in the donor pool. The placebo test enables us, to some 
degree, to interfere on the results. We will deem the results significant if the estimated effect 
from a change in state ownership is unusually large for Statoil and Telenor relative to the 
distribution of the placebo market reactions (Abadie et al., 2015). We expect the market reaction 
for Statoil and Telenor to be significant larger than the market reactions from the placebo tests. 
The results of the placebo tests are illustrated in Figure 7. 
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The yellow line represents the true treatment effect of Statoil or Telenor. The magnitude of the 
differences in both divestments in Telenor and in the first divestment in Statoil, are unusually 
high compared to the placebos given by the grey lines in Figure 7, which suggests a significant 
market reaction from a change in state ownership. In the case of Statoil’s second divestment, 
the magnitude of the differences are more normal relative to the placebos. On that day, many 
of the placebo treatments have higher differences than the one observe for Statoil, suggesting 
that the small negative market reaction from the divestment in Statoil in 2005 is not significant. 
All though eyeballing the graphs might provide some hints on the credibility of the results, it is 
not a valid approach to decide the statistical significance level.  
Figure 7: The graphs illustrate the “In-Space” placebo test of the Synthetic Control. The Synthetic Control is used on all 
firms by reassigning the treatment to all of the comparable firms in the donor pool. The Y-axis denotes the differences between 
the synthetic and treated/placebo firm. The yellow line represents the differences between the synthetic firm and Statoil or 
Telenor, respectively. The grey lines represents the differences between the synthetic firms and the firms in the donor pool 
from the placebo tests. The date of treatment is illustrated by the vertical stippled line. The rarity of the magnitude of the 
difference on the treatment date indicates if the results are significant.  
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Finally, Figure 8 reports the ratios between the Post-RMSPE and the Pre-RMSPE for all events 
in Statoil and Telenor, combined with the ratio for all placebo treatments. A relative large ratio 
indicates that the treatment is statistically significant and that the quality of the pre-treatment 
fit is good, and a small ratio indicates a bad pre-treatment fit or/and insignificant treatment. 
Using the Post/Pre-RMSPE ratios in Figure 8 we are able to calculate the alternative 
significance level of the results.  
 
Figure 8 illustrates that two out of four events have the highest Post/Pre-RMSPE ratio relative 
to the placebo test ratios. As a result, if the divestment was randomly assigned to a firm in the 
“donor pool”, the probability of obtaining a ratio as high as Telenor and Statoil’s first 
divestment is  
1
7
= 14.29% and  
1
9
= 11.11%, respectively. In Telenor’s second divestment the 
probability is 
4
7
= 57.14%, and Statoil’s second divestment 
5
9
= 55.56%. Because the “donor 
pools” only consist of six and eight companies, Telenor and Statoil respectively, the maximum 
significance level is 
1
7
= 14.29% for Telenor and 
1
9
= 11.11% for Statoil. Abadie et al. (2003) 
use the 5% significance level to deem their results valid. As a consequence, the magnitude of 
Figure 8: Output of the Post/Pre RMPSE-Ratio for the In-Space Placebo test for the Synthetic Control. The graphs illustrate 
the ratios between the Post-RMSPE and the Pre-RMSPE for all divestment in Statoil and Telenor, combined with the ratios for 
all placebo treatments. A relative large ratio compared to the rest of the sample indicates that the market reaction from the 
divestment is statistically significant and that the quality of the pre-treatment fit is good. A small ratio indicates a bad pre-
treatment fit or/and insignificant market reaction. The red square highlights the Post/Pre-RMPSE Ratio for the actual 
divestments for Statoil and Telenor. 
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the market reaction from the Synthetic Control cannot be treated as statistically significant. 
However, the Synthetic Control, illustrated in Figure 6, is still valid as an indication of the 
exogenous nature of the divestment event. 
 
 Limitations of the Results 
The relevance of the Post/Pre-RMSPE ratio test is highly dependent on the quality of the pre-
treatment fit. As mentioned earlier, a poor pre-treatment fit results in lower ratios. 
Unfortunately, this is the case with the Synthetic Control. The Synthetic Control replicates the 
excess stock return of Statoil and Telenor fairly well, but the RMSPE is too large to be used for 
any significance level. As a result, the ratios from Figure 8 should not be trusted. For the 
analysis it means that we do not have any reliable significance levels from the Synthetic 
Control.  
 
 Empirical Impact of the Results 
 
The General OLS Model finds no significant correlation when analysing the general 
relationship between state ownership and abnormal return. The estimated relationship is 
positive, but not significant which implies that state ownership in general has a neutral effect 
on the abnormal return of the firm. In addition, the model reveals that state ownership increases 
the market beta of the firm. The model reveals a 0.314 higher market beta in state-owned firms 
compared to private firms, significant at a 1% level. Thus, if the OLS-assumptions hold, the 
General OLS Model predicts that state ownership has a neutral effect on abnormal return, but 
leads to higher systematic risk.  
The Event Model estimates a 40.1% reduction in daily abnormal return using a 1-day event 
window, K=1, for a hypothetical 100% divestment. The negative market reaction indicates that 
state ownership leads to higher abnormal return for Telenor and Statoil, if the event is 
exogenous. Moreover, the Event Model finds that the market beta increases with 0.123 at a 5% 
significance level after a divestment, implying that state ownership reduces the systematic risk 
of the firm. The conflicting results regarding systematic risk between the Event Model and the 
General OLS Model can methodologically be explained by different reference groups, private 
firms and previous levels of market betas, in the two models. 
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Earlier studies are concerned with the potential selection bias problem due to fundamental 
differences between state-owned and private firms. However, the Event Model provides 
evidence that state ownership in some cases truly has an effect on stock performance. As a 
result, the correlation in the General OLS Model, represented by SOE will to some extent be 
caused by state ownership. It is worth mentioning that the possibility of fundamental, fixed 
differences in the dataset could still cause bias in the SOE variable, but the Event Model has 
proven that in the case of Telenor and Statoil abnormal return is partly a result of the benefits 
of having the Norwegian Government as an owner. However, differences within state-owned 
firms, and between state-owned firms and private, which are not controlled for in the General 
OLS Model, make us unable to conclude that the SOE is an unbiased estimate of the state 
ownership effect on stock performance. 
Finally, the Synthetic Control indicates that the divestment decision is not endogenous, in terms 
of reverse causality or omitted variable bias, which makes the Event Model statistically valid. 
The placebo tests of the Event Study and the results of the Synthetic Control strengthen the 
statistically significance and validity of the negative market reaction following a divestment. 
As a consequence of the relative poor quality of the pre-treatment fit, the Synthetic Control is 
only valid45 as a robustness test of the exogeneity of the event. 
A limitation to the results are the small sample selection of state-owned firms and divestments 
which limit the impact of the results in the Event Study. There could be differences between 
state-owned firms, as a consequence, we have to be careful to generalize the results of the Event 
Model. The empirical results suggest that state ownership has positive impact on the abnormal 
return of Statoil and Telenor, but have an overall neutral effect for all state-owned firms. In 
addition, the results suggest that state ownership leads to higher systematic risk compared to 
private firms and that privatization leads to higher systematic risk. The results from the General 
OLS Model will be emphasized the most in the analysis, but the model alone is most likely not 
statistically valid due to unobservable differences between state-owned and private firms. To 
provide an economic valid answer to our research question the results have to be analysed using 
economic theory. 
 
                                                 
45 If the results of the Synthetic Control were statistically valid, we could also conclude on the size of the individual market 
reaction due to a reduction in state ownership. This could have been used to analyse different thresholds levels of privatization.   
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7 Economic Analysis 
 
The abnormal return for Statoil and Telenor in the Event Model are significant and robust. 
However, the General OLS Model do not find empirical support for a positive correlation 
between state ownership and abnormal return. To be able to conclude on the impact of state 
ownership in Norway, we need to further elaborate on the economics behind the results. Hence, 
economic theory is used to supplement the empirical analysis. Our economic view is through 
theoretical arguments derived from Agency Theory and Pricing Theory. 
 
 Agency Theory Arguments 
 
Corporate governance contributes to abnormal return. The General OLS Model documents a 
positive, but not significant, correlation between state ownership and abnormal return. 
However, the negative market reaction estimated in the Event Model implies that state 
ownership is believed to have a positive impact on the abnormal return. Privatization in 
Norwegian state-owned firms diversifies ownership which separates ownership and control, 
and creates agency costs (Fama, 1980). The “Managerial View” predicts that this should lead 
to reduced performance and could be one explanation for the negative market reaction estimated 
in the Event Model. Moreover, diversified ownership might impair the corporate governance 
practises in the state-owned firms and thus, to a greater extent encourage rent seeking 
behaviour. As a result, managers in Statoil and Telenor might pursue their own personal goals 
after privatization which diminish the value of the firm. It is reasonable to assume that it is in 
the interest of the Government to ensure the highest market value of their assets. Highly 
developed corporate governance practices increase the likelihood of attracting investors and 
help build a financially and strategically strong organization for long-term growth in 
shareholder value. For this reason, state ownership might induce corporate control and ensure 
shareholder value maximization. Hence, a potential explanation of the perceived positive 
impact of state ownership in Statoil and Telenor, is through better corporate governance 
practices. 
The corporate governance role of the Government might create free-rider opportunities 
resulting in abnormal return for investors holding state-owned company stocks. According to 
the dilution effect of the “Managerial View”, state-owned should outperform private firms 
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because of better monitoring of managers. High ownership stakes in Telenor (53.97%) and 
Statoil (67%) increases the incentives for corporate governance (Laffont, 1993). The 
Government is a majority owner who is likely to spend time and resources on enforcing 
shareholder value maximization thus, creating a free-rider opportunity for passive investors. On 
the contrary, investors in private firms with diluted ownership will not have the same free-rider 
opportunity. Moreover, this implies that passive investors in state-owned firms profit on the 
corporate governance initiatives of the Government and that state-owned should outperform 
private firms. Thus, high quality of corporate governance practices could be one explanations 
for the positive abnormal return documented in Statoil and Telenor. Different aspects of state 
ownership affect the abnormal return of a firm either positively or negatively. Even though the 
results in the General OLS Model reveal a neutral effect of state ownership, the corporate 
governance role of the Government might contribute with abnormal return. However, other 
aspects of state ownership might neutralize the positive contribution with offsetting effects. 
Another explanation of the neutral effect in the General OLS Model could be that corporate 
governance practises differ between state-owned firms. The Government might have different 
roles in Statoil and Telenor, than in the rest of their ownership portfolio. As a consequence, 
only shareholders in Statoil and Telenor benefit from state ownership. 
On the other hand, board members representing the Government might not have the right 
financial incentives to induce corporate control. The Government relies on their representatives 
in the board of directors to act on behalf of the Government and to preserve the value of the 
company. However, lack of incentives might lead to impaired corporate control, and will have 
a negative effect on the performance of state-owned firms. The representatives are not 
committed with any personal investments, which might lead to lack of proper incentives to 
monitor the behaviour of the managers (Xu & Wang, 1999). This implies that state ownership 
should be negative correlated with abnormal return, which contradicts the neutral effect 
estimated in the General OLS Model. Moreover, a divestment reduces the number of 
Government’s representatives in the board of directors and should result in a positive market 
reaction. The argument is inconsistent with the results for Statoil and Telenor, but could be 
applicable for other firms in the General OLS Model if the financial incentives to induce 
corporate control vary between state-owned firms. 
In addition, state ownership might lead to the pursuit of political goals rather than shareholder 
value maximization. Having the Government as a majority owner can create "majority-minority 
problems"(Gitmark, 2015). The Government could be tempted to gain advantages at the 
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expense of the minority owners and pursuit other goals which could lead to lower returns. 
However, the principles of passive ownership weakens the “Political View” argument. The 
Norwegian Government has clear corporate governance principles which state that it shall act 
as a passive investor. This implies that it cannot interfere in neither strategic decisions nor 
operational activities.  
On the other hand, the election of representatives in the board of directors is a political and 
subjective process, as a result, the representatives might be political biased. The political bias 
can result in non-profit maximizing goals, leading to a negative abnormal stock return. This 
argument could explain parts of the results in the General OLS Model. The “Political View” 
contributes with a negative aspect to the analysis of why state ownership has a neutral effect on 
abnormal return. Political and social goals could reduce the profitability of the firm and offset 
other positive attributes of the Norwegian Government, which results in a neutral effect of state 
ownership. Following the same argument, the market would expect state-owned firms to be 
more efficient and react positively to a divestment. A reduction in state ownership could serve 
as a signal of a reduction or potential elimination of the focus on social and political goals in 
the firm. The divestments in Telenor and Statoil lead to less government control 
and make private investors more responsible for ensuring a shareholder value maximization 
strategy. The argument is supported by Boardman and Vining (1989), Frydman et al. (1999) 
and Gupta (2005) who find evidence of private and fully privatized firms being more efficient 
than state-owned. The argument contradicts the results from the Event Model. However, one 
explanation could be that the control rights continues to be in the hands of the Government after 
the divestment. 
Divestments of limited size reduces the benefits of privatization. The “Political View” argument 
contradicts the results of a negative market reaction in Statoil and Telenor. However, it is 
possible that the market does not consider the small divestments in Statoil and Telenor to be 
sufficient. The market might not believe that a small reduction in state ownership is a big 
enough commitment for a significant reduction in the political influence over the firm. Earlier 
studies support our belief that full privatization is vital for achieving performance 
improvements. Scholars find that control rights have to be passed on to private hands before 
achieving any privatization benefits. Boardman and Vining's (1989) results indicate that 
efficiency and profitability gains only are achieved with full privatization. Another study 
by Eckel, Eckel and Singal (1997) finds concrete evidence that the efficiency of Air Canada did 
not increase until the control passed to private hands. As a consequence, the level of state 
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ownership has to surpass a certain threshold level in order to achieve the advantages of 
privatization. It is possible that the small divestments in Statoil and Telenor are not big enough 
for the financial market to react positively on. For this reason, the “Political View” argument 
of a more effective and profitable company after divestment due to a reduction in political goals, 
might be less relevant when analysing the divestments in Telenor and Statoil.  
Many factors affect stock performance, which makes it difficult to conclude on the economic 
mechanism behind the results. Some characteristics of the Government contributes to abnormal 
return, while other could have a negative impact. It is reasonable to believe that partial 
privatization increases efficiency due to fewer political goals, but other benefits from having 
the Norwegian Government as an owner could explain the negative market reaction estimated 
in the Event Model. Varying impact of state ownership could be explained by different roles of 
the Norwegian Government in the state-owned firms. As a result, state ownership in Statoil and 
Telenor might have a significant positive effect, but on a general basis the effect of state 
ownership is neutral as documented in the General OLS Model. It is important to emphasize 
that the increased efficiency earlier studies report is not necessarily inconsistent with a neutral 
effect of state ownership or a negative market reaction after a divestment. The market might 
believe that the corporate governance principles or other owner characteristics of the Norwegian 
Government outweigh or neutralize the increased efficiency from privatization. Especially the 
perception of protection against downside risk through channelling of government funds to the 
firms could be an important mechanism which might offset the negative aspects of the state 
ownership. 
 
 Soft Budget Constraints 
 
The general relationship between state ownership and higher systematic risk, and the negative 
market reaction documented in Statoil and Telenor, could be the result of soft budget 
constraints. Increased investments and protection against downside risk, is a mechanism 
through which soft budget constraints could affect systematic risk and abnormal return. 
Channelling of government funds and independent management can result in higher risk taking. 
At the same time, the Government is unlikely to allow the firm to face bankruptcy, thus, 
reducing downside risk and the firm’s market beta without changing the expected return of its 
investments, potentially increasing the firm’s abnormal return. The impact of soft budget 
constraints will be discussed in the sections below.  
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The passive ownership of the Government could lead to higher systematic risk in the firm’s 
investments. The argument supports the results in the General OLS Model of a higher 
systematic risk in state-owned firms compared to private. The passive role of the Government 
in investment and strategic decisions creates an administrative controlled firm which implies 
that the decisive authority transferred from the board of directors46 to the management. Thus, 
the passive ownership structure may have implications for the firm’s investment behaviour. 
Managers might seek more opportunistic investments which isolated could lead to greater 
systematic risks and hence, according to CAPM, higher expected return. The argument implies 
higher systematic risk for state-owned firms, and is consistent with the results in 
the General OLS Model. 
Moreover, financial characteristic of the Government can increase the market beta of the firm. 
Long investment horizon combined with a well-diversified large portfolio, implies that the 
Norwegian Government is risk-seeking (Fiskeridepartementet, 2014). A financially strong 
owner with low risk aversion results in investment opportunities and funding for state-owned 
firms not available for private. For this reason, state ownership could lead to investments with 
higher systematic risk compared to private ownership if capital is a scarce resource. This is in 
line with the results from the General OLS Model where the model estimates a higher market 
beta for state-owned firms compared to private. 
However, other owner characteristics of the Norwegian Government reduces the systematic 
risk of the firm by partially removing the threat of bankruptcy. The Government is unlikely to 
allow big and strategically important firms to go bankrupt, thus potentially eliminating or 
reducing downside risk. The Government acts as a bailout investor. Without the threat of 
bankruptcy, the firms’ downside risk is limited, resulting in a lower market beta of the firm 
compared to the weighted average of its investments47. Following this argument, a reduction in 
state ownership results in less protection against downside risk which leads to higher market 
beta of the firm. The argument supports the results in the Event Model, where we find evidence 
of an average increase in the market beta after a divestment, implying that the systematic risk 
increases with privatization. The results diverge from the positive relationship in 
the General OLS Model between state ownership and systematic risk.  
                                                 
46 In private companies the owners, through the board of directors, have the decisive authority of the firm. 
47 The assumption behind the arguments is that firms constitutes of a portfolio of investment. The firms expected return and 
risk is calculated as a weighted average of its portfolio. 
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However, the diverging results from the General OLS Model and the Event model regarding 
systematic risk could be the result of differences between the systematic risk of the firm and 
its investments. Whereas state ownership might lead to riskier investments, the Government 
also provides the firm with protection against any downside risk. As a result, the systematic risk 
of the firm is lower than the weighted average of its investment. In this way, it is natural to 
observe a higher systematic risk in state-owned firms compared to private firms, and a higher 
market beta when the protection against downside risk is reduced after a divestment. This 
argument supports the findings regarding systematic risk in the general OLS Model and the 
Event Model. The Section below will explain the impact of protection against downside risk. 
A protection against downside risk, without changing the expected return of its investments, is 
a source of abnormal return. Investors in state-owned firms get the expected return from the 
firm’s investment, but at a lower risk than if they were to replicate the same cash flow. For the 
same market beta, a state-owned firm has a higher expected return than the comparable private 
firm, resulting in positive abnormal return. As a result, the bailout role of the Norwegian 
Government could be a source of abnormal return and contributes positively to the estimated 
neutral effect of state ownership in the General OLS Model. 
An increase in systematic risk after a divestment, without changing the expected return, leads 
to a negative market reaction. Pricing Theory predicts that the market reacts with an immediate 
negative price correction on the first trading day after the announcement because of the 
anticipation of an increase in systematic risk for the same cash flow. According to Gordon’s 
Growth Model and CAPM, an increase in systematic risk increases the cost of equity, and if 
future dividends are held constant, then stock prices drop immediately. This is in line with the 
immediate negative market reaction and the increase in the systematic risk of both Telenor and 
Statoil estimated in the Event Model. The argument supports the findings for Telenor and 
Statoil in the Event Model. However, soft budget constraints are not in every aspect positive 
for state-owned firms, especially the lack of market discipline could affect the profitability of 
the firms.  
Lack of market discipline might cause inefficient state-owned firms. The disciplinary effect of 
the market is a second mechanism through which soft budget constraints could affect the market 
value of a firm. Fully privatized firms strive to be as efficient and competitive as possible 
because the threat of financial distress, credit ratings and take-overs is more important to private 
firms For this reason, private firms should be more efficient than state-owned, which all things 
equal, contributes negatively to the effect of state ownership and contradicts the results for 
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Statoil and Telenor. Majumdar (1998) and Kornai, Maskin and Roland (2003) find supporting 
evidence of soft budget constraints leading to inefficiency in state-owned firms. However, it is 
important to emphasize that efficiency and stock performance are not necessarily perfect 
correlated. Soft budget constraints might lead to less efficient firms, but protection against 
downside risk might have a positive impact on the abnormal return. Moreover, the impact of 
soft budget constraints may differ between state-owned firms and could be one reason behind 
the neutral effect of state ownership estimated in the General OLS Model. 
 
 Economic Conclusion 
 
Economic theory does not provide any guidance on the trade-off between state and private 
ownership. Earlier studies tend to support arguments in favour of privatization, however, 
without a proper test, it is difficult to conclude on whether the “Managerial View” or the 
”Political View” of Agency Theory affect returns the most. In addition to the diverging 
theoretical effect of state ownership, the Government might have varying roles and owner 
characteristics in the state-owned firms. As a result, the effect of state ownership varies between 
the firms analysed in the General OLS Model and could explain why we do not have the 
empirical support to conclude on a general basis that Norwegian state ownership has a positive 
or negative effect on abnormal return. Neither economic arguments nor the empirical results 
are able to favour private over state ownership, resulting in a conclusion of a neutral effect of 
Norwegian state ownership which may vary between firms. 
The abnormal return for Statoil and Telenor in the Event Model are significant and robust, but 
it is difficult to conclude on the economic mechanism behind the results. One explanation is 
that protection against downside risk for a given level of expected return, results in a positive 
abnormal return. Further, a divestment might result in less protection against financial distress, 
leading to higher market beta without increasing the expected return. As a result, the market 
anticipates the higher future market beta and reacts negatively, which is consistent with the 
result in the Event Model. To conclude on the economic reasons for the observed relationship 
between state ownership and abnormal stock return, each economic argument has to be 
empirically tested. This is left for future research. Further, we recommend future research to 
analyse state ownership characteristics in Telenor and Statoil with other state-owned firms to 
see if the Norwegian Government can contribute with abnormal return in all its firms. 
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8 Firm-Specific Analysis 
 
 Motivation and Background 
 
As a supplementary analysis, we compare the abnormal return of the individual state-owned 
companies in the sample compared to their peer-average. Our motivation behind this analysis 
is that the performance of state-owned firms are often48 compared to an index or industry using 
accumulated return. Using our own dataset, the state-owned firms are compared to their average 
peer. The results are presented in Figure 9.  
  
                                                 
48 Among others, an article from Aftenposten uses accumulated graphs to conclude on the effect of state ownership (Bjørnestad, 
2014, November 08) 
Figure 9: Accumulated excess return of the state-owned companies and the industry average. The industry average is 
constructed from the average of the state-owned companies’ peer-groups. 
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Figure 9 indicates that some of the state-owned firms have higher excess stock return than their 
respective peer-average. However, graphing accumulated returns mislead the true relationship 
between state ownership and excess stock return because one period of good return will have 
an infinite effect on the accumulated return An abnormally high return at time 𝑇0 gives a spike 
in the accumulated return graph which lasts for the whole period 𝑇𝑡>𝑇0. Thus, in order to 
estimate the relationship between individual state-owned firms and abnormal return compared 
to the average peer-group, we use daily rather than accumulated return and consider normal 
return. 
 
 Firm-Specific Model 
 
We estimate a firm specific OLS Model49 for each of the state-owned firms. 
𝑅𝑖𝑡 = 𝛼𝑖 + 𝐵1𝑆𝑂𝐸𝑖 + 𝐵2
𝑖 𝑅𝑡
𝑚 + 𝐵3
𝑖 𝑆𝑀𝐵𝑡 + 𝐵4
𝑖𝐻𝑀𝐿𝑡 + 𝐵5
𝑖 𝑀𝑂𝑀𝑡 + 𝐵6𝑌𝑒𝑎𝑟𝑡 + 𝐵7𝑀𝑜𝑛𝑡ℎ𝑡
+ 𝜀𝑖𝑡, 𝑖𝑓 𝐼𝑛𝑑𝑢𝑠𝑡𝑟𝑦𝑗 = 𝑗 
The model has the same specifications as the General OLS Model in Section 6.2, except that 
the regression is run for each industry50 separately. The firm sample consists of state-owned 
firms and the average peer. The model tests if the state-owned firm has an abnormal return 
higher than the average in its industry. It is an empirical test of the graphs in Figure 9.  
 
 Results of the Firm-Specific Model 
 
We perform eight individual regressions, one for each state-owned company. The results are 
presented in Table 9. The variables listed in column 1 to 8 capture the firm-specific relationship 
between state ownership and abnormal stock return for each industry. Column 5 shows that 
SAS has 0.0627% lower abnormal return compared to its peer-average, significant at 1% level. 
The coefficients displayed in column 1, 2, 3, 6 and 8 show that Statoil, Hydro, Kongsberg, DNB 
and Telenor have in average significant positive daily abnormal stock returns relative to its 
peer-average. The coefficients for Hydro, DNB and Kongsberg are significant at a 1% level, 
Telenor and Statoil are significant at a 5% level. Column 7 shows that Yara is not significant.  
                                                 
49 We control for the four Fama French factors, excess market return, SMB, HML and Momentum by interacting the factors 
with a company dummy variable. This creates individual factor loadings.   
50 Airlines, Farming and Fishing, Fertilizer, Financials, Oil and Gas, Industrials, Materials and Telecom 
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The results from the Firm-Specific Model show that the relationship between state ownership 
and abnormal return varies between firms. However, the results demonstrate that majority of 
the state-owned firms achieves a higher abnormal return compared to the average peer. It is 
important to emphasize that the results are an empirical test of the graphs in Figure 9, and should 
not be interpreted as the true effect of state ownership in the individuals firms. 
 
Table 9: Columns 1-10 show the results of the firm-specific regressions in which each state-owned company is regressed on 
the industry average. The reported coefficient is on a dummy variable for each stated-owned company. The reference group 
is the average peer-group to the state-owned company in question. Furthermore, we control for the four Fama French factors, 
excess market return, SMB, HML and Momentum, each interacted with a company dummy variable. Finally, we control for 
macro factors and seasonal factors using yearly and monthly dummies, respectively. 
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9 Conclusion 
 
The Norwegian state ownership plays a substantial role in the Norwegian economy. The 
purpose of this thesis, is to analyse the effect of state ownership on abnormal return and 
systematic risk in Norwegian state-owned firms listed on Oslo Stock Exchange in the period 
1999-2015. We compare stock performance between state-owned and private firms and 
investigate four divestments where Statoil and Telenor are partially privatized through block 
sales to foreign institutional investors. To our knowledge, this thesis is the first to use the 
immediate market reactions to analyse the effect of state ownership. Using an OLS specification 
and an event-study, we are able to estimate the effect of state ownership on abnormal return 
and systematic risk, and to isolate the effect of state ownership in Statoil and Telenor. 
The general relationship between state ownership and abnormal return is analysed in the 
General OLS Model. The model reveals a positive but not significant correlation which implies 
that state ownership in general has a neutral effect on the abnormal return of the firm. The 
results reject Hypothesis 1 of a negative effect of state ownership and imply that the Norwegian 
Government contributes with positive abnormal return which offsets the negative effects earlier 
studies report. In addition, the model reveals that state ownership increases the market beta of 
the firm. We find evidence of a 0.314 higher market beta in state-owned firms compared to 
private firms, significant at a 1% level. The results contradict Hypothesis 2 of less risky state-
owned firms and imply that the attributes of the Norwegian Government affect the investment 
behaviour of the firm. Thus, if the OLS-assumptions hold, the General OLS Model predicts that 
state ownership has a neutral effect on abnormal normal, but leads to higher systematic risk. 
Further, this thesis has analysed the market reactions from four exogenous divestment events 
in Statoil and Telenor in an Event Model inspired by Dube et al. (2011). The results indicate 
that state ownership is perceived by the market to have a positive effect on the abnormal return 
of Statoil and Telenor. The results reveal a negative market reaction of a change in abnormal 
return of 40.1% for a 1-day event window, K=1, and a cumulative change in abnormal return 
of 38.2% for a 2-day event window, K=2, both significant at a 1% level. The market reaction 
happens immediately after the divestment announcement and is significant up to three days after 
the event. The results reject Hypothesis 3 of a positive market reaction and further suggest that 
the Norwegian Government contributes with positive aspects affecting abnormal return. 
The exogeneity of the event is validated using the Synthetic Control Group Method. The results 
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from the Event Model are significant and robust for both "In-Space" and "In-Time" placebo 
tests.  
Finally, the results reveal that privatization increases the systematic risk of Telenor and Statoil. 
The market beta increases with 0.123 at a 5% significance level after a divestment. The results 
contradict the positive relationship between state ownership and systematic risk in the General 
OLS Model. However, the diverging results could be explained by differences between the 
systematic risk of the firm and the weighted average of its investments. State ownership might 
lead to riskier investments, and at the same time provide protection against downside risk. As 
a result, the systematic risk of the firm is lower than the weighted average of its investment. 
Following this argument, the systematic risk in state-owned firms would be higher compared 
to private, and a higher market beta would be observed when protection against downside risk 
is reduced after a divestment.  
The mechanisms behind the results are difficult to identify because many aspects of state 
ownership could affect stock performance. However, the Event Model is able to quantify one 
mechanism through which state ownership could affect abnormal return. The results of the 
Event Model imply that state ownership reduces the systematic risk of Statoil and Telenor. This 
could be a source of abnormal return if the Government reduces the downside risk of the firm 
without affecting the expected return. A reduction in state ownership results in less protection 
against downside risk, leading to higher market beta without increasing the expected return. As 
a result, the market reaction from a state divestment will be negative as we observe in the Event 
Model. However, the results from the Event Model cannot be generalized to all state-owned 
firms because state ownership is not homogenous between firms. The effect of Norwegian state 
ownership may vary between different firms. 
Neither the results from the empirical analysis nor economic theory provides any clear guidance 
on the trade-offs between private and state ownership. The “Political View”, “Managerial 
View” and different aspect of soft budget constraints provide diverging arguments. In addition, 
the Norwegian Government’s owner characteristics and roles may vary between the different 
firms. As a consequence, the theoretical conclusion on how state ownership affects the 
abnormal return is inconclusive and might be neutral as we estimate in the General OLS model. 
Earlier studies support the claim that state ownership leads to inefficiency and low productivity 
through political goals and lack of market discipline. Boardman and Vining 
(1989), Dewenter and Malatesta (2001), Gupta (2005) and Frydman et al. (1999) find clear 
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evidence that privatization leads to profitability and efficiency gains. Majumdar (1998) also 
supports this claim while investigating the implications of soft budget constraints and the lack 
of market discipline in state-owned firms. Our results of a neutral effect of state ownership are 
somewhat diverging from the results in earlier studies. An explanation could be that this thesis 
stands out from previous work in two ways. First, the dataset consists of market data rather than 
accounting data. Second, we analyse the effect of state ownership on abnormal return and 
systematic risk rather than on efficiency or profitability. A neutral effect of state ownership 
could be consistent with previous evidence as long as the Government contributes with 
shareholder value which offsets the lower efficiency.  
Given the evidence from earlier studies, we conclude that the Norwegian Government 
contributes with abnormal return which neutralizes, and in Statoil and Telenor offsets other 
negative aspects of state ownership. Further, we conclude that state ownership affects the 
systematic risk of the firm positively compared to private ownership, but in the case of Statoil 
and Telenor contributes with a reduction in systematic risk in comparison to higher levels of 
private ownership. 
The event analysis is relatively robust. The Synthetic Control Group Method combined with 
"In-Time" and "In-Space" placebos stress the robustness of the results. Still, the models and the 
dataset are not perfect. One key limitation to the results in the General OLS Model is the 
potential selection bias problem. The estimated neutral effect of state ownership could be biased 
due to fundamental differences between private and state-owned firms. We recommend future 
research to include a broader variety of state-owned firms and divestment events to address the 
general effect of state ownership in an event study to avoid selection bias. Moreover, with 
further divestment events the researcher could analyse at which threshold level of privatization 
the potential increase in efficiency outweighs the benefits of state ownership. Another 
interesting topic for further research is to analyse the characteristics of the Norwegian 
Government’s corporate governance practices in Statoil and Telenor to optimize the 
Government’s contribution to abnormal return in other state-owned firms. 
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10 Appendix 
 
  
Table 10: Descriptive statistics by peer-group. Daily mean raw return is the average daily log 
stock return, market cap is the average market cap and volume is the average daily trading 
volume from the period 05.01.1999 -31.08.2015. Firms listed after 05.01.1999 are included 
from their first trading day.  
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Table 11: Descriptive statistics by peer-group Continued. Daily mean raw return is the average daily log 
stock return, market cap is the average market cap and volume is the average daily trading volume from 
the period 05.01.1999 -31.08.2015. Firms listed after 05.01.1999 are included from their first trading 
day. 
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Figure 101: Plot of individual stock return after 
"Winsorization" 
Figure 110: Plot of individual stock return before "Winsorization" 
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Technical Properties Synthetic Control Method 
The technical properties of the Synthetic Control Method are quite complicated. However, the 
choice of weights W* is quite intuitive. W* is a vector chosen to minimize 
(𝑋1 − 𝑋0𝑊)′𝑉(𝑋1 − 𝑋0) subject to 𝑤𝑗 ≥ 0 (𝑗 = 1, 2, … , 𝐽) and 𝑤1 + ⋯ + 𝑤𝑗 = 1.  
Where 𝑋0 is the firm from the donor pool, and 𝑋1 is the treated firm. The vector, W* optimize 
the combination of publicly listed firms which best resembles the treated firms excess stock 
return determinants; RMRF, HML, SMB and MOM, before the change in state ownership. The 
V vector represents the importance of each excess stock return determinant. The choice of V 
could be subjective, reflecting knowledge about the relative importance of each particular stock 
return predictor, or Stata can determine V such that the excess stock return path for the treated 
firm in the pre-event period is best reproduced by the synthetic control group. In this analysis, 
V is chosen with the latter method. W* then optimizes both the pre-treatment fit of the excess 
stock return and the given determinants of the excess stock return. Mathematically the method 
minimizes the Root Mean Square Prediction Error. The RMSPE is defined below. 
𝑅𝑀𝑆𝑃𝐸 = (
1
𝑇0
∑ (𝑌𝑖𝑡 − ∑ 𝑤𝑗
∗𝑌𝑗𝑡
𝐽+1
𝑗=2
)
2𝑇0
𝑇1
)
1/2
 
Our goal is to approximate the excess stock return path that the treated firm would have 
experienced in the absence of the change in ownership. This is referred to as the counterfactual. 
The counterfactual is mathematically expressed as 𝑌1
∗ = 𝑌0𝑊
∗ and 𝑌1 is the path of the treated 
firm. We are interested in the differences, graphed in Figure 4, after the event between 𝑌1
∗ and 
𝑌1, denoted as ∆𝑌𝑝𝑜𝑠𝑡 (Abadie & Gardeazabal, 2003). 
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Diff-in-Diff and the Synthetic Control Group Method 
The relationship between the DID-estimator and the Synthetic Control estimator is easy to show 
mathematically. The intuition behind the DID estimator can be illustrated with an intuitively 
table: 
The DID-estimators, 𝛿1 is presented in Table 12. The DID estimator can also be written as: 
𝛿1 = 𝑌𝑝𝑟𝑒 − 𝑌𝑝𝑟𝑒. In comparison, the synthetic control group estimator is, ∆𝑌𝑝𝑜𝑠𝑡. The Synthetic 
Control minimizes the pre-treatment differences between the control group and the treatment 
group, ∆𝑌𝑝𝑟𝑒. ∆𝑌𝑝𝑟𝑒 is close to zero if the synthetic control group is of high quality and tracks 
the treated firm’s stock return well. This implies that if the synthetic control group is good, the 
DID estimator and the Synthetic Control estimator should yield the same result.  
 
Strengths and Weaknesses of the Synthetic Control 
An important feature of the Synthetic Control, is that the method forces us to test the similarity 
between the treated firm and the firms from the “donor pool”. As a result, we get an indication 
of the quality of the control group and prevents us from estimating extreme counterfactuals. 
Extreme counterfactuals are those counterfactuals that are far outside the convex hull of the 
data (King & Zeng, 2006). 
Interpolation biases can be severe if the relationship between excess stock return and the four 
factor loadings are highly nonlinear and the support of the variables are high (Abadie et al., 
2010). To avoid this bias we have restricted the donor pool to only include firms with similar 
characteristics to the treated firm. Another reason to consider firms similar to the treated unit, 
is to avoid over-fitting. Over-fitting problems arise when the characteristics of the treated firm 
are artificially matched by exploiting idiosyncratic variations in a large sample of completely 
different firms. This could result in a control group which do not follow the same trends and 
Table 12: Illustration of the DID-estimator 
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characteristics as the treated firm, hence resulting in extreme counterfactuals (Abadie et al., 
2015). 
The credibility of the Synthetic Control depends upon how well it tracks the treated firm’s 
characteristics and 𝑅𝑖𝑡 over a longer time-period prior to the change in state ownership. Abadie 
et al. (2015) do not recommend this approach when the number of pre-treatment periods is 
small or the fit is poor. They also state that a longer period of post-treatment data may be 
required in cases where the treatment effect emerges gradually or changes after the event. Our 
dataset consists of a multiple periods both before and after a change in state ownership and we 
believe that the standards of Abadie et al. (2015) are met. 
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Stata Do-File 
 
The do-file is organized in sequential order of the methodology with explanatory comments for 
each step in the methodology. Descriptive statistics and the General OLS Model come first. 
Further, the do-file of the Event Model is presented and last the four Synthetic Control are 
presented. 
descriptiv sensor - Printed on 14.12.2015 17:24:51
Page 1
1
2 *** Descriptive Statitisics ***
3
4 import excel "C:\Users\Thomas
Kringlebu\Dropbox\Masteroppgave\Sluttfase\Datasett\Paneldata.xlsx", sheet("Sheet1")
cellrange(C1:P368897) firstrow clear
5 cd "C:\Users\Thomas Kringlebu\Dropbox\Masteroppgave\Sluttfase\output stata\Model 1"
6
7 import excel "C:\Users\Stig
Bratfos\Dropbox\Masteroppgave\Sluttfase\Datasett\Paneldata.xlsx", sheet("Sheet1")
cellrange(C1:P368897) firstrow clear
8 cd "C:\Users\Stig Bratfos\Dropbox\Masteroppgave\Sluttfase\output stata\Model 1"
9
10 *** Preparing the dataset ***
11 encode(SOE), gen(SOE1)
12 encode(Company), gen(Company1)
13 encode(Country), gen(Country1)
14 encode(Sector), gen(Sector1)
15 replace Rmrf = ln(1+Rmrf)
16 replace SMB = ln(1+SMB)
17 replace HML = ln(1+HML)
18 replace Momentum = ln(1+Momentum)
19
20 *** Multiplying the closingprice by 100 for the firms where Bloomberg report only 1/100
of the stock price ***
21 replace Closingprice=Closingprice*100 if Company==("Shell")
22 replace Closingprice=Closingprice*100 if Company==("BP")
23 replace Closingprice=Closingprice*100 if Company==("Rolls-Royce")
24 replace Closingprice=Closingprice*100 if Company==("Senior")
25 replace Closingprice=Closingprice*100 if Company==("Vodafone")
26 replace Closingprice=Closingprice*100 if Company==("Carr's Group")
27 replace Closingprice=Closingprice*100 if Company==("Ricardo")
28 replace Closingprice=Closingprice*100 if Company==("Goodwin")
29 replace Closingprice=Closingprice*100 if Company==("Costain Group")
30 replace Closingprice=Closingprice*100 if Company==("Atkins")
31 replace Closingprice=Closingprice*100 if Company==("Intl Consolidated")
32 replace Closingprice=Closingprice*100 if Company==("Israel Chemicals")
33 rename (Closingprice) (Price)
34 rename (Mcap) (Marketcap)
35
36 *** Generating Excess Stock Return ***
37 gen exreturn =return-rf
38 drop if exreturn==.
39
40 *** Deleting the first observation for all companies ***
41 sort Date
42 gen index=_n
43 drop if index<=88
44 xtset Company1 Date
45
46 *** Generate the SOE and StateBeta variable for all State-owned Firms ***
47 gen SOE2 = 1
48 replace SOE2 = 0 if SOE == "No" | SOE == ""
49 gen StateBeta = SOE2*Rmrf
50
51 ******Descriptive before cleaning********
52 scatter exreturn Company1, msize(vsmall) graphregion(color(white))
53 graph export "scatterexreturnbeforewashing.png", replace
54 *** Testing the normality of the returns before cleaning***
55 qui histogram return
56 graph export "histoexreturnbeforewashing.png", replace
57
58 **** Summary Statistics Return, Mcap and Volume - before cleaning*****
59 sum return Marketcap Volume
60 outreg2 using returnMcapVolume, tex replace sum(log) keep(return Marketcap Volume)
61
62 *** Summary Statistics for state-owned vs private, and for all firms ***
63
64 ***Decriptive Return***
65 sum return if SOE2==1
66 outreg2 using returndescriptive if SOE2==1, tex replace sum(log) keep(return) eqkeep(N
mean) cttop(State Owned)
67 sum return if SOE2!=1
68 outreg2 using returndescriptive if SOE2!=1, tex append sum(log) keep(return) eqkeep(N
mean) cttop(Private Firms)
69 sum return
70 outreg2 using returndescriptive, tex append sum(log) keep(return) cttop(State Owned)
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cttop(All Firms)
71
72 ***Decriptive Marketcap***
73 sum Marketcap if SOE2==1
74 outreg2 using marketcapdescriptive if SOE2==1, tex replace sum(log) keep(Marketcap)
eqkeep(N mean) cttop(State Owned)
75 sum Marketcap if SOE2!=1
76 outreg2 using marketcapdescriptive if SOE2!=1, tex append sum(log) keep(Marketcap)
eqkeep(N mean) cttop(Private Firms)
77 sum Marketcap
78 outreg2 using marketcapdescriptive, tex append sum(log) keep(Marketcap) cttop(Private
Firms) cttop(All Firms)
79
80 ***Decriptive Volume***
81 sum Volume if SOE2==1
82 outreg2 using volumedescriptive if SOE2==1, tex replace sum(log) keep(Volume) eqkeep(
N mean) cttop(State Owned)
83 sum Volume if SOE2!=1
84 outreg2 using volumedescriptive if SOE2!=1, tex append sum(log) keep(Volume) eqkeep(N
mean) cttop(Private Firms)
85 sum Volume
86 outreg2 using volumedescriptive, tex append sum(log) keep(Volume) cttop(All Firms)
87
88 **** Summary statistics for all companies, (Appendix)***
89 tab Company1, sum(return)
90 tab Company, sum(Marketcap)
91 tab Company, sum(Volume)
92 outreg2 using companies, tex append sum(detail) keep(return) eqkeep(N mean)
93
94 *** Winsorizing the dataset to handle outliers, at the 98% level***
95 winsor exreturn, gen(Exreturn) p(0.01)
96
97 ***Plottting return after cleaining ***
98 scatter Exreturn Company1, msize(vsmall) graphregion(color(white))
99 graph export "scatterrexreturnafterwashing.png",replace
100
101 *** Testing the normality of the returns after cleaning***
102 histogram Exreturn
103 graph export "historeturnafterwashing.png", replace
104 * The returns are normally distributed
105
106 ***Graphing state-owned firms to the average peer-group***
107 ***Statoil***
108 by Company1: gen sumstat1= sum(exreturn) if Date>(`=td(19jun2001)')
109 twoway (line sumstat1 Date if Company=="Statoil" & Date>(`=td(19jun2001)'), lcolor(red
) graphregion(color(white)) lwidth(vthin)) /*
110 */(line sumstat1 Date if Company=="SecSta" & Date>(`=td(19jun2001)'), lcolor(blue)
graphregion(color(white)) lwidth(vthin)), /*
111 */legend(label(1 "Statoil") label(2 "Oil Sector"))
112 graph export "Statoil.png", replace
113 graph save "Statoil.gph", replace
114
115
116 ***Hydro***
117 ***Sector average***
118 twoway (line sumstat Date if Company=="Hydro", lcolor(red) graphregion(color(white))
lwidth(vthin))/*
119 */(line sumstat Date if Company=="Sechyd", lcolor(blue) graphregion(color(white))
lwidth(vthin)), /*
120 */legend(label(1 "Hydro") label(2 "Materials Sector"))
121 graph export "Hydro.png", replace
122 graph save "Hydro.gph", replace
123
124 ***DnB***
125 ***Sector average***
126 twoway (line sumstat Date if Company=="DnB", lcolor(red) graphregion(color(white))
lwidth(vthin))/*
127 */(line sumstat Date if Company=="SecDnb", lcolor(blue) graphregion(color(white))
lwidth(vthin)), /*
128 */legend(label(1 "DnB") label(2 "Financial Sector"))
129 graph export "DNB.png", replace
130 graph save "DNB.gph", replace
131
132 ***Kongsberggruppen***
133 ***Sector average***
134 twoway (line sumstat Date if Company=="Kongsberg", lcolor(red) graphregion(color(white
)) lwidth(vthin))/*
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135 */(line sumstat Date if Company=="SecKon", lcolor(blue) graphregion(color(white))
lwidth(vthin)), /*
136 */legend(label(1 "Kongsberggruppen") label(2 "Industry Sector"))
137 graph export "Kongsberggruppen.png", replace
138 graph save "KongsbergGruppen.gph", replace
139
140 ***Telenor***
141 ***Sector average***
142 by Company1: gen sumstat2= sum(exreturn) if Date>(`=td(04dec2000)')
143 twoway (line sumstat2 Date if Company=="Telenor" & Date>(`=td(04dec2000)'), lcolor(red
) graphregion(color(white)) lwidth(vthin))/*
144 */(line sumstat2 Date if Company=="SecTel" & Date>(`=td(04dec2000)'), lcolor(blue)
graphregion(color(white)) lwidth(vthin)), /*
145 */legend(label(1 "Telenor") label(2 "Telecom Sector"))
146 graph export "Telenor.png", replace
147 graph save "Telenor.gph", replace
148
149
150 ***Cermaq***
151 ***Sector average***
152 by Company1: gen sumstat3= sum(exreturn) if Date>(`=td(25oct2005)')
153 twoway (line sumstat3 Date if Company=="Cermaq" & Date>(`=td(25oct2005)'), lcolor(red)
graphregion(color(white)) lwidth(vthin))/*
154 */(line sumstat3 Date if Company=="SecCer" & Date>(`=td(25oct2005)'), lcolor(blue)
graphregion(color(white)) lwidth(vthin)), /*
155 */legend(label(1 "Cermaq") label(2 "Farming and Fishing Sector"))
156 graph export "Cermaq.png", replace
157 graph save "Cermaq.gph", replace
158
159
160 ***SAS***
161 ***Sector average***
162 twoway (line sumstat Date if Company=="SAS", lcolor(red) lcolor(red) graphregion(color
(white)) lwidth(vthin))/*
163 */(line sumstat Date if Company=="SecSas", lcolor(blue) graphregion(color(white))
lwidth(vthin)),/*
164 */ legend(label(1 "SAS") label(2 "Airlines Sector"))
165 graph export "SAS.png", replace
166 graph save "SAS.gph", replace
167
168
169
170 ***YARA***
171 ***Sector average***
172 by Company1: gen sumstat6= sum(exreturn) if Date>(`=td(26mar2004)')
173 twoway (line sumstat6 Date if Company=="Yara" & Date>(`=td(26mar2004)'), lcolor(red)
xlabel(`=td(01jan2004)'(1000)`=td(01jan2015)') graphregion(color(white)) lwidth(vthin))/*
174 */(line sumstat6 Date if Company=="SecYar" & Date>(`=td(26mar2004)'), lcolor(blue)
xlabel(`=td(01jan2004)'(1000)`=td(01jan2015)') graphregion(color(white)) lwidth(vthin)), /*
175 */legend(label(1 "Yara") label(2 "Fertilizer Sector"))
176 graph export "Yara.png", replace
177 graph save "Yara.gph", replace
178
179 graph combine "Statoil.gph" "Hydro.gph" "DNB.gph" "KongsbergGruppen.gph" "Telenor.gph"
, graphregion(color(white)) cols(2)
180 graph export "Combined1.png", replace
181 graph combine "Cermaq.gph" "Kvaerner.gph" "Aker Solutions.gph" "SAS.gph" "Yara.gph",
graphregion(color(white)) cols(2)
182 graph export "Combined2.png", replace
183 graph combine
184
185
186
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1
2 ****** OLS Model ******
3
4 import excel "C:\Users\Thomas
Kringlebu\Dropbox\Masteroppgave\Sluttfase\Datasett\Paneldata.xlsx", sheet("Sheet1")
cellrange(C1:P368897) firstrow clear
5 cd "C:\Users\Thomas Kringlebu\Dropbox\Masteroppgave\Sluttfase\output stata\Model 1"
6
7 import excel "C:\Users\Stig
Bratfos\Dropbox\Masteroppgave\Sluttfase\Datasett\Paneldata.xlsx", sheet("Sheet1")
cellrange(C1:P368897) firstrow clear
8 cd "C:\Users\Stig Bratfos\Dropbox\Masteroppgave\Sluttfase\output stata\Model 1"
9
10 *** Preparing the dataset ***
11 encode(SOE), gen(SOE1)
12 encode(Company), gen(Company1)
13 encode(Country), gen(Country1)
14 encode(Sector), gen(Sector1)
15 replace Rmrf = ln(1+Rmrf)
16 replace SMB = ln(1+SMB)
17 replace HML = ln(1+HML)
18 replace Momentum = ln(1+Momentum)
19
20 *** Multiplying the closingprice by 100 for the firms where Bloomberg report only 1/100
of the stock price ***
21 replace Closingprice=Closingprice*100 if Company==("Shell")
22 replace Closingprice=Closingprice*100 if Company==("BP")
23 replace Closingprice=Closingprice*100 if Company==("Rolls-Royce")
24 replace Closingprice=Closingprice*100 if Company==("Senior")
25 replace Closingprice=Closingprice*100 if Company==("Vodafone")
26 replace Closingprice=Closingprice*100 if Company==("Carr's Group")
27 replace Closingprice=Closingprice*100 if Company==("Ricardo")
28 replace Closingprice=Closingprice*100 if Company==("Goodwin")
29 replace Closingprice=Closingprice*100 if Company==("Costain Group")
30 replace Closingprice=Closingprice*100 if Company==("Atkins")
31 replace Closingprice=Closingprice*100 if Company==("Intl Consolidated")
32 replace Closingprice=Closingprice*100 if Company==("Israel Chemicals")
33 rename (Closingprice) (Price)
34 rename (Mcap) (Marketcap)
35
36 *** Generating Excess Stock Return ***
37 gen exreturn =return-rf
38 drop if exreturn==.
39
40 *** Deleting the first observation for all companies ***
41 sort Date
42 gen index=_n
43 drop if index<=88
44 xtset Company1 Date
45
46 *** Generate the SOE and StateBeta variable for all State-owned Firms ***
47 gen SOE2 = 1
48 replace SOE2 = 0 if SOE == "No" | SOE == ""
49 gen StateBeta = SOE2*Rmrf
50
51 *** Winsorizing the dataset to handle outliers, at the 98% level***
52 winsor exreturn, gen(Exreturn) p(0.01)
53
54 ***** THE OLS MODEL *****
55
56 *** generating yearly dummies ***
57 gen year=year(Date)
58 tab year, gen(y)
59 rename (y1 y2 y3 y4 y5 y6 y7 y8 y9 y10 y11 y12 y13 y14 y15 y16 y17)(y99 y00 y01 y02
y03 y04 y05 y06 y07 y08 y09 y10 y11 y12 y13 y14 y15)
60
61 *** generating monthly dummies ***
62 gen month= month(Date)
63 tabulate month, gen(Jan)
64 rename (Jan2 Jan3 Jan4 Jan5 Jan6 Jan7 Jan8 Jan9 Jan10 Jan11 Jan12) (Feb Mar Apr May
Jun Jul Aug Sep Oct Nov Dec)
65
66 *** generating peer group dummies  for the firm-specific OLS Model***
67 gen OilGas = 1 if Sector == "Oil&Gas" // Statoil and its peer group
68 replace OilGas =0 if Sector != "Oil&Gas"
69
70 gen Industrials = 1 if Sector == "Industrials" // Kongsberg and its peer group
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71 replace Industrials =0 if Sector != "Industrials"
72
73 gen Airlines = 1 if Sector == "Airlines" // SAS and its peer group
74 replace Airlines =0 if Sector != "Airlines"
75
76 gen Fishing = 1 if Sector == "Farming and Fishing" // Cermaq and its peer group
77 replace Fishing =0 if Sector != "Farming and Fishing"
78
79 gen Fertilizer = 1 if Sector == "Fertilizer" // Yara and its peer group
80 replace Fertilizer =0 if Sector != "Fertilizer"
81
82 gen Financials = 1 if Sector == "Financials" // DnB and its peer group
83 replace Financials =0 if Sector != "Financials"
84
85 gen Materials = 1 if Sector == "Materials" // Hydro and its peer group
86 replace Materials =0 if Sector != "Materials"
87
88 gen Telecom = 1 if Sector == "Telecom" // Telenor and its peer group
89 replace Telecom =0 if Sector != "Telecom"
90
91 *** generating company specific dummies ***
92 tabulate Company1, gen(x)
93 rename (x1 x2 x3 x4 x5 x6 x7 x8 x9 x10 x11)(Agrium AkerSolutions Akka Alcoa AlfaLaval
AlphaBank Aluar Alumina Andritz Atkins BP)
94 rename (x12 x13 x14 x15 x16 x17 x18 x19 x20 x21 x22 x23 x24 x25 x26)(Bankinter Beijer
Bucher Cameron Carr Century Cermaq CF /*
95 */Chevron Concentric ConoccoP Costain Danske EmiliaRoma Deutsche)
96 rename (x27 x28 x29 x30 x31 x32 x33 x34 x35 x36 x37 x38 x39 x40 x41)(DiSondrio DNB
DrilQ Exxon FMC Fischer Galp Gea /*
97 */Goodwin Graco Havfisk HelixEnergy Hydro Intl Israel)
98 rename (x42 x43 x44 x45 x46 x47 x48 x49 x50 x51 x52 x53 x54 x55 x56)(KS Kaiser
Kongsberg Krones Kvaerner Megafon/*
99 */ MobileTeles MonbergThorsen Mosaic Noranda Oberbank Oceaneering Potash REPSOL
Ricardo)
100 rename (x57 x58 x59 x60 x61 x62 x63 x64 x65 x66 x67 x68 x69 x70 x71 x72 x73 x74 x75
x76 x77 x78 x79 x80 x81 x82 x83 x84 x85 x86 x87 x88)/*
101 */(RollsRoyce SAS SecAker SecCer SecDnb SecKon SecKva SecSas SecSta SecTel Secyar
Sechyd Senior Shell SOC Statoil Subsea7 Sweco TDC Technip Tele2 TelecomItalia Telefonica /*
102 */ Telenor Total Transaero Unicredit UnitedCompany UnitedInternet Uralkali Vodafone
Yara)
103
104 *************
105 *Model 1 reg*
106 *************
107 *** Creating individual loadings for the Fama French Four Factors ***
108 gen agrRmrf=Agrium*Rmrf
109 gen akkRmrf=Akka*Rmrf
110 gen alcRmrf=Alcoa*Rmrf
111 gen alfRmrf=AlfaLaval*Rmrf
112 gen alpRmrf= AlphaBank*Rmrf
113 gen aluaRmrf= Aluar*Rmrf
114 gen alumRmrf= Alumina*Rmrf
115 gen andRmrf=Andritz*Rmrf
116 gen atkRmrf=Atkins*Rmrf
117 gen bpRmrf=BP*Rmrf
118 gen banRmrf=Bankinter*Rmrf
119 gen beiRmrf=Beijer*Rmrf
120 gen bucRmrf= Bucher*Rmrf
121 gen camRmrf=Cameron*Rmrf
122 gen carrRmrf=Carr*Rmrf
123 gen cenRmrf=Century*Rmrf
124 gen cerRmrf=Cermaq*Rmrf
125 gen cfRmrf=CF*Rmrf
126 gen cheRmrf=Chevron*Rmrf
127 gen conRmrf=Concentric*Rmrf
128 gen conoRmrf=ConoccoP*Rmrf
129 gen cosRmrf=Costain*Rmrf
130 gen danRmrf=Danske*Rmrf
131 gen emiRmrf=EmiliaRoma*Rmrf
132 gen deuRmrf=Deutsche*Rmrf
133 gen disRmrf=DiSondrio*Rmrf
134 gen dnbRmrf= DNB*Rmrf
135 gen driRmrf=DrilQ*Rmrf
136 gen exxRmrf=Exxon*Rmrf
137 gen fmcRmrf=FMC*Rmrf
138 gen fisRmrf=Fischer*Rmrf
139 gen galRmrf=Galp*Rmrf
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140 gen geaRmrf=Gea*Rmrf
141 gen gooRmrf=Goodwin*Rmrf
142 gen graRmrf=Graco*Rmrf
143 gen havRmrf=Havfisk*Rmrf
144 gen helRmrf=HelixEnergy*Rmrf
145 gen hydRmrf=Hydro*Rmrf
146 gen intRmrf=Intl*Rmrf
147 gen isrRmrf=Israel*Rmrf
148 gen ksRmrf=KS*Rmrf
149 gen kaiRmrf= Kaiser*Rmrf
150 gen konRmrf=Kongsberg*Rmrf
151 gen kroRmrf= Krones*Rmrf
152 gen megRmrf=Megafon*Rmrf
153 gen mobRmrf= MobileTeles*Rmrf
154 gen monRmrf=MonbergThorsen*Rmrf
155 gen mosRmrf=Mosaic*Rmrf
156 gen norRmrf=Noranda*Rmrf
157 gen obeRmrf=Oberbank*Rmrf
158 gen oceRmrf=Oceaneering*Rmrf
159 gen potRmrf=Potash*Rmrf
160 gen repRmrf=REPSOL*Rmrf
161 gen ricRmrf=Ricardo*Rmrf
162 gen rolRmrf=RollsRoyce*Rmrf
163 gen sasRmrf=SAS*Rmrf
164 gen senRmrf=Senior*Rmrf
165 gen sheRmrf= Shell*Rmrf
166 gen socRmrf=SOC*Rmrf
167 gen staRmrf=Statoil*Rmrf
168 gen subRmrf= Subsea7*Rmrf
169 gen sweRmrf=Sweco*Rmrf
170 gen tdcRmrf=TDC*Rmrf
171 gen tecRmrf=Technip*Rmrf
172 gen teleRmrf=Tele2*Rmrf
173 gen telecRmrf=TelecomItalia*Rmrf
174 gen telefRmrf=Telefonica*Rmrf
175 gen telenRmrf=Telenor*Rmrf
176 gen totRmrf=Total*Rmrf
177 gen traRmrf=Transaero*Rmrf
178 gen unicRmrf=Unicredit*Rmrf
179 gen unitRmrf=UnitedCompany*Rmrf
180 gen unitiRmrf=UnitedInternet*Rmrf
181 gen uraRmrf=Uralkali*Rmrf
182 gen vodaRmrf=Vodafone*Rmrf
183 gen yarRmrf=Yara*Rmrf
184
185
186 gen agrSMB=Agrium*SMB
187 gen akkSMB=Akka*SMB
188 gen alcSMB=Alcoa*SMB
189 gen alfSMB=AlfaLaval*SMB
190 gen alpSMB= AlphaBank*SMB
191 gen aluaSMB= Aluar*SMB
192 gen alumSMB= Alumina*SMB
193 gen andSMB=Andritz*SMB
194 gen atkSMB=Atkins*SMB
195 gen bpSMB=BP*SMB
196 gen banSMB=Bankinter*SMB
197 gen beiSMB=Beijer*SMB
198 gen bucSMB= Bucher*SMB
199 gen camSMB=Cameron*SMB
200 gen carrSMB=Carr*SMB
201 gen cenSMB=Century*SMB
202 gen cerSMB=Cermaq*SMB
203 gen cfSMB=CF*SMB
204 gen cheSMB=Chevron*SMB
205 gen conSMB=Concentric*SMB
206 gen conoSMB=ConoccoP*SMB
207 gen cosSMB=Costain*SMB
208 gen danSMB=Danske*SMB
209 gen emiSMB=EmiliaRoma*SMB
210 gen deuSMB=Deutsche*SMB
211 gen disSMB=DiSondrio*SMB
212 gen dnbSMB= DNB*SMB
213 gen driSMB=DrilQ*SMB
214 gen exxSMB=Exxon*SMB
215 gen fmcSMB=FMC*SMB
216 gen fisSMB=Fischer*SMB
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217 gen galSMB=Galp*SMB
218 gen geaSMB=Gea*SMB
219 gen gooSMB=Goodwin*SMB
220 gen graSMB=Graco*SMB
221 gen havSMB=Havfisk*SMB
222 gen helSMB=HelixEnergy*SMB
223 gen hydSMB=Hydro*SMB
224 gen intSMB=Intl*SMB
225 gen isrSMB=Israel*SMB
226 gen ksSMB=KS*SMB
227 gen kaiSMB= Kaiser*SMB
228 gen konSMB=Kongsberg*SMB
229 gen kroSMB= Krones*SMB
230 gen megSMB=Megafon*SMB
231 gen mobSMB= MobileTeles*SMB
232 gen monSMB=MonbergThorsen*SMB
233 gen mosSMB=Mosaic*SMB
234 gen norSMB=Noranda*SMB
235 gen obeSMB=Oberbank*SMB
236 gen oceSMB=Oceaneering*SMB
237 gen potSMB=Potash*SMB
238 gen repSMB=REPSOL*SMB
239 gen ricSMB=Ricardo*SMB
240 gen rolSMB=RollsRoyce*SMB
241 gen sasSMB=SAS*SMB
242 gen senSMB=Senior*SMB
243 gen sheSMB= Shell*SMB
244 gen socSMB=SOC*SMB
245 gen staSMB=Statoil*SMB
246 gen subSMB= Subsea7*SMB
247 gen sweSMB=Sweco*SMB
248 gen tdcSMB=TDC*SMB
249 gen tecSMB=Technip*SMB
250 gen teleSMB=Tele2*SMB
251 gen telecSMB=TelecomItalia*SMB
252 gen telefSMB=Telefonica*SMB
253 gen telenSMB=Telenor*SMB
254 gen totSMB=Total*SMB
255 gen traSMB=Transaero*SMB
256 gen unicSMB=Unicredit*SMB
257 gen unitSMB=UnitedCompany*SMB
258 gen unitiSMB=UnitedInternet*SMB
259 gen uraSMB=Uralkali*SMB
260 gen vodaSMB=Vodafone*SMB
261 gen yarSMB=Yara*SMB
262
263 gen agrHML = Agrium*HML
264 gen akkHML = Akka*HML
265 gen alcHML = Alcoa*HML
266 gen alfaHML = AlfaLaval*HML
267 gen alpHML = AlphaBank*HML
268 gen aluaHML = Aluar*HML
269 gen alumHML = Alumina*HML
270 gen andHML = Andritz*HML
271 gen atkHML = Atkins*HML
272 gen bpHML = BP*HML
273 gen bankHML = Bankinter*HML
274 gen beiHML = Beijer*HML
275 gen bucHML = Bucher*HML
276 gen camHML = Cameron*HML
277 gen carrHML = Carr*HML
278 gen centHML = Century*HML
279 gen cermHML = Cermaq*HML
280 gen cfHML = CF*HML
281 gen cheHML = Chevron*HML
282 gen conHML = Concentric*HML
283 gen conpHML = ConoccoP*HML
284 gen costHML = Costain*HML
285 gen danHML = Danske*HML
286 gen emrHML = EmiliaRoma*HML
287 gen deuHML = Deutsche*HML
288 gen disHML = DiSondrio*HML
289 gen dnbHML = DNB*HML
290 gen drilHML = DrilQ*HML
291 gen exxHML = Exxon*HML
292 gen fmcHML = FMC*HML
293 gen fisHML = Fischer*HML
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294 gen galHML = Galp*HML
295 gen geaHML =Gea*HML
296 gen godHML = Goodwin*HML
297 gen graHML = Graco*HML
298 gen havHML = Havfisk*HML
299 gen heliHML = HelixEnergy*HML
300 gen hydHML = Hydro*HML
301 gen intHML = Intl*HML
302 gen isrHML = Israel*HML
303 gen ksHML = KS*HML
304 gen kaiHML = Kaiser*HML
305 gen konHML = Kongsberg*HML
306 gen kroHML = Krones*HML
307 gen megHML = Megafon*HML
308 gen mobHML = MobileTeles*HML
309 gen monHML = MonbergThorsen*HML
310 gen mosHML = Mosaic*HML
311 gen norHML = Noranda*HML
312 gen obeHML = Oberbank*HML
313 gen oceHML = Oceaneering*HML
314 gen potHML = Potash*HML
315 gen repHML = REPSOL*HML
316 gen ricHML = Ricardo*HML
317 gen rolHML = RollsRoyce*HML
318 gen sasHML = SAS*HML
319 gen senHML = Senior*HML
320 gen sheHML = Shell*HML
321 gen socHML = SOC*HML
322 gen staHML = Statoil*HML
323 gen subHML = Subsea7*HML
324 gen sweHML = Sweco*HML
325 gen tdcHML = TDC*HML
326 gen tecHML = Technip*HML
327 gen teleHML = Tele2*HML
328 gen telcHML = TelecomItalia*HML
329 gen telefHML = Telefonica*HML
330 gen telenHML = Telenor*HML
331 gen totHML = Total*HML
332 gen tranHML = Transaero*HML
333 gen unicHML = Unicredit*HML
334 gen unitHML = UnitedCompany*HML
335 gen unitiHML = UnitedInternet*HML
336 gen uraHML = Uralkali*HML
337 gen vodHML = Vodafone*HML
338 gen yarHML = Yara*HML
339
340
341 gen agrMOM=Agrium*Momentum
342 gen akkMOM=Akka*Momentum
343 gen alcMOM=Alcoa*Momentum
344 gen alfMOM=AlfaLaval*Momentum
345 gen alpMOM= AlphaBank*Momentum
346 gen aluaMOM= Aluar*Momentum
347 gen alumMOM= Alumina*Momentum
348 gen andMOM=Andritz*Momentum
349 gen atkMOM=Atkins*Momentum
350 gen bpMOM=BP*Momentum
351 gen banMOM=Bankinter*Momentum
352 gen beiMOM=Beijer*Momentum
353 gen bucMOM= Bucher*Momentum
354 gen camMOM=Cameron*Momentum
355 gen carrMOM=Carr*Momentum
356 gen cenMOM=Century*Momentum
357 gen cerMOM=Cermaq*Momentum
358 gen cfMOM=CF*Momentum
359 gen cheMOM=Chevron*Momentum
360 gen conMOM=Concentric*Momentum
361 gen conoMOM=ConoccoP*Momentum
362 gen cosMOM=Costain*Momentum
363 gen danMOM=Danske*Momentum
364 gen emiMOM=EmiliaRoma*Momentum
365 gen deuMOM=Deutsche*Momentum
366 gen disMOM=DiSondrio*Momentum
367 gen dnbMOM= DNB*Momentum
368 gen driMOM=DrilQ*Momentum
369 gen exxMOM=Exxon*Momentum
370 gen fmcMOM=FMC*Momentum
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371 gen fisMOM=Fischer*Momentum
372 gen galMOM=Galp*Momentum
373 gen geaMOM=Gea*Momentum
374 gen gooMOM=Goodwin*Momentum
375 gen graMOM=Graco*Momentum
376 gen havMOM=Havfisk*Momentum
377 gen helMOM=HelixEnergy*Momentum
378 gen hydMOM=Hydro*Momentum
379 gen intMOM=Intl*Momentum
380 gen isrMOM=Israel*Momentum
381 gen ksMOM=KS*Momentum
382 gen kaiMOM= Kaiser*Momentum
383 gen konMOM=Kongsberg*Momentum
384 gen kroMOM= Krones*Momentum
385 gen megMOM=Megafon*Momentum
386 gen mobMOM= MobileTeles*Momentum
387 gen monMOM=MonbergThorsen*Momentum
388 gen mosMOM=Mosaic*Momentum
389 gen norMOM=Noranda*Momentum
390 gen obeMOM=Oberbank*Momentum
391 gen oceMOM=Oceaneering*Momentum
392 gen potMOM=Potash*Momentum
393 gen repMOM=REPSOL*Momentum
394 gen ricMOM=Ricardo*Momentum
395 gen rolMOM=RollsRoyce*Momentum
396 gen sasMOM=SAS*Momentum
397 gen senMOM=Senior*Momentum
398 gen sheMOM= Shell*Momentum
399 gen socMOM=SOC*Momentum
400 gen staMOM=Statoil*Momentum
401 gen subMOM= Subsea7*Momentum
402 gen sweMOM=Sweco*Momentum
403 gen tdcMOM=TDC*Momentum
404 gen tecMOM=Technip*Momentum
405 gen teleMOM=Tele2*Momentum
406 gen telecMOM=TelecomItalia*Momentum
407 gen telefMOM=Telefonica*Momentum
408 gen telenMOM=Telenor*Momentum
409 gen totMOM=Total*Momentum
410 gen traMOM=Transaero*Momentum
411 gen unicMOM=Unicredit*Momentum
412 gen unitMOM=UnitedCompany*Momentum
413 gen unitiMOM=UnitedInternet*Momentum
414 gen uraMOM=Uralkali*Momentum
415 gen vodaMOM=Vodafone*Momentum
416 gen yarMOM=Yara*Momentum
417
418
419 *******************
420 *Model 1 - general*
421 *******************
422
423 *** Excluding Aker Solution and Kvaerner ***
424 drop if Company =="Aker Solutions"
425 drop if Company == "Kvaerner"
426
427
428 *** Final General OLS Model ***
429 reg Exreturn SOE2 StateBeta agrRmrf akkRmrf alcRmrf alfRmrf alpRmrf aluaRmrf alumRmrf
andRmrf atkRmrf bpRmrf banRmrf beiRmrf bucRmrf camRmrf carrRmrf cenRmrf cerRmrf cfRmrf /*
430 */cheRmrf conRmrf conoRmrf cosRmrf danRmrf emiRmrf deuRmrf disRmrf dnbRmrf driRmrf
exxRmrf fmcRmrf fisRmrf galRmrf geaRmrf gooRmrf graRmrf havRmrf helRmrf /*
431 */hydRmrf intRmrf isrRmrf ksRmrf kaiRmrf konRmrf kroRmrf megRmrf mobRmrf monRmrf
mosRmrf norRmrf obeRmrf oceRmrf potRmrf repRmrf ricRmrf rolRmrf /*
432 */sasRmrf senRmrf sheRmrf socRmrf staRmrf subRmrf sweRmrf tdcRmrf tecRmrf teleRmrf
telecRmrf telefRmrf telenRmrf totRmrf traRmrf unicRmrf unitRmrf unitiRmrf /*
433 */uraRmrf vodaRmrf yarRmrf agrSMB akkSMB alcSMB alfSMB alpSMB aluaSMB alumSMB andSMB
atkSMB bpSMB banSMB beiSMB bucSMB camSMB carrSMB cenSMB cerSMB cfSMB /*
434 */cheSMB conSMB conoSMB cosSMB danSMB emiSMB deuSMB disSMB dnbSMB driSMB exxSMB fmcSMB
fisSMB galSMB geaSMB gooSMB graSMB havSMB helSMB hydSMB intSMB isrSMB /*
435 */ksSMB kaiSMB konSMB kroSMB megSMB mobSMB monSMB mosSMB norSMB obeSMB oceSMB potSMB
repSMB ricSMB rolSMB sasSMB senSMB sheSMB socSMB staSMB subSMB sweSMB /*
436 */tdcSMB tecSMB teleSMB telecSMB telefSMB telenSMB totSMB traSMB unicSMB unitSMB
unitiSMB uraSMB vodaSMB yarSMB agrHML akkHML alcHML alfaHML alpHML aluaHML /*
437 */alumHML andHML atkHML bpHML bankHML beiHML bucHML camHML carrHML centHML cermHML
cfHML cheHML conHML conpHML costHML danHML emrHML deuHML disHML dnbHML drilHML /*
438 */exxHML fmcHML fisHML galHML geaHML godHML graHML havHML heliHML hydHML intHML isrHML
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ksHML kaiHML konHML kroHML megHML mobHML monHML mosHML norHML obeHML /*
439 */oceHML potHML repHML ricHML rolHML sasHML senHML sheHML socHML staHML subHML sweHML
tdcHML tecHML teleHML telcHML telefHML telenHML totHML tranHML unicHML unitHML /*
440 */unitiHML uraHML vodHML yarHML agrMOM akkMOM alcMOM alfMOM alpMOM aluaMOM alumMOM
andMOM atkMOM bpMOM banMOM beiMOM bucMOM camMOM carrMOM cenMOM cerMOM cfMOM /*
441 */cheMOM conMOM conoMOM cosMOM danMOM emiMOM deuMOM disMOM dnbMOM driMOM exxMOM fmcMOM
fisMOM galMOM geaMOM gooMOM graMOM havMOM helMOM hydMOM intMOM isrMOM ksMOM kaiMOM /*
442 */konMOM kroMOM megMOM mobMOM monMOM mosMOM norMOM obeMOM oceMOM potMOM repMOM ricMOM
rolMOM sasMOM senMOM sheMOM socMOM staMOM subMOM sweMOM tdcMOM tecMOM teleMOM /*
443 */telecMOM telefMOM telenMOM totMOM traMOM unicMOM unitMOM unitiMOM uraMOM vodaMOM
yarMOM Jan1 Feb Mar Apr May Jun Jul Aug Sep Oct Nov Dec y99 y00 y01 y02 /*
444 */y03 y04 y05 y06 y07 y08 y09 y10 y11 y12 y13 y14 y15 OilGas Industrials Airlines
Fishing Fertilizer Financials Materials Telecom, cluster(Company1)
445 */ //Cermaq is the reference firm
446 estimates store General
447 outreg2 using Model1, tex replace title(General Pooled OLS) keep(SOE2 StateBeta)
nocons addtext( Year Dummy, Yes, Monthly Dummy, Yes, Individual Dummy, Yes, Fama-French 4
Factor, Yes)
448
449 ***** Test for serial correlation****
450 xtserial Exreturn SOE2 StateBeta agrRmrf akkRmrf alcRmrf alfRmrf alpRmrf aluaRmrf
alumRmrf andRmrf atkRmrf bpRmrf banRmrf beiRmrf bucRmrf camRmrf carrRmrf cenRmrf cerRmrf
cfRmrf /*
451 */cheRmrf conRmrf conoRmrf cosRmrf danRmrf emiRmrf deuRmrf disRmrf dnbRmrf driRmrf
exxRmrf fmcRmrf fisRmrf galRmrf geaRmrf gooRmrf graRmrf havRmrf helRmrf /*
452 */hydRmrf intRmrf isrRmrf ksRmrf kaiRmrf konRmrf kroRmrf megRmrf mobRmrf monRmrf
mosRmrf norRmrf obeRmrf oceRmrf potRmrf repRmrf ricRmrf rolRmrf /*
453 */sasRmrf senRmrf sheRmrf socRmrf staRmrf subRmrf sweRmrf tdcRmrf tecRmrf teleRmrf
telecRmrf telefRmrf telenRmrf totRmrf traRmrf unicRmrf unitRmrf unitiRmrf /*
454 */uraRmrf vodaRmrf yarRmrf agrSMB akkSMB alcSMB alfSMB alpSMB aluaSMB alumSMB andSMB
atkSMB bpSMB banSMB beiSMB bucSMB camSMB carrSMB cenSMB cerSMB cfSMB /*
455 */cheSMB conSMB conoSMB cosSMB danSMB emiSMB deuSMB disSMB dnbSMB driSMB exxSMB fmcSMB
fisSMB galSMB geaSMB gooSMB graSMB havSMB helSMB hydSMB intSMB isrSMB /*
456 */ksSMB kaiSMB konSMB kroSMB megSMB mobSMB monSMB mosSMB norSMB obeSMB oceSMB potSMB
repSMB ricSMB rolSMB sasSMB senSMB sheSMB socSMB staSMB subSMB sweSMB /*
457 */tdcSMB tecSMB teleSMB telecSMB telefSMB telenSMB totSMB traSMB unicSMB unitSMB
unitiSMB uraSMB vodaSMB yarSMB agrHML akkHML alcHML alfaHML alpHML aluaHML /*
458 */alumHML andHML atkHML bpHML bankHML beiHML bucHML camHML carrHML centHML cermHML
cfHML cheHML conHML conpHML costHML danHML emrHML deuHML disHML dnbHML drilHML /*
459 */exxHML fmcHML fisHML galHML geaHML godHML graHML havHML heliHML hydHML intHML isrHML
ksHML kaiHML konHML kroHML megHML mobHML monHML mosHML norHML obeHML /*
460 */oceHML potHML repHML ricHML rolHML sasHML senHML sheHML socHML staHML subHML sweHML
tdcHML tecHML teleHML telcHML telefHML telenHML totHML tranHML unicHML unitHML /*
461 */unitiHML uraHML vodHML yarHML agrMOM akkMOM alcMOM alfMOM alpMOM aluaMOM alumMOM
andMOM atkMOM bpMOM banMOM beiMOM bucMOM camMOM carrMOM cenMOM cerMOM cfMOM /*
462 */cheMOM conMOM conoMOM cosMOM danMOM emiMOM deuMOM disMOM dnbMOM driMOM exxMOM fmcMOM
fisMOM galMOM geaMOM gooMOM graMOM havMOM helMOM hydMOM intMOM isrMOM ksMOM kaiMOM /*
463 */konMOM kroMOM megMOM mobMOM monMOM mosMOM norMOM obeMOM oceMOM potMOM repMOM ricMOM
rolMOM sasMOM senMOM sheMOM socMOM staMOM subMOM sweMOM tdcMOM tecMOM teleMOM /*
464 */telecMOM telefMOM telenMOM totMOM traMOM unicMOM unitMOM unitiMOM uraMOM vodaMOM
yarMOM Jan1 Feb Mar Apr May Jun Jul Aug Sep Oct Nov Dec y99 y00 y01 y02 /*
465 */y03 y04 y05 y06 y07 y08 y09 y10 y11 y12 y13 y14 y15 OilGas Industrials Airlines
Fishing Fertilizer Financials Materials Telecom
466
467
468 ***** Firm-Specific OLS MODEL *****
469
470 gen secstaRmrf=SecSta*Rmrf
471 gen secstaSMB=SecSta*SMB
472 gen secstaHML=SecSta*HML
473 gen secstaMOM=SecSta*Momentum
474
475 gen seccerRmrf=SecCer*Rmrf
476 gen seccerSMB=SecCer*SMB
477 gen seccerHML=SecCer*HML
478 gen seccerMOM=SecCer*Momentum
479
480 gen secdnbRmrf=SecDnb*Rmrf
481 gen secdnbSMB=SecDnb*SMB
482 gen secdnbHML=SecDnb*HML
483 gen secdnbMOM=SecDnb*Momentum
484
485 gen seckonRmrf=SecKon*Rmrf
486 gen secakonSMB=SecKon*SMB
487 gen seckonHML=SecKon*HML
488 gen seckonMOM=SecKon*Momentum
489
model 1 sensor - Printed on 14.12.2015 17:25:43
Page 8
490 gen secsasmrf=SecSas*Rmrf
491 gen secsasSMB=SecSas*SMB
492 gen secsasHML=SecSas*HML
493 gen secsasMOM=SecSas*Momentum
494
495 gen sectelRmrf=SecTel*Rmrf
496 gen sectelSMB=SecTel*SMB
497 gen sectelHML=SecTel*HML
498 gen sectelMOM=SecTel*Momentum
499
500 gen secyarRmrf=Secyar*Rmrf
501 gen secyarSMB=Secyar*SMB
502 gen secyarHML=Secyar*HML
503 gen secyarMOM=Secyar*Momentum
504
505 gen sechydRmrf=Sechyd*Rmrf
506 gen sechydSMB=Sechyd*SMB
507 gen sechydHML=Sechyd*HML
508 gen sechydMOM=Sechyd*Momentum
509
510 *** Generating industry dummies which includes only the average of the peers and the
state-owned company for the firm-specific OLS regression ***
511
512 gen dummysta = (Company==("Statoil") | Company==("SecSta"))
513 gen dummycer = (Company==("Cermaq") | Company==("SecCer"))
514 gen dummykon = (Company==("Kongsberg") | Company==("SecKon"))
515 gen dummydnb = (Company==("DnB") | Company==("SecDnb"))
516 gen dummysas = (Company==("SAS") | Company==("SecSas"))
517 gen dummytel = (Company==("Telenor") | Company==("SecTel"))
518 gen dummyyar = (Company==("Yara") | Company==("SecYar"))
519 gen dummyhyd = (Company==("Hydro") | Company==("Sechyd"))
520
521
522 ***Model 1 - Statoil***
523 reg Exreturn staRmrf secstaRmrf secstaSMB secstaHML secstaMOM staSMB/*
524 */ staHML staMOM Statoil Jan1 Feb Mar Apr May Jun Jul Aug Sep Oct Nov Dec y99 y00
y01 y02 /*
525 */y03 y04 y05 y06 y07 y08 y09 y10 y11 y12 y13 y14 y15 if dummysta ==1,ro cluster(
Company1)
526 estimates store Statoil
527 outreg2 using Single, tex replace title(State Ownership) ctitle(Statoil)keep(Statoil)
nocons
528
529 ****Model 1 - Hydro****
530 reg Exreturn hydRmrf hydSMB hydHML hydMOM sechydRmrf sechydSMB sechydHML sechydMOM
Hydro Jan1 Feb Mar Apr May Jun Jul Aug Sep Oct Nov Dec y99 y00 y01 y02 /*
531 */y03 y04 y05 y06 y07 y08 y09 y10 y11 y12 y13 y14 y15 if dummyhyd ==1,ro cluster(
Company1)
532 estimates store Hydro
533 outreg2 using Single, tex append title(State Ownership) ctitle(Hydro)keep(Hydro) nocons
534
535 ****Model 1 - Kongsberg****
536 reg Exreturn konRmrf konSMB konHML konMOM Jan1 Feb Mar Apr May Jun Jul Aug Sep Oct Nov
Dec /*
537 */ Kongsberg seckonRmrf secakonSMB seckonHML seckonMOM y99 y00 y01 y02 /*
538 */ y03 y04 y05 y06 y07 y08 y09 y10 y11 y12 y13 y14 y15 if dummykon ==1, ro cluster(
Company1)
539 estimates store Kongsberg
540 outreg2 using Single, tex append title(State Ownership) ctitle(Kongsberg)keep(
Kongsberg) nocons
541
542 **** Model 1- Cermaq****
543 reg Exreturn cerRmrf cerSMB cermHML cerMOM Cermaq seccerRmrf seccerSMB seccerHML
seccerMOM Jan1 Feb Mar Apr May Jun Jul Aug Sep Oct Nov Dec /*
544 */ y99 y00 y01 y02 y03 y04 y05 y06 y07 y08 y09 y10 y11 y12 y13 y14 y15 if dummycer ==1
,ro cluster(Company1)
545 estimates store Cermaq
546 outreg2 using Single, tex append title(State Ownership) ctitle(Cermaq)keep(Cermaq)
nocons
547
548 **** Model 1 - SAS***
549 reg Exreturn sasRmrf sasSMB sasHML sasMOM SAS secsasmrf secsasSMB secsasHML secsasMOM
Jan1 Feb Mar Apr May Jun Jul Aug Sep Oct Nov Dec /*
550 */ y99 y00 y01 y02 y03 y04 y05 y06 y07 y08 y09 y10 y11 y12 y13 y14 y15 if dummysas ==1
,ro cluster(Company1)
551 estimates store SAS
552 outreg2 using Single, tex append title(State Ownership) ctitle(SAS)keep(SAS) nocons
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553
554 **** Model 1- DNB*****
555 reg Exreturn dnbRmrf dnbSMB dnbHML dnbMOM DNB secdnbRmrf secdnbSMB secdnbHML secdnbMOM
Jan1 Feb Mar Apr May Jun Jul Aug Sep Oct Nov Dec /*
556 */ y99 y00 y01 y02 y03 y04 y05 y06 y07 y08 y09 y10 y11 y12 y13 y14 y15 if dummydnb ==1
, ro cluster(Company1)
557 estimates store DNB
558 outreg2 using Single, tex append title(State Ownership) ctitle(DNB)keep(DNB) nocons
559
560 **** Model 1 - Yara***
561 reg Exreturn yarRmrf yarSMB yarHML yarMOM Yara secyarRmrf secyarSMB secyarHML
secyarMOM Jan1 Feb Mar Apr May Jun Jul Aug Sep Oct Nov Dec /*
562 */ y99 y00 y01 y02 y03 y04 y05 y06 y07 y08 y09 y10 y11 y12 y13 y14 y15 if dummyyar ==1
, ro cluster(Company1)
563 estimates store Yara
564 outreg2 using Single, tex append title(State Ownership) ctitle(Yara)keep(Yara) nocons
565
566 **** Model 1 - Telenor***
567 reg Exreturn telenRmrf telenSMB telenHML telenMOM Telenor sectelRmrf sectelSMB
sectelHML sectelMOM Jan1 Feb Mar Apr May Jun Jul Aug Sep Oct Nov Dec y99 y00 y01 y02 y03
y04 y05 y06 y07 y08 y09 y10 y11 y12 y13 y14 y15 /*
568 */ if dummytel ==1, ro cluster(Company1)
569 estimates store Telenor
570 outreg2 using Single, tex append title(State Ownership) ctitle(Telenor)keep(Telenor)
nocons
571
572
573
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1
2 *** The Event Model ***
3 clear all
4
5 import excel using "C:\Users\Thomas
Kringlebu\Dropbox\Masteroppgave\Sluttfase\Datasett\Model2.xlsx", sheet ("Model 2")
cellrange (B3:p12579) firstrow clear
6 cd "C:\Users\Thomas Kringlebu\Dropbox\Masteroppgave\Sluttfase\output stata\Model2"
7
8 import excel using "C:\Users\Stig
Bratfos\Dropbox\Masteroppgave\Sluttfase\Datasett\Model2.xlsx", sheet ("Model 2") cellrange
(B3:p12579) firstrow clear
9 cd "C:\Users\Stig Bratfos\Dropbox\Masteroppgave\Sluttfase\output stata\Model2"
10
11 *** Preparing the dataset ***
12 encode (Sector), gen(Sector1)
13 encode (Company), gen (Company1)
14 rename (Closingprice) (Price)
15
16
17 replace Rmrf = ln(1+Rmrf)
18 replace SMB = ln(1+SMB)
19 replace HML = ln(1+HML)
20 replace Momentum = ln(1+Momentum)
21
22 *** Generating excess stock return ***
23 gen exreturn =return-rf
24 drop if exreturn==.
25
26 *** Deleting the first observation due to no return ***
27 sort Date
28 gen index = _n
29 drop if index<4
30 drop index
31 xtset Company1 Date
32 drop if Company=="Cermaq"
33
34 *** Winsorizing the dataset to handle outliers, at the 98% level***
35 winsor exreturn, gen(Exreturn) p(0.01)
36
37 *** Generating year dummies ***
38 gen year=year(Date)
39 tab year, gen(y)
40 rename (y1 y2 y3 y4 y5 y6 y7 y8 y9 y10 y11 y12 y13 y14 y15 y16)(y00 y01 y02 y03 y04
y05 y06 y07 y08 y09 y10 y11 y12 y13 y14 y15)
41
42 *** Generating monthly dummies ***
43 gen month= month(Date)
44 tabulate month, gen(Jan)
45 rename (Jan2 Jan3 Jan4 Jan5 Jan6 Jan7 Jan8 Jan9 Jan10 Jan11 Jan12) (Feb Mar Apr May
Jun Jul Aug Sep Oct Nov Dec)
46
47 *** Generating a dummy for Telenor after the first divestment ***
48 gen PostPrivTelenor = (Date>td(30jun2003)& Company=="Telenor")
49
50 *** Generating a dummy for Telenor after the second divestment ***
51 gen PostPrivStatoil = (Date>td(07jul2004)& Company=="Statoil")
52
53 *** Creating the PostPriv variable ***
54 gen PostPrivStatoilRmrf= PostPrivStatoil*Rmrf
55 gen PostPrivTelenorRmrf= PostPrivTelenor*Rmrf
56 gen PostPriv= PostPrivStatoilRmrf + PostPrivTelenorRmrf
57
58 *** Creating individual loadings for the Fama French Four Factors ***
59 tabulate Company1, gen(x)
60 rename(x1 x2)(Statoil Telenor)
61
62 gen staRmrf=Statoil*Rmrf
63 gen staHML=Statoil*HML
64 gen staSMB=Statoil*SMB
65 gen staMOM=Statoil*Momentum
66
67 gen telRmrf=Telenor*Rmrf
68 gen telHML=Telenor*HML
69 gen telSMB=Telenor*SMB
70 gen telMOM=Telenor*Momentum
71
model 2  sensor - Printed on 14.12.2015 17:26:32
Page 2
72 *************
73 *Reg model 2*
74 *************
75
76 **** K-days = -1 ****
77 *** Generating the change in ownership variable ***
78 *First divestment Telenor
79 gen Dummy1min1= (Date==`=td(29jun2003)' & Company=="Telenor")
80 gen Change1=0.139
81
82 *Second divestment Telenor
83 gen Dummy2min1= (Date==`=td(29mar2004)' & Company=="Telenor")
84 gen Change2=0.0945
85
86 *First divestment Statoil
87 gen Dummy3min1= (Date==`=td(06jul2004)' & Company=="Statoil")
88 gen Change3=0.046
89
90 *Second divestment Statoil
91 gen Dummy4min1= (Date==`=td(16feb2005)' & Company=="Statoil")
92 gen Change4=0.0459
93
94 *** Generating the average Priv variable ***
95 gen priv=Dummy1min1*Change1 + Dummy2min1*Change2 + Dummy3min1*Change3 + Dummy4min1*
Change4
96
97 *** Reg K=-1 ***
98 reg Exreturn priv staRmrf staHML staSMB telRmrf /*
99 */telHML telSMB telMOM staMOM PostPriv y00 y01 Statoil Telenor/*
100 */ y02 y03 y04 y05 y06 y07 y08 y09 y10 y11 y12 y13 y14 y15 Jan1 Feb Mar Apr /*
101 */ May Jun Jul Aug Sep Oct Nov Dec, ro
102 estimates store Kmin1
103 outreg2 using Model2, tex replace title(Change in State Ownership) ctitle(K=-1)keep(
priv PostPriv) nocons addtext( Year Dummy, Yes, Monthly Dummy, Yes, Individual Dummy, Yes,
Fama-French 4 Factor, Yes)
104
105 **** K-days = 1 ****
106 *** Generating the change in ownership variable ***
107 *First divestment Telenor
108 gen Dummy11= (Date==`=td(30jun2003)' & Company=="Telenor")
109
110 *Second divestment Telenor
111 gen Dummy21= (Date==`=td(30mar2004)' & Company=="Telenor")
112
113 *First divestment Statoil
114 gen Dummy31= (Date==`=td(07jul2004)' & Company=="Statoil")
115
116 *Second divestment Statoil
117 gen Dummy41= (Date==`=td(17feb2005)' & Company=="Statoil")
118
119 *** Generating the average Priv variable ***
120 drop priv
121 gen priv=Dummy11*Change1 + Dummy21*Change2 + Dummy31*Change3 + Dummy41*Change4
122
123 *** Reg K=1 ***
124 reg Exreturn priv staRmrf staHML staSMB telRmrf /*
125 */telHML telSMB telMOM staMOM PostPriv /*
126 */ y00 y01 Statoil Telenor/*
127 */ y02 y03 y04 y05 y06 y07 y08 y09 y10 y11 y12 y13 y14 y15 Jan1 Feb Mar Apr /*
128 */ May Jun Jul Aug Sep Oct Nov Dec, ro
129 estimates store K1
130 outreg2 using Model2, tex append title(Change in State Ownership) ctitle(K=1)keep(priv
PostPriv) nocons addtext( Year Dummy, Yes, Monthly Dummy, Yes, Individual Dummy, Yes,
Fama-French 4 Factor, Yes)
131
132 **** K-days = 2 ****
133 *** Generating the change in ownership variable ***
134 *First divestment Telenor
135 gen Dummy1= (Date==`=td(30jun2003)' | Date==`=td(01jul2003)' & Company=="Telenor")
136
137 *Second divestment Telenor
138 gen Dummy2= (Date==`=td(30mar2004)' | Date==`=td(31mar2004)' & Company=="Telenor")
139
140 *First divestment Statoil
141 gen Dummy3= (Date==`=td(07jul2004)' | Date==`=td(08jul2004)' & Company=="Statoil")
142
143 *Second divestment Statoil
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144 gen Dummy4= (Date==`=td(17feb2005)' | Date==`=td(18feb2005)' & Company=="Statoil")
145
146 *** Generating the average Priv variable ***
147 drop priv
148 gen priv=Dummy1*Change1 + Dummy2*Change2 + Dummy3*Change3 + Dummy4*Change4
149
150 *** Generating the average Priv variable for the Placebo test ***
151 gen priv2=Dummy1*Change1 + Dummy2*Change2 + Dummy3*Change3 + Dummy4*Change4
152
153 *** Reg k=2 ***
154 reg Exreturn priv staRmrf staHML staSMB telRmrf /*
155 */telHML telSMB PostPriv telMOM staMOM /*
156 */ y00 y01 Statoil Telenor /*
157 */ y02 y03 y04 y05 y06 y07 y08 y09 y10 y11 y12 y13 y14 y15 Jan1 Feb Mar Apr /*
158 */ May Jun Jul Aug Sep Oct Nov Dec, ro
159 estimates store K2
160 outreg2 using Model2, tex append title(Change in State Ownership) ctitle(K=2)keep(priv
PostPriv) nocons addtext( Year Dummy, Yes, Monthly Dummy, Yes, Individual Dummy, Yes,
Fama-French 4 Factor, Yes)
161
162 **** K-days = 3 ****
163 *** Generating the change in ownership variable ***
164 *First divestment Telenor
165 drop Dummy1
166 gen Dummy1= (Date==`=td(30jun2003)' | Date==`=td(01jul2003)' | Date==
`=td(02jul2003)' & Company=="Telenor")
167
168 *Second divestment Telenor
169 drop Dummy2
170 gen Dummy2= (Date==`=td(30mar2004)' | Date==`=td(31mar2004)' | Date==
`=td(01apr2004)' & Company=="Telenor")
171
172 *First divestment Statoil
173 drop Dummy3
174 gen Dummy3= (Date==`=td(07jul2004)' | Date==`=td(08jul2004)' | Date==
`=td(09jul2004)' & Company=="Statoil")
175
176 *Second divestment Statoil
177 drop Dummy4
178 gen Dummy4= (Date==`=td(17feb2005)' | Date==`=td(18feb2005)' | Date==
`=td(22feb2005)' & Company=="Statoil")
179
180 *** Generating the average Priv variable ***
181 drop priv
182 gen priv=Dummy1*Change1 + Dummy2*Change2 + Dummy3*Change3 + Dummy4*Change4
183
184 *** Reg k=3 ***
185 reg Exreturn priv staRmrf staHML staSMB telRmrf /*
186 */telHML telSMB PostPriv telMOM staMOM /*
187 */ y00 y01 Statoil Telenor/*
188 */ y02 y03 y04 y05 y06 y07 y08 y09 y10 y11 y12 y13 y14 y15 Jan1 Feb Mar Apr /*
189 */ May Jun Jul Aug Sep Oct Nov Dec, ro
190 estimates store K3
191 outreg2 using Model2, tex append title(Change in State Ownership) ctitle(K=3)keep(priv
PostPriv) nocons addtext( Year Dummy, Yes, Monthly Dummy, Yes, Individual Dummy, Yes,
Fama-French 4 Factor, Yes)
192
193 **** K-days = 5 ****
194 *** Generating the change in ownership variable ***
195 *First divestment Telenor
196 drop Dummy1
197 gen Dummy1= (Date==`=td(30jun2003)' | Date==`=td(01jul2003)' | Date==
`=td(02jul2003)' | Date==`=td(03jul2003)' | Date==`=td(07jul2003)' & Company=="Telenor")
198
199 *Second divestment Telenor
200 drop Dummy2
201 gen Dummy2= (Date==`=td(30mar2004)' | Date==`=td(31mar2004)' | Date==
`=td(01apr2004)' | Date==`=td(02apr2004)' | Date==`=td(05apr2004)' & Company=="Telenor")
202
203 *First divestment Statoil
204 drop Dummy3
205 gen Dummy3= (Date==`=td(07jul2004)' | Date==`=td(08jul2004)' | Date==
`=td(09jul2004)' | Date==`=td(12jul2004)' | Date==`=td(13jul2004)' & Company=="Statoil")
206
207 *Second divestment Statoil
208 drop Dummy4
209 gen Dummy4= (Date==`=td(17feb2005)' | Date==`=td(18feb2005)' | Date==
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`=td(22feb2005)' | Date==`=td(23feb2005)' | Date==`=td(24feb2005)' & Company=="Statoil")
210
211 *** Generating the average Priv variable ***
212 drop priv
213 gen priv=Dummy1*Change1 + Dummy2*Change2 + Dummy3*Change3 + Dummy4*Change4
214
215 *** Reg k=5 ***
216 reg Exreturn priv staRmrf staHML staSMB telRmrf /*
217 */telHML telSMB PostPriv telMOM staMOM /*
218 */ y00 y01 Statoil Telenor/*
219 */ y02 y03 y04 y05 y06 y07 y08 y09 y10 y11 y12 y13 y14 y15 Jan1 Feb Mar Apr /*
220 */ May Jun Jul Aug Sep Oct Nov Dec, ro
221 estimates store K5
222 outreg2 using Model2, tex append title(Change in State Ownership) ctitle(K=5)keep(priv
PostPriv) nocons addtext( Year Dummy, Yes, Monthly Dummy, Yes, Individual Dummy, Yes,
Fama-French 4 Factor, Yes)
223
224 **** K-days = 7 ****
225 *** Generating the change in ownership variable ***
226 *First divestment Telenor
227 drop Dummy1
228 gen Dummy1= (Date==`=td(30jun2003)' | Date==`=td(01jul2003)' | Date==
`=td(02jul2003)' | Date==`=td(03jul2003)' | Date==`=td(07jul2003)' /*
229 */| Date==`=td(08jul2003)' | Date==`=td(09jul2003)' & Company=="Telenor")
230
231 *Second divestment Telenor
232 drop Dummy2
233 gen Dummy2= (Date==`=td(30mar2004)' | Date==`=td(31mar2004)' | Date==
`=td(01apr2004)' | Date==`=td(02apr2004)' | Date==`=td(05apr2004)' /*
234 */| Date==`=td(06apr2004)' | Date==`=td(07apr2004)' & Company=="Telenor")
235
236 *First divestment Statoil
237 drop Dummy3
238 gen Dummy3= (Date==`=td(07jul2004)' | Date==`=td(08jul2004)' | Date==
`=td(09jul2004)' | Date==`=td(12jul2004)' | Date==`=td(13jul2004)' /*
239 */| Date==`=td(14jul2004)' | Date==`=td(15jul2004)' & Company=="Statoil")
240
241 *Second divestment Statoil
242 drop Dummy4
243 gen Dummy4= (Date==`=td(17feb2005)' | Date==`=td(18feb2005)' | Date==
`=td(22feb2005)' | Date==`=td(23feb2005)' | Date==`=td(24feb2005)' /*
244 */| Date==`=td(25feb2005)' | Date==`=td(28feb2005)' & Company=="Statoil")
245
246 *** Generating the average Priv variable ***
247 drop priv
248 gen priv=Dummy1*Change1 + Dummy2*Change2 + Dummy3*Change3 + Dummy4*Change4
249
250 *** Reg k=7 ***
251 reg Exreturn priv staRmrf staHML staSMB telRmrf /*
252 */telHML telSMB PostPriv telMOM staMOM /*
253 */ y00 y01 Statoil Telenor/*
254 */ y02 y03 y04 y05 y06 y07 y08 y09 y10 y11 y12 y13 y14 y15 Jan1 Feb Mar Apr /*
255 */ May Jun Jul Aug Sep Oct Nov Dec, ro
256 estimates store K5
257 outreg2 using Model2, tex append title(Change in State Ownership) ctitle(K=7)keep(priv
PostPriv) nocons addtext( Year Dummy, Yes, Monthly Dummy, Yes, Individual Dummy, Yes,
Fama-French 4 Factor, Yes)
258
259 **** K-days = 10 ****
260 *** Generating the change in ownership variable ***
261 *First divestment Telenor
262 drop Dummy1
263 gen Dummy1= (Date==`=td(30jun2003)' | Date==`=td(01jul2003)' | Date==
`=td(02jul2003)' | Date==`=td(03jul2003)' | Date==`=td(07jul2003)' /*
264 */| Date==`=td(08jul2003)' | Date==`=td(09jul2003)' | Date==`=td(10jul2003)' |
Date==`=td(11jul2003)' | Date==`=td(14jul2003)' & Company=="Telenor")
265
266 *Second divestment Telenor
267 drop Dummy2
268 gen Dummy2= (Date==`=td(30mar2004)' | Date==`=td(31mar2004)' | Date==
`=td(01apr2004)' | Date==`=td(02apr2004)' | Date==`=td(05apr2004)' /*
269 */| Date==`=td(06apr2004)' | Date==`=td(07apr2004)' | Date==`=td(08apr2004)' |
Date==`=td(12apr2004)' | Date==`=td(13apr2004)' & Company=="Telenor")
270
271 *First divestment Statoil
272 drop Dummy3
273 gen Dummy3= (Date==`=td(07jul2004)' | Date==`=td(08jul2004)' | Date==
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`=td(09jul2004)' | Date==`=td(12jul2004)' | Date==`=td(13jul2004)' /*
274 */| Date==`=td(14jul2004)' | Date==`=td(15jul2004)' | Date==`=td(16jul2004)' |
Date==`=td(19jul2004)' | Date==`=td(20jul2004)'& Company=="Statoil")
275
276 *Second divestment Statoil
277 drop Dummy4
278 gen Dummy4= (Date==`=td(17feb2005)' | Date==`=td(18feb2005)' | Date==
`=td(22feb2005)' | Date==`=td(23feb2005)' | Date==`=td(24feb2005)' /*
279 */| Date==`=td(25feb2005)' | Date==`=td(28feb2005)' | Date==`=td(01mar2005)' |
Date==`=td(02feb2005)' | Date==`=td(03feb2005)' & Company=="Statoil")
280
281 *** Generating the average Priv variable ***
282 drop priv
283 gen priv=Dummy1*Change1 + Dummy2*Change2 + Dummy3*Change3 + Dummy4*Change4
284
285 *** Reg k=10 ***
286 reg Exreturn priv staRmrf staHML staSMB telRmrf /*
287 */telHML telSMB PostPriv telMOM staMOM /*
288 */ y00 y01 Statoil Telenor/*
289 */ y02 y03 y04 y05 y06 y07 y08 y09 y10 y11 y12 y13 y14 y15 Jan1 Feb Mar Apr /*
290 */ May Jun Jul Aug Sep Oct Nov Dec, ro
291 estimates store K5
292 outreg2 using Model2, tex append title(Change in State Ownership) ctitle(K=10)keep(
priv PostPriv) nocons addtext( Year Dummy, Yes, Monthly Dummy, Yes, Individual Dummy, Yes,
Fama-French 4 Factor, Yes)
293
294 ********* In-time Placebo test *****
295 *t=-25
296 reg Exreturn f25.priv2 staRmrf staHML staSMB telRmrf /*
297 */telHML telSMB PostPriv telMOM staMOM /*
298 */ y00 y01 Statoil Telenor/*
299 */ y02 y03 y04 y05 y06 y07 y08 y09 y10 y11 y12 y13 y14 y15 Jan1 Feb Mar Apr /*
300 */ May Jun Jul Aug Sep Oct Nov Dec, ro
301 estimates store tmin25
302 outreg2 using placebo, tex replace title(In-Time shifted Placebos) ctitle(t=-25)keep(
f25.priv2) nocons
303 *t=-20
304 reg Exreturn f20.priv2 staRmrf staHML staSMB telRmrf /*
305 */telHML telSMB PostPriv telMOM staMOM /*
306 */ y00 y01 Statoil Telenor/*
307 */ y02 y03 y04 y05 y06 y07 y08 y09 y10 y11 y12 y13 y14 y15 Jan1 Feb Mar Apr /*
308 */ May Jun Jul Aug Sep Oct Nov Dec, ro
309 estimates store tmin20
310 outreg2 using placebo, tex append title(In-Time shifted Placebos) ctitle(t=-20)keep(
f20.priv2) nocons
311 *t=-15
312 reg Exreturn f15.priv2 staRmrf staHML staSMB telRmrf /*
313 */telHML telSMB PostPriv telMOM staMOM /*
314 */ y00 y01 Statoil Telenor/*
315 */ y02 y03 y04 y05 y06 y07 y08 y09 y10 y11 y12 y13 y14 y15 Jan1 Feb Mar Apr /*
316 */ May Jun Jul Aug Sep Oct Nov Dec, ro
317 estimates store tmin15
318 outreg2 using placebo, tex append title(In-Time shifted Placebos) ctitle(t=-15)keep(
f15.priv2) nocons
319 *t=-10
320 reg Exreturn f10.priv2 staRmrf staHML staSMB telRmrf /*
321 */telHML telSMB PostPriv telMOM staMOM /*
322 */ y00 y01 Statoil Telenor/*
323 */ y02 y03 y04 y05 y06 y07 y08 y09 y10 y11 y12 y13 y14 y15 Jan1 Feb Mar Apr /*
324 */ May Jun Jul Aug Sep Oct Nov Dec, ro
325 estimates store tmin10
326 outreg2 using placebo, tex append title(In-Time shifted Placebos) ctitle(t=-10)keep(
f10.priv2) nocons
327 *t=-5
328 reg Exreturn f5.priv2 staRmrf staHML staSMB telRmrf /*
329 */telHML telSMB PostPriv telMOM staMOM /*
330 */ y00 y01 Statoil Telenor/*
331 */ y02 y03 y04 y05 y06 y07 y08 y09 y10 y11 y12 y13 y14 y15 Jan1 Feb Mar Apr /*
332 */ May Jun Jul Aug Sep Oct Nov Dec, ro
333 estimates store tmin5
334 outreg2 using placebo, tex append title(In-Time shifted Placebos) ctitle(t=-5)keep(f5.
priv2) nocons
335 *t=0
336 reg Exreturn priv2 staRmrf staHML staSMB telRmrf /*
337 */telHML telSMB PostPriv telMOM staMOM /*
338 */ y00 y01 Statoil Telenor/*
339 */ y02 y03 y04 y05 y06 y07 y08 y09 y10 y11 y12 y13 y14 y15 Jan1 Feb Mar Apr /*
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340 */ May Jun Jul Aug Sep Oct Nov Dec, ro
341 estimates store tmin0
342 outreg2 using placebo, tex append title(In-Time shifted Placebos) ctitle(t=0)keep(
priv2) nocons
343 *t=+5
344 reg Exreturn l5.priv2 staRmrf staHML staSMB telRmrf /*
345 */telHML telSMB PostPriv telMOM staMOM /*
346 */ y00 y01 Statoil Telenor/*
347 */ y02 y03 y04 y05 y06 y07 y08 y09 y10 y11 y12 y13 y14 y15 Jan1 Feb Mar Apr /*
348 */ May Jun Jul Aug Sep Oct Nov Dec, ro
349 estimates store tplu5
350 outreg2 using placebo, tex append title(In-Time shifted Placebos) ctitle(t=+5)keep(l5.
priv2) nocons
351 *t=+10
352 reg Exreturn l10.priv2 staRmrf staHML staSMB telRmrf /*
353 */telHML telSMB PostPriv telMOM staMOM /*
354 */ y00 y01 Statoil Telenor/*
355 */ y02 y03 y04 y05 y06 y07 y08 y09 y10 y11 y12 y13 y14 y15 Jan1 Feb Mar Apr /*
356 */ May Jun Jul Aug Sep Oct Nov Dec, ro
357 estimates store tplu10
358 outreg2 using placebo, tex append title(In-Time shifted Placebos) ctitle(t=+10)keep(
l10.priv2) nocons
359 *t=+15
360 reg Exreturn l15.priv2 staRmrf staHML staSMB telRmrf /*
361 */telHML telSMB PostPriv telMOM staMOM /*
362 */ y00 y01 Statoil Telenor/*
363 */ y02 y03 y04 y05 y06 y07 y08 y09 y10 y11 y12 y13 y14 y15 Jan1 Feb Mar Apr /*
364 */ May Jun Jul Aug Sep Oct Nov Dec, ro
365 estimates store tplu15
366 outreg2 using placebo, tex append title(In-Time shifted Placebos) ctitle(t=+15)keep(
l15.priv2) nocons
367 *t=+20
368 reg Exreturn l20.priv2 staRmrf staHML staSMB telRmrf /*
369 */telHML telSMB PostPriv telMOM staMOM /*
370 */ y00 y01 Statoil Telenor/*
371 */ y02 y03 y04 y05 y06 y07 y08 y09 y10 y11 y12 y13 y14 y15 Jan1 Feb Mar Apr /*
372 */ May Jun Jul Aug Sep Oct Nov Dec, ro
373 estimates store tplu20
374 outreg2 using placebo, tex append title(In-Time shifted Placebos) ctitle(t=+20)keep(
l20.priv2) nocons
375 *t=+25
376 reg Exreturn l25.priv2 staRmrf staHML staSMB telRmrf /*
377 */telHML telSMB PostPriv telMOM staMOM /*
378 */ y00 y01 Statoil Telenor/*
379 */ y02 y03 y04 y05 y06 y07 y08 y09 y10 y11 y12 y13 y14 y15 Jan1 Feb Mar Apr /*
380 */ May Jun Jul Aug Sep Oct Nov Dec, ro
381 estimates store tplu25
382 outreg2 using placebo, tex append title(In-Time shifted Placebos) ctitle(t=+25)keep(
l25.priv2) nocons
383
synth telenor nedsalg 1 sensor - Printed on 14.12.2015 17:26:56
Page 1
1
2 ******** Synthetic Control Group Method *******
3
4 ******* Telenor: Divestment 1 *******
5 import excel "C:\Users\Thomas Kringlebu\Dropbox\Masteroppgave\Sluttfase\Datasett\Model3
telenor.xlsx", sheet("Telenor") cellrange(D3:j28647) firstrow clear
6 cd "C:\Users\Thomas Kringlebu\Dropbox\Masteroppgave\Sluttfase\output stata"
7
8 encode (Company), gen(Company1)
9
10 *** Deleting all observation, without 30 observations prior/after the event****
11 tabulate (Company1)
12 drop if Date<`=td(16may2003)' | Date>`=td(12aug2003)'
13 tsset Company1 Date
14 label drop Company1
15
16 *** Running the Synth package***
17 synth Return Rmrf SMB HML Mom, trunit(5) trperiod(`=td(30jun2003)') fig keep(tele1,
replace)
18
19 ** Graphing the differences between synth and treatment firm**
20 use tele1, clear
21 gen diff = _Y_treated - _Y_synthetic
22
23 rename _time Date
24 format Date %td
25 drop if missing(Date)
26 local lp `lp' line diff Date, lcolor(gs12) ||
27
28 **** Graph the difference ****
29 twoway `lp' || line diff Date, ///
30 lcolor(orange) legend(off) xline(`=td(27jun2003)', lpattern(dash) lcolor(grey)) xlabel
(`=td(16may2003)'(30)`=td(12aug2003)') title("First Divestment in Telenor")
31 *Note: We use the day before the execution date to draw the vertical line
representing the event, because the graph draws the line at the end of date.
32 graph save "Telenor1diff", replace
33 graph export "Telenor1diff.png", replace
34
35 *** Post/pre ratio ***
36 gen diff2=diff^2
37 sum diff2 if Date<(`=td(30jun2003)'), meanonly
38 mat t1=(r(mean))^0.5
39 sum diff2 if Date>(`=td(30jun2003)'), meanonly
40 mat t2=(r(mean))^0.5
41 loc names "diff"
42 mat t3=t2[1,1] / t1[1,1]
43 matlist t3
44
45 ********* Placebo Analysis***********************
46 import excel "C:\Users\Thomas Kringlebu\Dropbox\Masteroppgave\Sluttfase\Datasett\Model3
telenor.xlsx", sheet("Telenor") cellrange(D3:j28647) firstrow clear
47 cd "C:\Users\Thomas Kringlebu\Dropbox\Masteroppgave\Sluttfase\output stata"
48
49 encode (Company), gen(Company1)
50
51 *** Preparing the dataset ***
52 tabulate (Company1)
53 drop if Date<`=td(16may2003)' | Date>`=td(12aug2003)'
54 tsset Company1 Date
55 label drop Company1
56
57 *** Iterative Program for Placebo test ***
58 forval i=1/7 {
59 qui synth Return Rmrf SMB HML Mom, trunit(`i') trperiod(`=td(30jun2003)') fig
keep(placebo_`i', replace)
60 }
61
62 forval i=1/7{
63 use placebo_`i', clear
64 rename _time Date
65 gen diff`i' = _Y_treated - _Y_synthetic
66 keep Date diff`i'
67 drop if missing(Date)
68 save placebo_`i', replace
69 }
70
71 *** Merging all placebo effects into one graph ***
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72 use placebo_1, clear
73 forval i=2/7{
74 qui merge 1:1 Date using placebo_`i', nogenerate
75 }
76 local lp
77 forval i=1/7 {
78 local lp `lp' line diff`i' Date, lcolor(gs12) ||
79 }
80
81 *** Creating the merged graph ***
82 format Date %td
83 twoway `lp' || line diff5 Date, ///
84 lcolor(orange) legend(off) xline(`=td(27jun2003)', lpattern(dash) lcolor(grey)) xlabel
(`=td(16may2003)'(30)`=td(12aug2003)') title("First Divestment in Telenor")
85 graph save "Telenor1placebo", replace
86 graph export "Telenor1placebo.png", replace
87
88 ********'' Post/Pre ratio************
89 import excel "C:\Users\Thomas Kringlebu\Dropbox\Masteroppgave\Sluttfase\Datasett\Model3
telenor.xlsx", sheet("Telenor") cellrange(D3:j28647) firstrow clear
90 cd "C:\Users\Thomas Kringlebu\Dropbox\Masteroppgave\Sluttfase\output stata"
91
92 encode (Company), gen(Company1)
93
94 *** Preparing the dataset ***
95 tabulate (Company1)
96 drop if Date<`=td(16may2003)' | Date>`=td(02jul2003)'
97 tsset Company1 Date
98 label drop Company1
99
100 *** Iterative Program for Post/Pre ratio test ***
101 forval i=1/7 {
102 qui synth Return Rmrf SMB HML Mom, trunit(`i') trperiod(`=td(30jun2003)') fig
keep(placebo_`i', replace)
103 }
104
105 tempname resmat
106 forval i=1/7{
107 use placebo_`i', clear
108 rename _time Date
109 gen diff`i' = _Y_treated - _Y_synthetic
110 gen diff2`i'=diff`i'^2
111 sum diff2`i' if Date<(`=td(30jun2003)'), meanonly
112 mat t1=(r(mean))^0.5
113
114 sum diff2`i' if Date>=(`=td(30jun2003)'), meanonly
115 mat t2=(r(mean))^0.5
116 mat t3=t2[1,1]/t1[1,1]
117 matrix `resmat' = nullmat(`resmat') \ t3
118 local names `"`names' `"`i'"'"'
119 }
120 mat colnames `resmat' = "ratio"
121 mat rownames `resmat' = `names'
122 matlist `resmat' , row("Unit")
123 svmat `resmat', names(RMSPEratio)
124
125 generate str var9 = "TDC" in 1
126 replace var9 = "Tele2" in 2
127 replace var9 = "Telecom Italia" in 3
128 replace var9 = "Telefonica" in 4
129 replace var9 = "Telenor" in 5
130 replace var9 = "United Internet" in 6
131 replace var9 = "Vodafone" in 7
132 rename var9 Company
133 encode (Company), gen(Company1)
134 scatter RMSPEratio1 Company1, xlabel(1 2 3 4 5 6 7, valuelabel angle(90)) title(
"First Divestment in Telenor")
135 graph save "Telenor1ratio", replace
136 graph export "Telenor1ratio.png", replace
137
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1
2 ******** Synthetic Control Group Method *******
3
4 ******* Telenor: Divestment 2 *******
5 import excel "C:\Users\Thomas Kringlebu\Dropbox\Masteroppgave\Sluttfase\Datasett\Model3
telenor.xlsx", sheet("Telenor") cellrange(D3:j28647) firstrow clear
6 cd "C:\Users\Thomas Kringlebu\Dropbox\Masteroppgave\Sluttfase\output stata"
7
8 encode (Company), gen(Company1)
9
10 *** Deleting all observation, without 30 observations prior/after the event****
11 tsset Company1 Date
12 tabulate (Company1)
13 drop if Date<`=td(13feb2004)' | Date>`=td(11may2004)'
14 tsset Company1 Date
15 label drop Company1
16
17 *** Running the Synth package***
18 synth Return Rmrf SMB HML Mom, trunit(5) trperiod(`=td(30mar2004)') fig keep(tele2,
replace)
19
20 ** Graphing the differences between synth and treatment firm**
21 use tele2, clear
22 gen diff = _Y_treated - _Y_synthetic
23 rename _time Date
24 format Date %td
25 drop if missing(Date)
26 local lp `lp' line diff Date, lcolor(gs12) ||
27
28 **** Graph the difference ****
29 twoway `lp' || line diff Date, ///
30 lcolor(orange) legend(off) xline(`=td(29mar2004)', lpattern(dash) lcolor(grey)) xlabel
(`=td(13feb2004)'(30)`=td(11may2004)') title("Second Divestment in Telenor")
31 *Note: We use the day before the execution date to draw the vertical line
representing the event, because the graph draws the line at the end of date.
32 graph save "Telenor2diff", replace
33 graph export "Telenor2diff.png", replace
34
35 *** Post/pre ratio ***
36 gen diff2=diff^2
37 sum diff2 if Date<(`=td(30mar2004)'), meanonly
38 mat t1=(r(mean))^0.5
39 sum diff2 if Date>(`=td(30mar2004)'), meanonly
40 mat t2=(r(mean))^0.5
41 loc names "diff"
42 mat t3=t2[1,1] / t1[1,1]
43 matlist t3
44
45 ********* Placebo Analysis***********************
46 import excel "C:\Users\Thomas Kringlebu\Dropbox\Masteroppgave\Sluttfase\Datasett\Model3
telenor.xlsx", sheet("Telenor") cellrange(D3:j28647) firstrow clear
47 cd "C:\Users\Thomas Kringlebu\Dropbox\Masteroppgave\Sluttfase\output stata"
48
49 encode (Company), gen(Company1)
50
51 *** Preparing the dataset ***
52 tabulate (Company1)
53 drop if Date<`=td(13feb2004)' | Date>`=td(11may2004)'
54 tsset Company1 Date
55 label drop Company1
56
57 *** Iterative Program for Placebo test ***
58 forval i=1/7 {
59 qui synth Return Rmrf SMB HML Mom, trunit(`i') trperiod(`=td(30mar2004)') fig
keep(placebo_`i', replace)
60 }
61
62 forval i=1/7{
63 use placebo_`i', clear
64 rename _time Date
65 gen diff`i' = _Y_treated - _Y_synthetic
66 keep Date diff`i'
67 drop if missing(Date)
68 save placebo_`i', replace
69 }
70
71 *** Merging all placebo effects into one graph ***
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72 use placebo_1, clear
73 forval i=2/7{
74 qui merge 1:1 Date using placebo_`i', nogenerate
75 }
76 local lp
77 forval i=1/7 {
78 local lp `lp' line diff`i' Date, lcolor(gs12) ||
79 }
80
81 *** Creating the merged graph ***
82 format Date %td
83 twoway `lp' || line diff5 Date, ///
84 lcolor(orange) legend(off) xline(`=td(29mar2004)', lpattern(dash) lcolor(grey)) xlabel
(`=td(13feb2004)'(30)`=td(11may2004)') title("Second Divestment in Telenor")
85 graph save "Telenor2placebo", replace
86 graph export "Telenor2placebo.png", replace
87
88 ******** Post/Pre ratio ************
89 import excel "C:\Users\Thomas Kringlebu\Dropbox\Masteroppgave\Sluttfase\Datasett\Model3
telenor.xlsx", sheet("Telenor") cellrange(D3:j28647) firstrow clear
90 cd "C:\Users\Thomas Kringlebu\Dropbox\Masteroppgave\Sluttfase\output stata"
91
92 encode (Company), gen(Company1)
93
94 *** Preparing the dataset ***
95 tabulate (Company1)
96 drop if Date<`=td(13feb2004)' | Date>`=td(01apr2004)'
97 tsset Company1 Date
98 label drop Company1
99
100 *** Iterative Program for Post/Pre ratio test ***
101 forval i=1/7 {
102 qui synth Return Rmrf SMB HML Mom, trunit(`i') trperiod(`=td(30mar2004)') fig
keep(placebo_`i', replace)
103 }
104
105 tempname resmat
106 forval i=1/7{
107 use placebo_`i', clear
108 rename _time Date
109 gen diff`i' = _Y_treated - _Y_synthetic
110 gen diff2`i'=diff`i'^2
111 sum diff2`i' if Date<(`=td(30mar2004)'), meanonly
112 mat t1=(r(mean))^0.5
113
114 sum diff2`i' if Date>=(`=td(30mar2004)'), meanonly
115 mat t2=(r(mean))^0.5
116 mat t3=t2[1,1]/t1[1,1]
117 matrix `resmat' = nullmat(`resmat') \ t3
118 local names `"`names' `"`i'"'"'
119 }
120 mat colnames `resmat' = "ratio"
121 mat rownames `resmat' = `names'
122 matlist `resmat' , row("Unit")
123 svmat `resmat', names(RMSPEratio)
124
125 generate str var9 = "TDC" in 1
126 replace var9 = "Tele2" in 2
127 replace var9 = "Telecom Italia" in 3
128 replace var9 = "Telefonica" in 4
129 replace var9 = "Telenor" in 5
130 replace var9 = "United Internet" in 6
131 replace var9 = "Vodafone" in 7
132 rename var9 Company
133 encode (Company), gen(Company1)
134 scatter RMSPEratio1 Company1, xlabel(1 2 3 4 5 6 7, valuelabel angle(90)) title(
"Second Divestment in Telenor")
135 graph save "Telenor2ratio", replace
136 graph export "Telenor2ratio.png", replace
137
138
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1
2 ******** Synthetic Control Group Method *******
3
4 ******* Statoil: Divestment 1 *******
5 import excel "C:\Users\Thomas Kringlebu\Dropbox\Masteroppgave\Sluttfase\Datasett\Model3
statoil.xlsx", sheet("Sheet1") cellrange(D2:j36830) firstrow clear
6 cd "C:\Users\Thomas Kringlebu\Dropbox\Masteroppgave\Sluttfase\output stata"
7
8 encode (Company), gen(Company1)
9
10 *** Deleting all observation, without 30 observations prior/after the event****
11 tsset Company1 Date
12 tabulate (Company1)
13 drop if Date<`=td(21may2004)' | Date>`=td(19aug2004)'
14 tsset Company1 Date
15 label drop Company1
16
17 *** Running the Synth package***
18 synth Return Rmrf SMB HML Mom, trunit(8) trperiod(`=td(07jul2004)') fig keep(stat1,
replace)
19
20 ** Graphing the differences between synth and treatment firm**
21 use stat1, clear
22 gen diff = _Y_treated - _Y_synthetic
23
24 rename _time Date
25 format Date %td
26 drop if missing(Date)
27 local lp `lp' line diff Date, lcolor(gs12) ||
28
29 **** Graph the difference ****
30 twoway `lp' || line diff Date, ///
31 lcolor(orange) legend(off) xline(`=td(06jul2004)', lpattern(dash) lcolor(grey)) xlabel
(`=td(21may2004)'(30)`=td(19aug2004)') title("First Divestment in Statoil")
32 *Note: We use the day before the execution date to draw the vertical line
representing the event, because the graph draws the line at the end of date.
33 graph save "Statoil1diff", replace
34 graph export "Statoil1diff.png", replace
35
36 *** Post/pre ratio ***
37 gen diff2=diff^2
38 sum diff2 if Date<(`=td(07jul2004)'), meanonly
39 mat t1=(r(mean))^0.5
40 sum diff2 if Date>(`=td(07jul2004)'), meanonly
41 mat t2=(r(mean))^0.5
42 loc names "diff"
43 mat t3=t2[1,1] / t1[1,1]
44 matlist t3
45
46 ********* Placebo Analysis***********************
47 import excel "C:\Users\Thomas
Kringlebu\Dropbox\Masteroppgave\Sluttfase\Datasett\Model3 statoil.xlsx", sheet("Sheet1")
cellrange(D2:j36830) firstrow clear
48 cd "C:\Users\Thomas Kringlebu\Dropbox\Masteroppgave\Sluttfase\output stata"
49
50 encode (Company), gen(Company1)
51
52 *** Preparing the dataset ***
53 tsset Company1 Date
54 tabulate (Company1)
55 drop if Date<`=td(21may2004)' | Date>`=td(19aug2004)'
56 tsset Company1 Date
57 label drop Company1
58
59 *** Iterative Program for Placebo test ***
60 forval i=1/9 {
61 qui synth Return Rmrf SMB HML Mom, trunit(`i') trperiod(`=td(07jul2004)') fig
keep(placebo_`i', replace)
62 }
63
64 forval i=1/9{
65 use placebo_`i', clear
66 rename _time Date
67 gen diff`i' = _Y_treated - _Y_synthetic
68 keep Date diff`i'
69 drop if missing(Date)
70 save placebo_`i', replace
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71 }
72
73 *** Merging all placebo effects into one graph ***
74 use placebo_1, clear
75 forval i=2/9{
76 qui merge 1:1 Date using placebo_`i', nogenerate
77 }
78 local lp
79 forval i=1/9 {
80 local lp `lp' line diff`i' Date, lcolor(gs12) ||
81 }
82
83 *** Creating the merged graph ***
84 format Date %td
85 twoway `lp' || line diff8 Date, ///
86 lcolor(orange) legend(off) xline(`=td(06jul2004)', lpattern(dash) lcolor(grey)) xlabel
(`=td(21may2004)'(30)`=td(19aug2004)') title("First Divestment in Statoil")
87 graph save "Statoil1placebo", replace
88 graph export "Statoil1placebo.png", replace
89
90
91 ********'' Post/Pre ratio************
92 import excel "C:\Users\Thomas
Kringlebu\Dropbox\Masteroppgave\Sluttfase\Datasett\Model3 statoil.xlsx", sheet("Sheet1")
cellrange(D2:j36830) firstrow clear
93 cd "C:\Users\Thomas Kringlebu\Dropbox\Masteroppgave\Sluttfase\output stata"
94
95 encode (Company), gen(Company1)
96
97 *** Preparing the dataset ***
98 tsset Company1 Date
99 tabulate (Company1)
100 drop if Date<`=td(21may2004)' | Date>`=td(09jul2004)'
101 tsset Company1 Date
102 label drop Company1
103
104 *** Iterative Program for Post/Pre ratio test ***
105 forval i=1/9 {
106 qui synth Return Rmrf SMB HML Mom, trunit(`i') trperiod(`=td(07jul2004)') fig
keep(placebo_`i', replace)
107 }
108
109 tempname resmat
110 forval i=1/9{
111 use placebo_`i', clear
112 rename _time Date
113 gen diff`i' = _Y_treated - _Y_synthetic
114 gen diff2`i'=diff`i'^2
115 sum diff2`i' if Date<(`=td(07jul2004)'), meanonly
116 mat t1=(r(mean))^0.5
117
118 sum diff2`i' if Date>=(`=td(07jul2004)'), meanonly
119 mat t2=(r(mean))^0.5
120 mat t3=t2[1,1]/t1[1,1]
121 matrix `resmat' = nullmat(`resmat') \ t3
122 local names `"`names' `"`i'"'"'
123 }
124 mat colnames `resmat' = "ratio"
125 mat rownames `resmat' = `names'
126 matlist `resmat' , row("Unit")
127 svmat `resmat', names(RMSPEratio)
128
129 generate str var9 = "BP" in 1
130 replace var9 = "Cameron" in 2
131 replace var9 = "Chevron" in 3
132 replace var9 = "ConocoPhilips" in 4
133 replace var9 = "Exxon" in 5
134 replace var9 = "Repsol" in 6
135 replace var9 = "Shell" in 7
136 replace var9 = "Statoil" in 8
137 replace var9 = "Total" in 9
138 rename var9 Company
139 encode (Company), gen(Company1)
140 scatter RMSPEratio1 Company1, xlabel(1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9, valuelabel angle(90)) title(
"First Divestment in Statoil")
141 graph save "Statoil1ratio", replace
142 graph export "Statoil1ratio.png", replace
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1
2 ******* Synthetic Control Group Method *******
3
4 ******* Statoil: Divestment 2 *******
5 import excel "C:\Users\Thomas Kringlebu\Dropbox\Masteroppgave\Sluttfase\Datasett\Model3
statoil.xlsx", sheet("Sheet1") cellrange(D2:j36830) firstrow clear
6 cd "C:\Users\Thomas Kringlebu\Dropbox\Masteroppgave\Sluttfase\output stata"
7
8 encode (Company), gen(Company1)
9
10 *** Deleting all observation, without 30 observations prior/after the event****
11 tabulate (Company1)
12 drop if Date<`=td(04jan2005)' | Date>`=td(01apr2005)'
13 tsset Company1 Date
14 label drop Company1
15
16 *** Running the Synth package***
17 synth Return Rmrf SMB HML Mom, trunit(8) trperiod(`=td(17feb2005)') fig keep(stat2,
replace)
18
19 ** Graphing the differences between synth and treatment firm**
20 use stat2, clear
21 gen diff = _Y_treated - _Y_synthetic
22
23 rename _time Date
24 format Date %td
25 drop if missing(Date)
26 local lp `lp' line diff Date, lcolor(gs12) ||
27
28 **** Graph the difference ****
29 twoway `lp' || line diff Date, ///
30 lcolor(orange) legend(off) xline(`=td(16feb2005)', lpattern(dash) lcolor(grey)) title(
"Second Divestment in Statoil")
31 *Note: We use the day before the execution date to draw the vertical line
representing the event, because the graph draws the line at the end of date.
32 graph save "Statoil2diff", replace
33 graph export "Statoil2diff.png", replace
34
35 *** Post/pre ratio ***
36 gen diff2=diff^2
37 sum diff2 if Date<(`=td(16feb2005)'), meanonly
38 mat t1=(r(mean))^0.5
39 sum diff2 if Date>(`=td(16feb2005)'), meanonly
40 mat t2=(r(mean))^0.5
41 loc names "diff"
42 mat t3=t2[1,1] / t1[1,1]
43 matlist t3
44
45 ********* Placebo Analysis***********************
46 import excel "C:\Users\Thomas
Kringlebu\Dropbox\Masteroppgave\Sluttfase\Datasett\Model3 statoil.xlsx", sheet("Sheet1")
cellrange(D2:j36830) firstrow clear
47 cd "C:\Users\Thomas Kringlebu\Dropbox\Masteroppgave\Sluttfase\output stata"
48
49 *** Preparing the dataset ***
50 encode (Company), gen(Company1)
51 tsset Company1 Date
52 tabulate (Company1)
53 drop if Date<`=td(04jan2005)' | Date>`=td(01apr2005)'
54 label drop Company1
55
56 *** Iterative Program for Placebo test ***
57 forval i=1/9 {
58 qui synth Return Rmrf SMB HML Mom, trunit(`i') trperiod(`=td(16feb2005)') fig
keep(placebo_`i', replace)
59 }
60
61 forval i=1/9{
62 use placebo_`i', clear
63 rename _time Date
64 gen diff`i' = _Y_treated - _Y_synthetic
65 keep Date diff`i'
66 drop if missing(Date)
67 save placebo_`i', replace
68 }
69
70 *** Merging all placebo effects into one graph ***
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72 use placebo_1, clear
73 forval i=2/9{
74 qui merge 1:1 Date using placebo_`i', nogenerate
75 }
76 local lp
77 forval i=1/9 {
78 local lp `lp' line diff`i' Date, lcolor(gs12) ||
79 }
80
81 *** Creating the merged graph ***
82 format Date %td
83 twoway `lp' || line diff8 Date, ///
84 lcolor(orange) legend(off) xline(`=td(16feb2005)', lpattern(dash) lcolor(grey)) title(
"Second Divestment in Statoil")
85 graph save "Statoil2placebo", replace
86 graph export "Statoil2placebo.png", replace
87
88 ********'' Post/Pre ratio************
89 import excel "C:\Users\Thomas
Kringlebu\Dropbox\Masteroppgave\Sluttfase\Datasett\Model3 statoil.xlsx", sheet("Sheet1")
cellrange(D2:j36830) firstrow clear
90 cd "C:\Users\Thomas Kringlebu\Dropbox\Masteroppgave\Sluttfase\output stata"
91
92 *** Preparing the dataset ***
93 encode (Company), gen(Company1)
94 tsset Company1 Date
95 tabulate (Company1)
96 drop if Date<`=td(04jan2005)' | Date>`=td(22feb2005)'
97 label drop Company1
98
99 *** Iterative Program for Post/Pre ratio test ***
100 forval i=1/9 {
101 qui synth Return Rmrf SMB HML Mom, trunit(`i') trperiod(`=td(17feb2005)') fig
keep(placebo_`i', replace)
102 }
103
104 tempname resmat
105 forval i=1/9{
106 use placebo_`i', clear
107 rename _time Date
108 gen diff`i' = _Y_treated - _Y_synthetic
109 gen diff2`i'=diff`i'^2
110 sum diff2`i' if Date<(`=td(17feb2005)'), meanonly
111 mat t1=(r(mean))^0.5
112
113 sum diff2`i' if Date>=(`=td(17feb2005)'), meanonly
114 mat t2=(r(mean))^0.5
115 mat t3=t2[1,1]/t1[1,1]
116 matrix `resmat' = nullmat(`resmat') \ t3
117 local names `"`names' `"`i'"'"'
118 }
119 mat colnames `resmat' = "ratio"
120 mat rownames `resmat' = `names'
121 matlist `resmat' , row("Unit")
122 svmat `resmat', names(RMSPEratio)
123
124 generate str var9 = "BP" in 1
125 replace var9 = "Cameron" in 2
126 replace var9 = "Chevron" in 3
127 replace var9 = "ConocoPhilips" in 4
128 replace var9 = "Exxon" in 5
129 replace var9 = "Repsol" in 6
130 replace var9 = "Shell" in 7
131 replace var9 = "Statoil" in 8
132 replace var9 = "Total" in 9
133 rename var9 Company
134 encode (Company), gen(Company1)
135 scatter RMSPEratio1 Company1, xlabel(1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9, valuelabel angle(90)) title(
"Second Divestment in Statoil")
136 graph save "Statoil2ratio", replace
137 graph export "Statoil2ratio.png", replace
138
139 *** Merging the three grapfs for all four divestments into three graphs ***
140 graph combine "Telenor1ratio" "Telenor2ratio" "Statoil1ratio" "Statoil2ratio", cols(2)
title("Post/Pre RMPSE-Ratio")
141 graph export "PostPreratio.png", replace
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142 graph combine "Telenor1placebo" "Telenor2placebo" "Statoil1placebo" "Statoil2placebo",
cols(2) title("In-Space Placebo Test")
143 graph export "Placebo.png", replace
144 graph combine "Telenor1diff" "Telenor2diff" "Statoil1diff" "Statoil2diff", cols(2)
title("Treated - Synthetic")
145 graph export "Diff.png", replace
146
147
